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The objective of the legality principle is to promote autonomy by providing 
individuals with opportunities to plan courses of conduct free from state intrusion. If 
precise rules are not prescribed in advance, individuals may lack notice of what is 
prohibited and may be subjected to arbitrary treatment. Thus, the Constitution 
commands that legal officials honor formal terms of engagement and limit enforcement 
efforts to narrowly defined crimes. But, under pressing conditions, the prevailing rules 
may prove too rigid, compelling courts to carve out post hoc exceptions. As a matter of 
practice, these exceptions tend to operate asymmetrically—benefiting the state only. 
This Article uses Fourth Amendment doctrine to examine that asymmetry. 
I coin the term “meaningful understanding” to describe the functional Fourth 
Amendment methodology by which courts sometimes accommodate law-enforcement 
needs, fears, and even mistakes. The enterprise is admirable, but there is a dark side: 
a judge cannot understand meaningfully a reasonable officer in his particular situation 
without concurrently tolerating an otherwise impermissible intrusion upon autonomy. 
The officer enjoys a piecemeal exception that the individual experiences as a piecemeal 
(and often unanticipated) burden. In this way, meaningful understanding works to 
excuse unexpected coercion. The individual is left unfairly surprised—unable to plan 
a law-abiding life consistent with the promise of the legality principle. 
This troubling state of affairs arises most often in the context of order-maintenance 
policing. Street encounters are fast-moving and understandably unpredictable. In 
such circumstances, officers may end up deviating unforeseeably from the usual rules, 
confounding the capacity of pedestrians and motorists to comprehend the scope of state 
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power and the quality of individual rights. We need not look far to find tragic real 
world examples. I discuss several, including the traffic stop and arrest of Sandra 
Bland, a motorist whose subsequent death in a jail cell became a focus of the legal 
and social justice movement known as “Black Lives Matter.” 
The jurisprudential path forward, however, is not to command greater fidelity to 
formal Fourth Amendment rules, but instead to try within limits to understand much 
more. In this vein, Jeremy Waldron has described a “procedural” conception of 
legality, characterized by “modes of argumentation” capacious enough to bring all 
reasonable sides of the story to bear. The goal is ambitious. But the Article concludes 
with a modest and viable set of doctrinal reforms to better pursue meaningful 
understanding—articulated and evaluated bilaterally. 
 
It wasn’t only wickedness and scheming that made people unhappy, it was confusion 
and misunderstanding; above all, it was the failure to grasp the simple truth that other 
people are as real as you. And only in a story could you enter these different minds 
and show how they had an equal value. That was the only moral a story need have. 
IAN MCEWAN, ATONEMENT (2001) 
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INTRODUCTION 
I like to ride my bike on the sidewalk, to let my dog run free, to spend warm 
afternoons in the park with a cold beer. But, obviously, I may not be allowed to 
do these things. The state manages my existence in public spaces. It picks sides. 
By constraining my autonomy to do what I want to do with my bike, pet, and 
intoxicants, the state has created an environment in which another individual 
may enjoy the outdoors without dodging dogs and bikes, without smelling stale 
beer. This is the story of order-maintenance enforcement.1 As the name 
implies, it is a story of state ordering. The state forces me to trade disordered 
autonomy for engineered autonomy—autonomy within state bounds.2 
In a liberal criminal justice system, the exchange may be considered fair 
enough, even before we appeal to some invented notion of the social 
contract.3 Liberalism presupposes certain checks on the manner by which the 
state manufactures order—checks intended to ensure, at a minimum, that 
offenses are promulgated and enacted prospectively and plainly.4 The 
objective, here, is not only to provide the public with notice of proscribed 
conduct but also to limit the state’s arbitrary exercises of power.5 
The principle of legality is the name given to this requirement that 
offenses be previously and precisely defined. In our criminal justice system, 
it finds expression through a series of “bulwarks” designed to promote notice 
and to protect against arbitrary and capricious enforcement—constitutional 
 
1 On order-maintenance enforcement, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF 
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2005); Josh Bowers, Grassroots 
Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007) [hereinafter Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining]; Josh 
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1655 (2010) [hereinafter Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence]; Josh Bowers & Paul H. 
Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and 
Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211 (2012). 
2 See RICHARD BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 41 (4th ed. 2015) (“At the level of societal 
organization, Enlightenment thought emphasized . . . [that t]he state owed its authority to the 
aggregate surrenders of individual freedom necessary to the formation of the social compact. 
Everyone gave up some freedom in order to secure the benefits of an ordered society.”); cf. infra 
notes 47, 52–55 and accompanying text (defining individual autonomy as the capacity of the 
individual to predict, plan, and live according to her own reasons). 
3 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, ch. XIV, para. 7 (1651) (discussing obligations that arise 
from the social contract); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971) (describing the 
formation of a social contract). But see Rolf Sartorius, Political Authority and Political Obligation, 67 
VA. L. REV. 3, 12 (1981) (“As an account of the putative foundation of political obligation . . . any 
theory of an implied social contract must fail.”). 
4 See infra notes 46–53, 61–64, 114, and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 26, 41-42, 113, 127, 295, 385, 431, and accompanying text (discussing the 
conventional perspective that formalism best checks arbitrary exercises of power). 
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rules against, for instance, ex post facto laws and vague offenses.6 The rule of 
lenity may also be understood as legality’s effort—in the face of 
constitutionally tolerable statutory ambiguity—to give the benefit of the 
doubt to the individual whose liberty is threatened by conviction and 
punishment. Even burdens of proof (and the presumption of innocence more 
generally) operate on a like notion that—unless and until the state can 
demonstrate otherwise—the rights of the individual against the coercion of 
the criminal law ought to trump the instrumental needs of the state.7 
Of course, this idea of notice is no more than a fiction for a number of well-
examined reasons. Holmes’ “bad man” does not pore over penal codes,8 and 
public-order offenses are mala prohibita only.9 Accordingly, even the “good” 
man—the man who wishes only to do the right thing—may lack “social duty” 
notice that the state has proscribed criminally some instance of state-
determined disorderly conduct.10 When it comes to public-order offenses, the 
notion that “everyone is presumed to know the law” carries comparatively less 
 
6 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1884); see also HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL SANCTION 93 (1968) (“The devices worked out by the courts to keep the principle of legality in 
good repair comprise a cluster of doctrines that give the criminal law much of its distinctive content.”). 
7 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 109-10 (2004) (describing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a constraint 
on government power); see also Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 280 (2002) 
(“The presumption of innocence determines the allowed limits of interference by the State in the 
autonomy of an individual . . . .”). 
My project is non-consequential. I am concerned with the legality principle and the judge’s 
obligation to administer it. Accordingly, I bracket the empirical question of whether order-
maintenance policing works either to promote public safety and order or to counteract more 
serious crime. As the debate over broken-windows theory has demonstrated, the answers to 
these questions are largely unsettled. See generally, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, New York City’s 
Natural Experiment, in THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2007) (evaluating the 
effectiveness of order-maintenance policing); see also Jeffrey Fagan & John MacDonald, Policing, 
Crime, and Legitimacy in New York and Los Angeles: The Social and Political Contexts of Two Historic 
Crime Declines, in NEW YORK AND LOS ANGELES: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 243 (2013) (same); 
HARCOURT, supra note 1 (arguing that order-maintenance policing is ineffective). My personal 
opinion is that even if heavy-handed order–maintenance tactics were to be proven effective at 
fighting serious crime, the negative externalities would remain prohibitively high. See Bowers 
& Robinson, supra note 1, at 279-280 & n.318 (suggesting decriminalization of public-order 
offenses). These social costs are measured in broken households, broken relationships, and 
broken bones. Supra notes 33–40, 113–16, 204–08, 279–96, 422–31 and accompanying text; see 
also Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, supra note 1, at 92-93 & n.35 (describing the collateral 
costs of order-maintenance policing). But, again, that empirical question is largely tangential to 
the immediate project. 
8 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
9 See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 279-80. 
10 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913); see also Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 
214 (describing the “faithful man” as “an individual who complies with the law not because he 
rationally calculates that it is in his best interest to do so but because he sees himself as a moral actor 
who divines that it is right to defer to legitimate authority”). 
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weight than when our criminal codes approximate a shared morality.11 
Moreover, law enforcers have no shortage of public-order offenses from which 
to choose, leaving some only seldom or selectively enforced.12 In such 
circumstances, even a diligent study of the law may reveal only so much about 
whether, when, where, and how police officers might concentrate their energies. 
And, to the extent the individual guesses right, her predictions often have less 
to do with binding legal codes than with sociopolitical, economic, and cultural 
forces and considerations—some, normatively defensible; others, less so.13 
This is a pessimistic picture. But it is not new. In the past two decades, 
there has developed a rich literature on “overcriminalization,” which 
catalogues the difficulties of predicting state action based on even precisely 
defined public-order offenses.14 There are also some scholars who have 
examined the intersection that intrigues me most here—the manner by which 
Fourth Amendment doctrines have contributed to the shortcomings of code 
law. In this Article, I rehearse some familiar observations—most notably, the 
failure of the Fourth Amendment to adequately check pretextual searches and 
seizures.15 But my principal aim is to identify, analyze, and criticize an under-
appreciated and counterintuitive way in which Fourth Amendment doctrines 
have operated to obscure the individual’s capacity to forecast what she can 
and cannot do, free from state intrusion. 
Imagine that an officer hopes to arrest me for drinking alcohol in the park. 
The principle of legality ostensibly dictates that he needs an applicable valid 
statute and sufficient proof of guilt, which the Supreme Court has defined as 
probable cause.16 Or does he? The Court has carved several exceptions to its 
purportedly hard-and-fast Fourth Amendment rules. Most notably, it has 
held that an officer may get things wrong yet remain on the right side of the 
Fourth Amendment. He may make a reasonable mistake about the facts that 
he relies upon to establish probable cause. He even may err about the scope 
 
11 Compare State v. Boyett, 32 N.C. 336, 343–44 (1849) (“[E]very one has an innate sense of right and 
wrong, which enables him to know when he violates the law, and it is of no consequence, if he be not able 
to give the name, by which the offence is known in the law books, or to point out the nice distinctions 
between the different grades of offence.”), with Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary 
of the Vagueness Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2055, n.13 (2015) (explaining that “fair notice” is a particular 
problem when it comes to “street cleaning” statutes and other public-order offenses), and John Calvin 
Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 216 (1985) (same). 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 See infra Part II (discussing police officers’ good and bad reasons for action). 
14 See infra notes 432–44, 85, and accompanying text. 
15 See infra Part II. 
16 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001); see also United States v. Watson, 
423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976) (upholding search incident to a warrantless arrest); infra notes 87–88, 93, 
99–113, 117 (discussing Atwater and related doctrine). 
134 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 129 
of the criminal law itself (which is, paradoxically, the kind of mistake almost 
wholly unavailable to an untrained layperson).17 
Consider a few twists to the hypothetical. Suppose that the law has 
changed such that the open-container ordinance in question no longer applies 
to a container of alcohol wrapped in a paper bag. Moreover, suppose that my 
paper bag suitably conceals my container such that the officer mistakes a flash 
of the red exterior of my alcohol-free Coca-Cola for a Budweiser beer. If the 
officer’s legal and factual mistakes are deemed reasonable, then his conduct—
the arrest—is constitutional. In turn, I am subjected to a different constraint. 
As I read it, the operative rule is no longer defined exclusively by statutory 
language (simplified to the following): In public, possess no open containers of 
alcohol. It is defined also by the officer’s perspective and practice: In public, 
possess no open containers of something that an officer reasonably could believe to be 
alcohol (even if it is not) in a manner he reasonably could believe violates the law 
(even if it does not). The end result is that the officer has the opportunity to 
arrest me with neither sufficient proof of a criminal act nor even an applicable 
criminal statute. My autonomy is constrained by the reasonable officer’s 
belief, evaluated from his perspective. Put differently, the arresting officer’s 
reasonable belief constitutes an extenuating circumstance sufficient to excuse 
him from legality’s usual rules. 
To get to this point, the Supreme Court has relied upon an odd (but, 
conceptually, neither incompatible nor indefensible) pairing of 
methodologies. The first and primary methodology is founded on the principle 
of legality. The second is founded on what I call a principle of meaningful 
understanding. The principle of legality is thought to dictate that police 
officers must be guided by bright-line rules or, at least, well-structured 
standards—most notably, the Fourth Amendment’s ostensible warrant and 
probable cause requirements.18 The principle of meaningful understanding 
recognizes, by contrast, that it may be impractical or even impossible to hold 
officers categorically to these rules and standards. Consequently, a court may 
use a methodology of meaningful understanding to prioritize affective and 
particularistic questions of what constitutes reasonable enough police behavior, 
all things considered.19 Here, the judicial craft is closer to sociology than 
conventional legal analysis and decisionmaking. Max Weber, for instance, 
championed a method of sociological inquiry called verstehen, which translates 
roughly to “meaningful understanding.” The central premise of verstehen is 
 
17 See infra Section IV.A (describing doctrine and discussing traditional rule that mistake or 
ignorance of law is no excuse). 
18 See infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text (discussing baseline Fourth Amendment 
requirements). 
19 See infra Section I.C (discussing “general reasonableness”). 
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that we cannot expect to understand meaningfully a situation until we “wear 
the shoes” of the actors involved “to see things from their perspective.”20 
But the seemingly peculiar feature of the Supreme Court’s prevailing 
Fourth Amendment methodology of meaningful understanding is that it has 
come to operate almost entirely asymmetrically—to the benefit of the state 
only. The critical legal studies camp would argue that this asymmetry is a 
product of institutional indifference, implicit and systemic bias, or even 
purposeful discrimination. And those arguments may have merit.21 But there 
is also a more charitable explanation—an unidentified neutral logic—that 
might account, at least partially, for the Court’s asymmetric methodology of 
understanding. My positive contribution is to pinpoint this neutral logic, to 
map it onto Fourth Amendment doctrine, and, perhaps counterintuitively, to 
trace its roots back to the dominant conception of the legality principle. My 
normative contribution is to reveal why the Court’s neutral logic—even if 
conceptually defensible—remains practically flawed. Finally, my prescription 
is to urge the Court not to abandon its methodology of understanding, but to 
carry it further—to try, within limits, to understand much more. 
*      *      * 
The hitch is that the criminal justice system cannot function fairly or 
effectively with reference to only the rules designed to guide and control 
conduct. Inevitably, the system must carve exceptions. And, when it comes to 
these exceptions, the conventional wisdom is that the system need not speak 
in terms prospective and precise.22 Rather, exceptions permissibly may be 
 
20 JOHN J. MACIONIS & LINDA M. GERBER, SOCIOLOGY (7th ed. 2010); see also infra Section 
III.A, notes 303–06, and accompanying text. 
21 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 323 (1987) (summarizing the critical legal studies movement with the quip 
that “people in power sometimes abuse law to achieve their own ends”); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567–70 (1983) (outlining judicial lack of 
objectivity). Likewise, there may be other comparatively benign biases at work. For instance, the 
Court may unconsciously prioritize safety and policing need, evaluating these aims in the aggregate 
but the intrusion in isolation. See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 384 (3d ed. 2011) (“Whatever the best answer in theory, historically Fourth 
Amendment law does seem to have responded to law enforcement needs.”); see also Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“There have been powerful hydraulic pressures 
throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and 
give the police the upper hand.”); cf. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 84 
(2015) (maintaining that Americans consider “safety . . . a higher value than justice, perhaps the 
highest value”); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders & the Search for Solidarity Through Modern 
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 852 (2000) (observing that aggregative reasoning may lead to 
harsh criminal justice policies). 
22 See infra notes 142–145 and accompanying text (describing why piecemeal affirmative 
defenses do not offend the rule of law). 
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post hoc and particularistic—at least as long as they operate only to forgive 
rule violations. The rationale is twofold. First, positive legality is not 
offended by pleasant surprises, and an exception that tends toward leniency 
produces only a pleasant surprise. Second, there is no comparable need to 
classify ex ante (and with precision) the rulebreaking behavior that might 
qualify for a lenient exception, because an individual could not plan for the 
qualifying behavior in any event. Consider, for example, the hungry man, 
tempted to steal food. The dominant conception of the legality principle 
dictates that he must have the means to know that theft is generally 
prohibited, but he need not be made aware also of the circumstances under 
which he might be forgiven for carrying away a loaf of bread. Genuine 
necessity will find him. If he is truly starving, he will seek nourishment, 
independent of applicable legal rules or contextual exceptions therefrom.23 
Return to my hypothetical. Positive legality demands that I have the 
means to know the substantive rule that forbids me from drinking in public. 
Likewise, the arresting officer must have the means to know the substantive 
and procedural rules that specify how he may enforce my rules against me. 
But, in the face of extenuating and often unforeseeable circumstances, one or 
the other of us might come to enjoy a piecemeal and post hoc exception. It is 
not necessary, however, that the respective beneficiary anticipates the 
exception since the exception does not burden the beneficiary with additional 
legal oversight. The beneficiary remains as free as before to plan and carry 
out a rulebound course of action.24 The practical mistake, however, is to 
assume that the officer and I plan our courses of action in isolation. In fact, 
our two sets of rules and exceptions operate relationally—almost reciprocally. 
When the officer plans his conduct, he plans his exercises of power over me. And 
when a court excuses that officer for some failure to abide by his own rules, 
the court extends his dominion. This is the unappreciated price of a judicial 
methodology of meaningful understanding that asymmetrically benefits 
government regulators. Once a court understands the regulator in an 
empathetic and affective sense, the individual’s rules are made fuzzier thereby. 
In my hypothetical, I am left genuinely puzzled about what I can and 
cannot do. I am left surprised—unfairly surprised. And this is exactly the kind 
of “unfair surprise” that offends the aim (if not the prevailing letter) of the 
legality principle.25 I have no sufficient way of knowing prospectively that my 
 
23 See infra notes 144–145 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of “acoustic separation”). 
24 See infra notes 142–145 and accompanying text. 
25 See PACKER, supra note 6, at 86-90 (observing that the principle of legality operates as a 
protection against “unfair surprise”); Jeffries, supra note 11, at 216 (same); see also RICHARD BONNIE 
ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 81 (3d ed. 2010) (observing that the legality principle is designed to provide 
a “prophylaxis against the arbitrary and abusive exercise of discretion in the enforcement of the penal 
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partially concealed, open can of soda may excuse a state intrusion on my 
autonomy. I am not even expected to anticipate my own piecemeal exceptions 
to my own rules. How, then, am I expected to anticipate the officer’s exceptions? 
To decipher that attenuated set of signals, I would need to know more than 
the underlying rules. I would need to understand meaningfully the psyche and 
motivations of the reasonable officer within his particular circumstances. That 
level of meaningful understanding should perhaps be the job of judges. But, 
in a liberal criminal justice system committed to giving the benefit of the 
doubt to the suspect or accused, it should not be made mine.26 
To put matters in economic terms, a piecemeal exception to the law of the 
police shifts information costs from the officer to me. It diminishes the clarity 
of my obligations and the quality of my rights. To know what I may do, I 
must discover not only the code law but also whatever professional police 
norms and practices a court may come to understand after the fact. The law 
is made cloudier for me. I must do more than guess at the blurry edges. I 
must divine the officer’s good enough perceptions. I must read his abstract 
reasonable mind (and, likewise, the abstract reasonable mind of the 
accommodating judge). Comparatively, the law is made more accessible to 
the officer. Or, more accurately, he enjoys a lighter burden for law’s ongoing 
imprecisions. When he navigates the blurry edges of permissible and 
impermissible conduct, he is given the benefit of his own reasonable (albeit 
potentially mistaken) perspective. From his standpoint, his good-enough 
 
law”); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974, 2038-39 (2008) (indicating 
that the “premise” of the vagueness doctrine is to protect defendants and constrain the state). 
Throughout this article, I use the terms legality and rule of law almost interchangeably. I 
recognize that the concepts may differ (depending upon definitions). But the common convention 
is to conflate. See Jeffries, supra note 11, at 212 (linking the rule of law to the legality principle); 
Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008) (“It is, after all, an 
accident of usage that the particular phrase the Rule of Law is used for this ideal. Some theorists use 
the term legality or principles of legality instead.”). If nothing else, the legality principle and the rule 
of law share the same liberal objectives. See Waldron, supra, at 6 (observing that the central premise 
of the rule of law is that “people in positions of authority” not be left to act upon “their own 
preferences, their own ideology, or their own individual sense of right and wrong”); see also RONALD 
A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 17 (2001) (observing that the principal objective of the 
rule of law is to “help[] assure that the processes of government, rather than the predilections of the 
individual decisionmaker, govern”); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decisions Rules & Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 668 (1983) (“[T]he rule of law is said to limit 
officials’ discretion and thereby to curb their potential arbitrariness. The rule of law reduces the 
danger that officials may indulge their self-interest or give vent in their decisions to personal 
animosities or prejudices.”); cf. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Dark Side of the Relationship Between the Rule 
of Law and Liberalism, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 516, 519 (2008) (“Liberalism asserts that liberty 
from the encroachments of fellow citizens and from the arbitrary whims of government officials 
cannot exist without the rule of law.”). 
26 See supra notes 5-7, infra notes 47, 50–53, 149–151, 172–175, 267, 376, and accompanying text 
(discussing the state’s obligations to provide adequate notice, and examining the individual’s 
corresponding duty to learn law and abide by it). 
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perceptions may bring the law’s blurry edges into sharp-enough focus (even 
if he cannot know precisely which extenuating circumstances might qualify 
for a given set of exceptions in a given set of circumstances). 
Asymmetric understanding operates along two dimensions. In the first 
instance, courts evaluate the perspective of the officer but not the individual. 
Moreover, courts consider only the particulars that benefit the state—the 
details that excuse otherwise impermissible intrusions. In either event, the 
prevailing asymmetric methodology operates to undermine notice 
asymmetrically. The individual is left in a precarious position whereby she 
cannot adequately plan—as a matter of right—a course of conduct free from 
state intrusion. With respect to the purposes of the legality principle, the 
implications are these: (1) the individual is less aware of the scope of police 
power, (2) she is less able to stand her ground, and (3) in the extreme, 
asymmetric understanding could even generate a vicious cycle. The very 
effort to exercise rights might trigger and excuse more substantial state 
intrusions, which, in turn, might serve to expand and obscure further the 
scope of police power.27 
This phenomenon potentially reaches well beyond criminal justice. Across 
a range of regulatory regimes (including, most obviously, administrative law), 
a fair claim could be made that the judicial effort to understand a government 
regulator’s needs and perspective might produce unintended confusion for 
the regulated party. But my ambitions are more modest. For several reasons, 
I limit the focus to criminal procedure and order–maintenance policing. First, 
the concept of notice plays an outsized role in criminal justice precisely 
because the stakes of enforcement and punishment are atypically high.28 
Second, order–maintenance enforcement is likelier to produce confusion 
because public-order offenses proscribe conduct that is not intuitively 
blameworthy, and individuals lack even “lawyer’s notice” of the kind that 
typifies white-collar criminal law and other regulatory regimes.29 Third, 
police officers are likelier to break the rules of street encounters (excusably or 
otherwise), because “officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving”.30 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, street encounters are 
 
27 See infra notes 176–178, 196–207, 251, 267 and accompanying text (describing the manner by 
which exercises of rights may invite and authorize state intrusions, and discussing the traffic stop 
and arrest of Sandra Bland). 
28 See PACKER, supra note 6, at 74 ([H]uman autonomy . . . is a fortiori important for that most 
coercive of legal instruments, the criminal law.”); supra notes 8-11, infra notes 48–50, 173, 376–377, 
and accompanying text. 
29 Jeffries, supra note 11, at 216; infra notes 111–15 and accompanying text. 
30 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989); infra notes 162–64, 178–81, 218–20, 223–24, 
250, and accompanying text. 
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likelier to entail a particularly illiberal form of intrusion—that is, the 
imposition of rough justice, intentional or otherwise. 
It may be tempting to distinguish order–maintenance street stops and 
arrests from post-conviction penalties. But rough justice is not limited to 
what happens at sentence. Lesser forms of coercion likewise might offend the 
legality principle.31 As Malcolm Feeley famously explained, when it comes to 
petty crime enforcement, “the process itself is the primary punishment.”32 
Fast-paced encounters sometimes devolve rapidly—from menacing stop and 
humiliating arrest to violence or worse (followed, thereafter, by state pleas for 
understanding).33 In my hypothetical, the officer might soon discover the 
error of his ways—that I am a normatively and legally innocent man, who 
possessed only a soft drink.34 But, by that point, I might be in cuffs, on the 
ground with an arm around my neck and a taser to my back. If I try to protest, 
I might suffer worse. And, even if I try to comply, I might fail to do so in just 
the right way (at least, in the eyes of the reasonable officer).35 
Of course, my hypothetical poses no real-world problem. There is no 
authentic unfairness to a white, middle-aged law professor’s imagined 
confusion or putative disappointment at a fictional afternoon visit to the park 
spoiled by an officer bent on public ordering. The genuine problems are not 
made up. They are problems experienced routinely within communities and 
by populations inordinately made subjects of not only disorder but also order-
maintenance enforcement.36 They are problems that are exacerbated by (and 
that, in turn, may exacerbate) implicit bias and the too-short reach of the 
Equal Protection Clause.37 They are problems for individuals who lawfully 
 
31 PACKER, supra note 6, at 98 (describing the practice of arrest “for investigation” or “on 
suspicion” as offensive to the principle of legality). 
32 MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 199 (1979); see also JOSH 
BOWERS, LEGALITY & ROUGH JUSTICE (manuscript in progress) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE]; infra notes 279–95 and accompanying text (describing arrest as a form 
of punishment and citing sources). 
33 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing the 
lasting toll of even peaceful stops and arrests); infra notes 40, 341, 430–32 and accompanying text 
(describing police-civilian interactions in majority-minority communities, and discussing the arrests 
and deaths of Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, and Philando Castile). 
34 See infra notes 124–126, 376–79, 402–406, and accompanying text (discussing the concept of 
normative innocence). 
35 Cf. PACKER, supra note 6, at 98 (explaining that the “ideal” of the legality principle is 
“flouted” when police officers arrest an individual whom they believe was merely “up to no good,” 
even if the individual is held in custody for “only for a few minutes”). 
36 See infra notes 112–14, 204–07, 388, and accompanying text (describing a culture of fear in 
heavily policed communities). 
37 See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text (describing the shortcomings of prevailing 
Equal Protection doctrine). I do not pretend that the legality question (here, as it relates to Fourth 
Amendment doctrine) is the only relevant question or even the principal question pertaining to 
official exercises of coercion. But it is a primary question that, in practice, also implicates other 
140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 129 
resist the state only to find exercises of rights met by greater police intrusions 
still.38 Most of all, they are problems for real people with real names, like Eric 
Garner and Philando Castile—people for whom low-level police intrusions 
are hardly trivial and anything but hypothetical.39 These are the problems of 
order-maintenance policing—problems that likewise demand meaningful 
understanding. 
This project is, itself, an effort at meaningful understanding. I hope to 
explore how a system so deeply committed to a formal conception of legality 
has come to tolerate so much rough punishment. In the process, I reiterate a 
normative proposition that has been a central tenet of my scholarship to 
date—the claim that particularistic judicial oversight of official exercises of 
coercion is entirely consistent with (and perhaps even necessary to) the rule 
of law as an effective buffer against sovereign prerogative.40 To my thinking, 
there is much more to the legality principle, properly understood, than ever–
more precisely defined rules. The legality principle also embodies a 
 
primary questions, like discrimination and inequality. See Jeffries, supra note 11, at 213 (“[A]lthough 
there is no necessary connection between the formal requirements of the rule of law and any 
substantive notion of equality, in the context of contemporary American society the two are closely 
linked.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 193-94 
(2002) (examining intersecting concerns of the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourth Amendment); 
Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 790 (1994) (“[I]t is far more 
sensible to try to read the Fourth in light of other norms that do embody our overall constitutional 
structure today—free speech, free press, privacy, equal protection, due process, and just 
compensation”); Akhil R. Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1097, 1123-24 (1998) (noting that “issues of race . . . should be addressed in a comprehensive framework 
of constitutional reasonableness”). Perhaps a more rigorous Equal Protection or Due Process test 
could reach more effectively instances of arbitrary enforcement, but I have my doubts. In any event, 
the Fourth Amendment is the traditional mechanism by which the Supreme Court has regulated law 
enforcement. As such, I see it as the most logical site of constitutional interpretation, critique, and 
reform. I should recognize, however, that other scholars have offered alternative constitutional 
reforms, designed to achieve the same objectives. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the 
Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due Process Test Should Replace Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 261, 265-272 (1993) (endorsing a more vigorous due process test of fundamental 
fairness); Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 933 (2016) (endorsing 
a “non-comparative [Equal Protection] right to rational governmental action,” which she defines, inter 
alia, as “a right not to have one’s liberty curtailed for no reason”). 
38 See infra notes 177–78, 196, 268, and accompanying text (examining cases where individuals’ 
assertions of rights provoke fresh state intrusions). 
39 See infra notes 421–32 and accompanying text (discussing these and other recent cases). 
40 See generally Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1 (questioning judicial 
deference to prosecutors’ equitable charging decisions); Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional 
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity”, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987 (2014) 
[hereinafter Bowers, Pointless Indignity] (endorsing a “two-ply constitutional test” to comprehensively 
evaluate the legal and normative merits of arrests); BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32, infra 
notes 139–41, 319–28, accompanying text, and Section V.C. (endorsing a procedural conception of 
legality, administered judicially). 
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procedural dimension, capacious enough to accommodate context, 
perspective, voice, and narrative—considered and expressed bilaterally. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I describe the dominant 
conception of the legality principle and its preference for precisely defined 
rules, which are thought to promote consistent and predictable law 
enforcement. In Part II, I revisit certain well-examined objections to the 
conventional formalistic approach—most notably, that an officer may exploit 
overbroad criminal codes to inflict rough punishment based upon little more 
than an inchoate hunch. In Parts III and IV, I transition from the officer’s 
manipulation of the rules to his enjoyment of the exceptions. I explain that 
Fourth Amendment rules are only ostensibly firm. And I discuss the 
asymmetric shift from legality to understanding once an officer has broken the 
rules. Specifically, I examine the doctrines whereby courts have accommodated 
the officer’s perspective—his reasonable mistakes, fears, and needs, shaped by 
his professional experiences. And I reveal the manner by which the individual 
is burdened in turn—that she may offer no competing claim that a court 
should also accommodate her reasonable perspective—her reasonable mistakes, 
fears, and needs, shaped by her lay experiences. In Part V, I analyze several case 
studies and respond to objections. I apply prevailing doctrines to two recent 
incidents—the traffic stops of Sandra Bland and John Felton. Both incidents 
have generated significant media and political attention as part of the legal and 
social justice movement, “Black Lives Matter.” But I focus on the events only 
to make a jurisprudential point—to show how easy the criminal justice system 
has made it for the officer to replace the law’s precise meaning with a hazy 
police-generated message. The new message is as inscrutable to the layperson 
as historically discarded vagrancy statutes.41 If it can be deciphered at all, it 
translates to just this—“Annoy No Cop.” 
 
41 Compare infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text (discussing historical vagrancy and 
common law crimes), with infra notes 112–14, 267–71 (discussing modern application of 
contemporary vehicle and traffic laws); cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 
(1972) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance that would allow “poor people, nonconformists, 
dissenters, [and] idlers . . . to stand on a public sidewalk only at the whim of [the] police officer,” 
who could use the ordinance as “a convenient tool for harsh and discriminatory enforcement . . . 
against . . . groups deemed to merit . . . displeasure”) (internal citations omitted); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 671 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (remarking upon the “casual arrogance of those 
who have the untrammelled power . . . to seize one’s person”); BONNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 94 
(describing the due process implications of criminalizing mere “affronts to police authority” 
(internal citations omitted)); Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2236, 2245 (2013) (examining the consequences of “allow[ing] the net to be cast at large, to 
enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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I. LEGALITY, AUTONOMY & AUTHORITY 
There is no obvious answer to the question of when the state has 
criminalized too much, too hard. And, for present purposes, I leave that 
debate aside. I am not confident that the political branches are, in fact, 
particularly well situated to handle the substantive determination, but one 
fight at a time.42 For the sake of argument, then, I grant the Court’s 
assumption that the judiciary is generally incompetent to determine when—
morally or prudentially—the state has ordered to excess: 
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a 
code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction 
itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. 
And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what 
standard (or what right) we would decide . . . which particular provisions are 
sufficiently important to merit enforcement.43 
Instead, I turn to the processes by which our criminal justice system has 
regulated perceived arbitrary exercises of official coercion.44 
A. Precision & Planning 
The touchstone is the principle of legality—what Herbert Packer once 
called “the first principle of criminal law.”45 The animating idea is, first, that 
I am able to “predict and plan” my own life fairly and effectively only when I 
am given sufficient notice of the state’s plans and, second, that legal precision 
 
42 Cf. Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 
26, 40 (2012) (“[T]he Court has adopted a tone of almost cheerful resignation, as if it were helpless—
as opposed to merely unwilling—to constitutionally check the overinflated criminal codes . . . . The 
substantive law is what legislatures have made it and what the Court has permitted it to become.”). 
43 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996). Recently, Justice Kagan expressed more 
ambivalence but still concluded that the Court was unequipped to reign in criminal codes: 
[T]he real issue [is] overcriminalization and excessive punishment . . . . [This statute] 
is a bad law—too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which 
give prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion. And . . . [it] 
is unfortunately not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal 
criminal code. But whatever the wisdom or folly of [this statute], this Court does not 
get to rewrite the law . . . . If judges disagree with Congress’s choice, we are perfectly 
entitled to say so—in lectures, in law review articles, and even in dicta. But we are not 
entitled to replace the statute[.] 
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1100-02 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
44 See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 25, at 78 (“The [positive] principle of legality does not speak 
to the question of what conduct should be declared criminal. Rather, it states a normative expectation 
regarding how that decision should be made.”). 
45 PACKER, supra note 6, at 79. 
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is the best mechanism to ensure that the state hews to its own plans.46 Of 
course, the desire for precision and predictability extends even beyond 
criminal justice. Nevertheless, the premise is that there is an “especial need 
for certainty” in a domain in which the state commonly brands and restrains 
its citizens, warehousing (and sometimes even exterminating) their bodies.47 
The “law of crime” is said to be “special” precisely because criminal justice is 
especially coercive.48 And, in such circumstances, the conventional wisdom is 
that only a formalistic approach may provide adequate protection against 
arbitrary exercises of state power.49 
 
46 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 180-83 (1968) (explaining that 
criminal justice, appropriately designed, allows us “to predict and plan the future course of our lives 
within the coercive framework of the law . . . to foresee the times of law’s interference”); see also 
SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 119 (2011); PACKER, supra note 6, at 84-85 (“[T]his is the first argument 
that is always advanced in support of the principle of legality: that people are entitled to fair notice 
of what the law requires so that they may plan their lives accordingly . . . . [The] more sophisticated 
rationale of the principle of legality . . . is that it is necessary in order to prevent abuses of official 
discretion.”); Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 673 (“[T]he importance of the rule of law [is to] guid[e] 
individual behavior.”); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 223–
24 (1979) (“[T]he law must be capable of being obeyed . . . . [I]t must be capable of guiding the 
behavior of its subjects. It must be such that they can find out what it is and act on it.”); supra notes 
2-6 and accompanying text. 
47 Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 215, 256 (1987); see also H.L.A. HART, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EXCUSES, IN 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28, 44–47 (2d ed. 1969); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating 
Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (1974) (discussing criminal law’s long tradition of “strict 
adherence to rules”); cf. Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why is This Right Different from 
All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 821 (1994) (explaining that criminal justice is different in 
kind from other forms of legal regulation and that “liberty from confinement cannot be relegated to 
the status of unprotected aspects of daily life”). 
48 Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law 
and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 97 (1996); see also Egon Bittner, The Police 
on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. R. 699, 700 (1967) (“[C]rime belongs wholly to 
the law, and its treatment is exhaustively based on considerations of legality”). 
49 According to John Jeffries: 
The rule of law signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in the exercise of government 
power . . . . [T]he agencies of official coercion should, to the extent feasible, be guided 
by rules . . . [as a means to promote] regularity and evenhandedness in the 
administration of justice and accountability in the use of government power. 
Jeffries, supra note 11, at 201, 212 (explaining that “appeals to the ‘Rule of Law,’” as they apply to the 
penal law, tend to entail “the resort to legal formalism as a constraint against unbridled discretion”); 
see also PACKER, supra note 6, at 88-90 (describing how the principle of legality serves an important 
function in limiting arbitrary state action); Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1030 
(describing a reason-giving requirement that would serve as a check on police discretion); see also 
DAVID DYZENHAUS, RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 179-80 
(1999) (“[T]he rule of law . . . refer[s] to the idea that law should meet certain procedural 
requirements so that the individual is enabled to obey it . . . . [It must] be relatively certain, clearly 
expressed, open . . . adequately publicized . . . [and] prospective . . . . The practical effect . . . is to 
set limits to the discretion of legislators, administrators, judges and the police.”). 
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This formalistic conception of the legality principle provides the theoretical 
underpinnings for a “rule of law as a law of rules”50—a positive and orthodox 
approach, grounded in “legal formalism.”51 According to David Dyzenhaus: 
“[L]aw must take the form of rules” so that people may take its requirements 
into account “when planning their affairs.”52 But this invites the question: What 
is so important about planning affairs? Surely, the legality principle does more 
than just promote day-to-day efforts to schedule and organize efficiently. 
Planning is also a tool for self-discovery and expression—for “self-ownership.”53 
In the words of John Christman: “[T]o be autonomous is to be one’s own person, 
to be directed by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are 
not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be 
considered one’s authentic self.”54 The ability to plan thereby implicates the 
metaphysical as much as the mundane. In a given setting, to know what the state 
may not do is to know not only what I may do but also to ponder and pursue who 
I am and what I may become.55 Or, at least, that is the ostensible promise and 
hope of the legality principle as it relates to individual autonomy. 
The preceding is just a rough sketch of several contested concepts. There 
is no settled definition of either individual autonomy or its relationship to the 
 
50 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1989). 
51 Jeffries, supra note 11, at 201 (describing the “quite conventional” conception of the rule of 
law and the principle of legality). 
52 DYZENHAUS, supra note 49, at 179-80; see also SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 119 (2011) (“[T]he 
creation and persistence of the fundamental rules of law is grounded in the capacity that all individuals 
possess to adopt plans.”); Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 670 (“[T]he rule of law is . . . essential to one’s 
capacity to make and carry out life plans.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 083: Normativity, 
Morality, & Ethics, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (July 24, 2016), http://lsolum.typepad.com/ 
legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory_le_3.html [https://perma.cc/AFC6-7K4F] (“One reason 
that the rule of law is important has to do with predictability and certainty.”). 
53 Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 670 (“By enhancing the individual’s life-planning capacity, the 
rule of law expands freedom of action, secures a measure of individual liberty, and expresses respect for 
individual autonomy.”); Solum, supra note 52 (“The predictability and certainty of the law creates a 
sphere of autonomy within which individuals can act without fear of government interference.”). On 
self-ownership, see generally G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY (1995). 
54 John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 3.3 (Jan. 9, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy/-moral/ 
[https://perma.cc/M84W-A96Q] [hereinafter Christman, Autonomy]; cf. Jeremy Waldron, Moral 
Autonomy and Personal Autonomy, in AUTONOMY AND THE NEW CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM 
307 (2005) (“Talk of personal autonomy evokes the image of a person in charge of his life, not just 
following his desires but choosing which of his desires to follow.”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY 
OF FREEDOM 369 (1986) (“The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to 
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.”). 
55 Christopher Wellman, Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation, 111 ETHICS 735, 738 (2001) 
(“Liberalism’s aversion to [state] paternalism implies that each autonomous individual has a right to 
decide which self-regarding benefits to pursue.”); Solum, supra note 52 (“What values are served by the 
rule of law? Why is the rule of law important? . . . The predictability and certainty of the law creates a 
sphere of autonomy within which individuals can act without fear of government interference.”). 
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legality principle and state coercion. 56 Other theorists invoke related values 
and principles to back the same or similar claims. For instance, Jeremy 
Waldron has argued that a rule-of-law system must demonstrate sufficient 
respect for citizens “as active centers of intelligence,” which Waldron rooted 
in a dignity principle. Likewise, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis famously 
championed a comprehensive privacy right “to be let alone”—to “enjoy life” 
and to “own” one’s own “inviolate personality.”57 And Ronald Dworkin 
asserted that a state committed to the rule of law must treat its citizens with 
“equal concern and respect.”58 These notions of dignity, privacy, and equality 
(and, of course, like notions of liberty and freedom) resonate with what I 
mean by individual autonomy. Simply, individual autonomy is no standalone 
liberal principle.59 There are other overlapping principles that may interact 
with each other and also with the legality principle.60 In any event, the exact 
 
56 For more on my conception of the principle of legality, see generally Bowers, Pointless 
Indignity, supra note 40; BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32; infra Section V.C. For more on 
my conception of state coercion, see generally Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1083 (2016) [hereinafter Bowers, Baselines] (discussing “the Court’s unwillingness to 
take seriously the issue of coercion as it applies to plea bargaining”). 
57 See Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-205 
(1890); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(describing “the right to be let alone . . . as against the Government” to be “the right most valued 
by civilized men”) overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745, 763-64 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is the basis of individuality. To 
be alone and be let alone . . . . Personality develops from within . . . . Invasions of privacy demean 
the individual . . . . The practice is incompatible with a free society.”) (quoting Attorney General 
William R. Clark); cf. Christman, Autonomy, supra note 54 (“Examination of the concept of 
autonomy also figures centrally in debates over . . . the right to privacy.”). 
58 See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 330 (2011) (“A political community 
has no moral power to create and enforce obligations against its members unless it treats them with 
equal concern and respect.”). 
59 I should make plain, however, that I do not believe that autonomy is synonymous with other 
liberal principles, including even freedom. Cf. Christman, Autonomy, supra note 54, at § 1.1 (“Some 
distinguish autonomy from freedom by insisting that freedom concerns particular acts while 
autonomy is a more global notion, referring to states of a person.”); see Scott Anderson, Coercion, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 27, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZG5U-YGA5] (referring to autonomy as a “special type of freedom,” which “is used 
to refer to an inner state of orderly self-directedness”); Sophia Moreau, Equality Rights and Stereotypes, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 283, 294 (David Dyzenhaus & 
Malcolm Thorburn eds. 2016) (distinguishing between “‘negative freedom,’ or the ability to live without 
interference from external pressures” and “‘positive freedom’ or ‘autonomy,’ or a person’s ability to shape 
her own life in accordance with her own beliefs and values”). 
60 Indeed, I recently authored an article examining the manner by which the Court’s positive conception 
of legality underserves the moral philosophic concept of dignity. See generally Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra 
note 40. And Paul Gowder has even argued persuasively that the preconditions of the rule of law—regularity, 
publicity, and generality—depend upon the state treating individuals equally. See Paul Gowder, The Rule of 
Law and Equality, 32 LAW & PHIL. 565, 567 (2013) (“When states achieve vertical equality, their legal 
institutions guard against hubris, officials’ use of their powers to claim certain kinds of superior status. They 
also guard against terror, the use of the state’s power to cow individuals into submissiveness.”); cf. Hellman, 
supra note 37, at 933 (describing how irrational laws implicate one conception of discrimination). 
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liberal principle is less important than my less controversial methodological 
claim: whatever the relevant concept (and however we may describe it), the 
criminal justice system has relied generally upon a “formalist world view” to 
express and advance it.61 A state actor is said to behave arbitrarily only when 
he has failed to follow established, precisely drawn rules.62 
In doctrinal terms, a hallmark of this formalistic conception of arbitrary 
state action is the rejection of common law criminality.63 Crimes cannot be 
officer-made—or even judge-made—and they certainly cannot be crafted 
after the fact, no matter how reprehensible the conduct in question and no 
matter how well meaning the state effort. Crimes are to be legislated ex ante 
or not at all.64 But, of course, it is not enough simply to demand that the 
legislature legislate. If it were, a clever representative could draft a 
comprehensive two sentence penal code: “No one may behave in a morally 
wrongful or socially costly manner. Anyone who does so shall be punished as justice 
or public safety or order demands.”65 The example may seem fanciful, but it is 
only slightly more opaque and open-ended than the catchall vagrancy statutes 
that our criminal justice system historically used to maintain order.66 But 
during the latter half of the last century, the Supreme Court systematically 
began to invalidate as unconstitutionally vague these relatively formless 
vagrancy offenses.67 The Court determined that vague statutes offended the 
legality principle in the same manner as common law crimes: they neither 
provided effective notice to the public of the conduct criminally proscribed 
nor imposed adequate limits upon law enforcement.68 By contrast, a precise 
 
61 Seidman, supra note 48, at 103 (“[A]lthough realism’s lessons for criminal law seem obvious, 
formalism continues to dominate criminal jurisprudence.”). 
62 One of the very few exceptions is Fourth Amendment doctrine pertaining to extraordinary uses 
of force—or what constitutional law calls “excessive force.” See infra notes 260–63, 292, 339–46 and 
accompanying text (discussing excessive force doctrine as applied in a variety of controversial cases). 
63 Jeffries, supra note 11, at 190–91 (discussing common law crimes and concluding that “the legality 
ideal is an explicit and self-conscious rejection of the historic methodology of the common law”). 
64 See id. (“[T]he categorical insistence on advance legislative crime definition is clearly a 
modern phenomenon.”); see also BONNIE ET AL., supra note 25, at 80-81; H.L.A. Hart, Philosophy of 
Law, Problems of, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 264, 273-74 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) 
(“The requirements that the law . . . should not be retrospective in operation . . . [is one of] the 
principles of legality.”). 
65 This is a version of another comprehensive criminal code, offered by Herbert Packer: 
“[W]hoever does anything bad shall be punished as justice may require.” PACKER, supra note 6, at 92. 
66 See, e.g., Jacksonville Ordinance § 26-57 (1965) (invalidated by Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156-57 (1972)) (criminalizing “[r]ogues and vagabonds, . . . lewd, wonton, 
and lascivious persons, . . . habitual loafers” and many other categories of people and conduct). 
67 See generally RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016). 
68 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“[A] penal statute [must] define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”); 
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 (“Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which 
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penal code was thought to announce its commands comprehensibly and 
comprehensively to both audiences—to the lay individuals who are the 
designated subjects of sufficiently precise criminal codes and to the law 
enforcers who are authorized to enforce these rules (and only these rules). 
B. Conduct Rules as Cop Rules 
At this point, it may be necessary to define our terms. We can distinguish 
between legal rules that are designed to guide behavior, which Meir Dan-Cohen 
famously dubbed “conduct rules,” and “decision rules” that direct legal officials 
to interpret and apply substantive criminal laws in particular ways.69 From this 
starting point, it may be tempting to define the constitutional limits on law 
enforcement as “decision rules” only. Indeed, this would seem to be the 
conventional view. But it is too simplistic, if not inaccurate. Unlike the 
professional adjudicator, the professional law enforcer is not tasked principally 
with the obligation to interpret and thereafter apply law—to reach legal 
determinations as a means of resolving cases. To the contrary, his primary 
function is to take action—to engage in conduct.70 To authorize state action, the 
officer depends in the first instance on the existence of the substantive criminal 
law and sufficient proof of its violation by another. The substantive criminal law 
thereby shapes the officer’s conduct, just as it shapes the conduct of the 
layperson. Conduct is controlled on each side of the coin. For the individual, the 
law defines what she cannot do. For the law enforcer, it defines what he can do.71 
But the substantive criminal law describes only a single set of conduct 
rules (albeit a single set that reaches two audiences). The scope of an officer’s 
authority to engage in conduct is shaped also by rules of criminal procedure. 
And these rules—particularly, Fourth Amendment rules—may be 
characterized likewise as a set of conduct rules for cops. Indeed, several 
 
is that all persons are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also BONNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 45 (“[T]he 
vagueness doctrine independently protects principle of legality or rule of law values in situations 
where legislation does not adequately constrain the authority of police, prosecutors, and courts to 
engage in arbitrary, ad hoc decisionmaking.”). 
69 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 630 (“[T]he law necessarily contains two sets of messages. 
One set is directed at the general public and provides the guidelines for conduct. These guidelines 
are . . . ‘conduct rules.’ The other set of messages is directed at the officials and provides guidelines 
for their decisions. These are ‘decision rules.’”). 
70 I am not the first person to draw this distinction between the manner by which rules convey 
different messages to adjudicators and law enforcers. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth 
Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 319 n.90 (2010) (“Speaking for two bodies—the police and 
lower courts—means that Court opinions must provide both decision rules to guide courts 
and conduct rules to guide police.” (emphasis added)); see also infra note 72 (citing sources). 
71 In this vein, it is no accident that the term misconduct (emphasis on the “conduct”) describes 
circumstances where a police officer oversteps. 
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commentators have done so already.72 There is no consensus over which exact 
doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure qualify as a cop’s conduct rules, 
but at a minimum they would seem to include the Fourth Amendment’s 
ostensible warrant and probable-cause requirements.73 These baseline 
procedural requirements represent efforts to define constitutional 
reasonableness formalistically—efforts to rely upon hard proxies over 
imprecise and holistic considerations of so-called “general reasonableness.”74 
This is, of course, consistent with the dominant conception of the principle 
of legality and its preference for relatively firm limits on official coercion.75 
 
72 See Mary D. Fan, Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1407, 1439 (2011) (discussing “conduct rule gaming” by police); Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes 
of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 92 (2011) (noting how police rely on decision rules to circumvent conduct 
rules); John E. Taylor, Using Suppression Hearing Testimony to Prove Good Faith Under United States 
v. Leon, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 155, 171 (2005) (“Although Dan-Cohen developed [his] model in the 
context of discussing substantive criminal law and its conduct rules addressing the general public, 
the model can be easily extended to the context of criminal procedure.”); see also Crocker, supra note 
70, at 318 (“In order to protect privacy, the Supreme Court must fashion conduct rules to regulate 
police behavior.”); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2471 (1996) (“The Warren Court established and 
embellished conduct rules governing police practices under three main constitutional rubrics: 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment’s 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of assistance 
of counsel in all criminal cases.”); cf. Malcolm Thorburn, A Liberal Criminal Law Cannot be Reduced 
to These Two Types of Rules, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 22, 23 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen 
Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2011) (“So is ‘arrest with a warrant’ a conduct rule or a decision 
rule? It seems that it is, instead, a conduct rule that issues from the exercise of a decision rule.”). 
73 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 72, at 171 (describing the warrant and probable cause requirements 
as “conduct rules telling police officers how they should conduct criminal investigations.”); see also 
Steiker, supra note 72, at 2472. 
74 See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 
227, 255 (1984) (describing the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to define “reasonableness” precisely); 
Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness”, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
1642, 1644 (1998) (“[T]ypically (and formalistically), . . . the Court considers the legality of a search 
to turn exclusively on whether there is a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that 
evidence of a criminal offense is present in a given location.”); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, 
& Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 887-88 (2009) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine is replete with 
rule-like presumptions of reasonableness for generically defined fact patterns.”); see also Virginia v. 
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (“In determining what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
we have given great weight to . . . the need for a bright-line constitutional standard”); Craig M. 
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1471 (1985) (providing a 
comparison of “bright line” versus “no lines” approaches to interpreting the Fourth Amendment). 
See generally Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40; Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward 
a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 129 (1989) 
(noting the Supreme Court’s turn towards “general reasonableness.”). 
75 Unsurprisingly, left-liberal proponents of a formalistic legality principle have used almost 
identical language to describe both sets of conduct rules for cops. Without precisely defined crimes, the 
officer may exercise “dictatorial power over the streets;” without structured search-and-seizure rules, the 
officer may act “despotically and capriciously.” Compare Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional 
Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police 
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Thus, we may draw a straight line between the Court’s prevailing 
substantive and procedural approaches. In each context, the prospective evil 
remains the same—“petty tyranny” or worse.76 And precision is thought to 
prevent it.77 Moreover, the two sets of conduct rules for cops are designed to 
operate compatibly. Consider, again, the officer who intends to arrest me. 
According to his substantive conduct rules, he may not make up a crime. 
According to his procedural conduct rules, he may not arrest on an inchoate 
hunch. His authority arises out of the interplay between his conduct rules. 
C. Dynamic Conduct Rules 
But, as we shall see, formalism’s aspirations ring hollow in practice. It is 
not so easy to maintain precisely drawn conduct rules. Even the brightest 
rules may have their fuzzy edges—in application and even in formulation. In 
this vein, John Jeffries has described the vagueness doctrine as “evaluative.”78 
And the Court has made plain that it will not demand “meticulous specificity” 
or “impractical” standards of statutory clarity.79 Likewise, probable cause is “a 
practical, common sense [standard] . . . given all the circumstances,” not a 
“hypertechnical” rule.80 Still, the officer’s contemporary conduct rules are 
designed to concentrate the analysis upon a single and relatively formal 
question—technical guilt accuracy. In this way, the modern criminal statute 
speaks to people in terms more exact than the common law offense, which 
sought to proscribe only “general moral blameworthiness.”81 Likewise, the 
 
Officers, and the Like, CRIM. L. BULL. 3, no.4, at 222-24 (1967), with Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives 
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 411 (1974) [hereinafter Amsterdam, Perspectives] 
(“[I]ndiscriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the discretion of executive officials, who may 
act despotically and capriciously in the exercise of the power to search and seizures.”). 
76 Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 75, at 411. 
77 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967) (discussing dangers of “after-the-event 
justification” and emphasizing importance of compelling law enforcement to “observe precise limits 
established in advance”). 
78 Jeffries, supra note 11 at 196; see also Low & Johnson, supra note 11, at 2052 (describing the 
indefiniteness of prevailing vagueness doctrine). 
79 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1948); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 352 
(1983) (“due process does not require ‘impossible standards of clarity.’”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“[W]e can never expect mathematical certainty from our language. The words 
of the ordinance are marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (observing that unconstitutional indefiniteness “is itself an indefinite concept”). 
80 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-38 (1983); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text 
(discussing probable cause as a somewhat uncertain and epistemic question). 
81 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 994 (1932) (observing that, 
historically, the measure of culpability was “general moral blameworthiness”); see also William E. 
Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. 
L. REV. 893, 910 (1978) (explaining that eighteenth-century juries were considered to be “good 
judges of the common law of the land” and were instructed “to do justice between the parties not 
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prevailing requirements of warrant and probable cause depend upon 
“quantitative” measures of legal guilt as compared to alternative “qualitative” 
considerations.82 This is all to say that formalism describes a spectrum, and it 
may be that no real-world conduct rule has ever landed squarely at either 
endpoint. Ironically, then, the best measure of formalism may be contextual—
to evaluate the question relationally by contrasting one legal rule against 
alternative historical, conceptual, or positive analogues.83 
Moreover, the realist knows that conduct rules change with time. One 
conduct rule unintentionally might reshape another. Or a conduct rule 
inadvertently might deliver multiple messages to multiple audiences. And, 
significantly, the more precisely defined the rule, the more readily the wrong 
audience eventually might overhear it. Probable cause offers a nice 
illustration. Members of the public might not know precisely what the 
standard demands, but they understand that the Fourth Amendment is said 
to require it.84 In turn, an individual might come—accurately or not—to read 
her own conduct rules as modified by probable cause. Thereafter, she might 
no longer construe a particular statutory offense as it was meant to be 
construed—as commanding simply “do not do X.” Instead, she might read it 
to declare: “do not give an officer probable cause to believe that you have done X.” 
The claim, here, is that conduct rules are products of more than ex ante 
design. They are products of what is read and understood and by whom. They 
are products of the bleed between overlapping conduct rules and even 
perceptible norms and practices.85 
 
by any quirks of the law . . . but by common sense as between man and man” (quoting Letter from 
James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (Dec. 25, 1779)). 
82 On the distinction between “general reasonableness” and more formal Fourth Amendment 
tests, see Colb, supra note 74, at 1644 (describing “probable cause” as a quantitative standard of 
confidence, as compared to a qualitative approach to reasonableness); Bradley, supra note 74, at 1471 
(describing two distinct models of Fourth Amendment adjudication); see generally Bowers, Pointless 
Indignity, supra note 40; Wasserstrom, supra note 74; infra notes 308–11 and accompanying text 
(endorsing a two-ply test, incorporating both models of Fourth Amendment adjudication). 
83 In this vein, Bill Stuntz has described probable cause as a test of “formal legality,” 
notwithstanding its fuzzier margins. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 258 (2011). Likewise, even though vagueness doctrine entails a somewhat evaluative 
standard, Mark Kelman has observed that it still resonates in the more formalistic “rule-respecting liberal 
tradition.” Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS 207, 212 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2011). 
84 Indeed, the idea of probable cause has even become something of a cultural artifact—
inspiring songs, fiction, and movies. See, e.g., BRAND NUBIAN, Probable Cause, on FOUNDATION 
(Arista Records 1998) (“You don’t have to break no laws/They just say probable cause.”); RIDLEY 
PEARSON, PROBABLE CAUSE (1990); PROBABLE CAUSE (Pacific Victory Pictures 1994). 
85 By way of further example, motorists commonly read vehicle-and-traffic conduct rules in light 
of prevailing enforcement norms. For instance, a speed limit may be taken to permit the driver to go 
up to nine miles faster than the posted figure. See Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 749, 767 (2013) (describing “the real rule [as] a speed limit of 74 and not 65”); cf. Taylor, supra 
note 72, at 172 (explaining that conduct rules are meaningful only to the extent they are enforced). 
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The legality principle (as currently construed) may command relatively 
precise rules, but our understanding of those rules and their reach responds 
likewise to forces on the ground and to other legal and extralegal impulses—
to what police officers know and do with their (and our) conduct rules; to 
what we know and do about what police officers know and do; to what police 
officers know and do about what we know and do; and to what courts know 
and do to accommodate (or not) the multitude of dynamic forces and 
conditions. Simply put, conduct rules are what we make of them. And, as I 
examine in the next three Parts, what we make of them is far from clear-cut 
or easy to anticipate. 
II. LEGALITY & SOVEREIGNTY 
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that a police officer’s subjective 
motivation is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.86 In a system 
committed to formal legality, inquiries into good or bad reasons are thought 
to be just too wooly. Consider, again, the officer’s arrest authority. Technical 
guilt accuracy is the categorical measure of constitutional reasonableness. 
Concretely, the police officer needs only probable cause to believe the arrestee 
has committed an offense—any offense, including even a noncriminal 
violation.87 This last point is subtle but profoundly important. We are a 
nation of petty rule breakers—low-level speeders, creators of trivial 
disorder.88 Indeed, the overwhelming majority of motorists break vehicle and 
traffic laws on an almost daily basis.89 To do so is customary—a matter of 
 
86 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006). 
87 See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (holding that the probable cause “rule extends 
even to minor misdemeanors”); Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (applying the probable 
cause rule “to all arrests”); see also Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped: Decriminalization and 
Legalism’s Limits, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 339 (2014) (collecting cases); Bowers, Pointless 
Indignity, supra note 1, at 998–1004, 1019–21; see, e.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72 (2001) 
(per curiam) (affirming constitutionality of full-custodial arrest for noncriminal traffic violation); 
Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rrests for violations of purely 
civil laws are common enough.”); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming 
arrest for failure to signal lane change); Miller v. City of Portland, No. 3:11–cv–01509–JE, 2014 WL 
320555, at *8 (D. Or. Jan. 29, 2014) (affirming full-custodial arrest for noncriminal jaywalking and 
observing that it is “immaterial to the scope of the Fourth Amendment” whether the state “has 
denominated this particular offense a ‘violation’ rather than a ‘crime’”). 
88 Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 
1163-64 (2004) (“American criminal justice is founded on overcriminalization and discretion . . . . Minor 
crimes absorb the bulk of our ordinary, local enforcement efforts and there is an endless supply of minor 
crime which may be pursued . . . . Many, if not most Americans repeatedly violate our substantive laws 
everyday, exposing themselves to police intrusion . . . .”). See generally Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the 
Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497 (2007) (examining the manner by which void-for-vagueness doctrine 
has failed adequately to limit discretionary enforcement of vehicle and traffic laws). 
89 See e.g., Fred Mannering, An Empirical Analysis of Driver Perceptions of The Relationship 
Between Speed Limits and Safety, Transportation Research Part F, https://engineering.purdue.edu/ 
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course, almost. But, once a pedestrian or motorist has violated some 
frequently flouted traffic or public-order law, her unexceptional conduct 
exposes her to the exceptional intrusion of a full-custodial arrest.90 
Of course, she may predict accurately that no officer would likely treat her 
trivial offense so harshly. But her guess is only a statistical expectation of 
“sovereign grace.”91 Her plans for unmolested passage are empirical and 
sociological, not legal. Legal entitlement belongs to the officer. He may rely 
upon byzantine vehicle and traffic law as a license to intrude. 
Observe, then, the manner by which precision has empowered. With well-
defined substantive conduct rules, the officer can easily identify a violation. 
The carefully drawn statute thereby grants the officer tremendous discretion 
to determine, practically, the offender and, likewise, the implications of the 
offense—to pick and choose which motorist should receive a warning, a ticket, 
or a trip to central booking.92 It is a choice that tends to turn on administrative 
or equitable considerations, not legal guilt.93 The Fourth Amendment 
disregards the questions that most matter: against whom will police enforce 
a public-order offense, and for what reason? 
 
~flm/CE361_files/Mannering-TRF-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPN3-KHUC] (“[O]bserved data 
show that only about 5% of drivers operate at or below speed limits on interstate highway segments 
posted at 55 mph, and that as few as 23% of drivers operate at or below the posted speed limit on 
non-freeway facilities.”); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 88, at 1520 (citing data to show that traffic laws 
are set by safety engineers with the assumption that some or even most motorists will speed). 
90 Weinstein, supra note 88, at 1164 (“[I]t is almost impossible to drive a car in America without 
giving the police a legally valid reason to stop and arrest you. Walking down the street, or sitting on 
a stoop, is little better . . . [in light of] proscriptions against disorderly conduct [and other public-
order offenses].”). 
91 Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the 
Limits of Law, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 413 (2008) (“[T]he rule of law is replete with . . . places 
where law runs up against sovereign prerogative. In those places, law runs out . . . . [The] law 
authorizes the exercise of a power that it does not regulate.”). 
92 Logan, supra note 87, at 331 (“[P]olice officers . . . wield near-total discretion to execute 
arrests for low-level social-disorder offenses.”); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 88, at 1503 n.38 (“[T]raffic 
laws confer virtually unlimited discretion on police to investigate whichever motorist they wish.”). 
93 Weinstein, supra note 88, at 1163-64 (“Anywhere in America today, if a practical and 
experienced police officer decides to impose some constraint, . . . she can often do so with almost 
certain impunity . . . . Police resources, not minor offenders, limit the number of arrests for minor 
offenses.”); see also FEELEY, supra note 32, at 284 (observing that decisionmaking in petty cases “are 
based on a host of considerations other than the strength of the evidence and applicable law,” 
including “assessments of the ‘real’ trouble”); id. at 159-61 (“I think the legal factors probably come 
into play in about one in every twenty-five cases . . . . [M]ost of the appeals are sort of common-
sense assessments of the situation.”) (quoting prosecutor); Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation 
and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 929 (1960) (noting 
equitable considerations predominate “for petty causes where expense of protracted investigation is 
out of proportion to the advantage of wholly assured [legal] result”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative 
Innocence, supra note 1, at 1662 n.21 (explaining that in petty cases “equitable considerations tend to 
predominate” over questions of legal guilt). See generally id. (describing three strands of analysis and 
three corresponding types of abuse: the legal, the administrative, and the equitable). 
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A. Reasons & Reasonableness 
The obvious fear is that the officer’s reasons and choices may have more to 
do with implicit (or even explicit) race bias than with public safety or order.94 
On this score, we may hope that the Equal Protection Clause might take up 
some of the slack. But, absent a frank admission of a discriminatory purpose, 
such claims are practical nonstarters.95 As a police union president recently 
conceded: “If an officer has probable cause to make a stop, there’s absolutely 
no way you can prove racial profiling unless you get into that officer’s head.”96 
In any event, an officer may behave arbitrarily without implicating race or 
ethnicity.97 Invidious discrimination is just one of the most reprehensible 
versions of arbitrary state action, but not the only version.98 Consider the 
 
94 Supra notes 22, 37-40 and infra notes 112–15, 122, 204–08, 421–30 and accompanying text. 
95 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (rejecting an equal protection claim—
notwithstanding a rigorous statistical showing of discriminatory charging and sentencing effects—
where no discriminatory purpose could be demonstrated in the immediate case); see also Chavez v. 
Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d. 612, 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding no discriminatory purpose 
despite statistical showing of racial disparities in traffic stops); PBS, Bryan Stevenson and Michelle 
Alexander, BILL MOYERS JOURNAL (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/ 
04022010/watch.html [https://perma.cc/982G-MWRG] (“McClesky [sic] versus Kemp has 
immunized the criminal justice system from judicial scrutiny for racial bias. It has made it virtually 
impossible to challenge . . . for racial bias in the absence of proof of intentional discrimination . . . 
[which] is almost impossible to come by in the absence of some kind of admission.”); Sarat & Clarke, 
supra note 91, at 395 (“Even a cursory glance at the [equal protection] case law reveals the extent to 
which judges . . . have abandoned oversight.”). 
96 Matt Ferner, New California Law Aims to Curb Racial Profiling by Police, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-law-police-racial-profiling_us_ 
5612fd05e4b0368a1a60c3ff [https://perma.cc/EK56-PSQN]; see also Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra 
note 40, at 1037 (“[P]lenty of room for mischief (unconscious or otherwise) remains between the 
limits of the Fourth Amendment and equal protection—between the requirement that an arresting 
officer possess probable cause and the requirement that an arrest have a nondiscriminatory 
purpose.”). Even without race bias, order-maintenance enforcement may remain localized to 
distressed majority-minority neighborhoods. Disorder correlates with urban poverty and urban 
poverty correlates with race. Thus, normatively dubious arrests pool in historically disadvantaged 
communities. See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1699 (“[T]he most 
persuasive explanation for why authorities target poor and minority communities for order 
maintenance policing is that disorder is disproportionately found there, and resources being finite, 
enforcement dollars are best spent on geographically targeted policing . . . even if public order crime 
is, to some degree, everywhere.”); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
1795, 1820-22 (1998) (“Looking in poor neighborhoods tends to be both successful and cheap . . . . 
Street stops can go forward with little or no advance investigation . . . . [T]he stops themselves 
consume little time, so the police have no strong incentive to ration them carefully.”). 
97 See infra notes 295, 302–05, 369–73, 378–79, 382–85 and accompanying text (discussing a 
broader conception of arbitrariness, and examining Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff, 136 
S. Ct. 2056 (2016)). 
98 See Jeffries, supra note 11, at 213 (observing that the “worst case” scenario for the rule of law 
is “hidden bias and prejudice”); see also Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1003 (“[E]qual 
protection is designed to regulate out of existence certain always-bad moral reasons. When it comes 
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facts of Atwater v. Lago Vista. An officer arrested a white “soccer mom” for the 
non-jailable offense of failing to buckle seatbelts.99 According to one 
commentator, the officer was a “jerk, acting out of seemingly personal 
pique.”100 And, remarkably, the Court agreed. It castigated the officer for 
subjecting the motorist to the “gratuitous humiliations” of a full custodial 
arrest, and it spoke reverently of her trampled-upon “claim to live free of 
pointless indignity and confinement.”101 In short, even the Court considered 
the arrest arbitrary by any folk measure. 
Nevertheless, the majority held the intrusion constitutionally reasonable 
because—to put it in our terms—the officer had satisfied his conduct rules. It did 
not matter that the officer had “behaved badly,” as the majority conceded.102 
The motorist had violated vehicle and traffic law. That was enough. 
Thereafter, the officer was entitled to indulge whatever “nonlegal impetus” 
drove him to respond so inequitably and nonsensically.103 With probable 
cause, he was “authorized . . . to make a custodial arrest.”104 More to the point, 
he was “authorized [but] not required” to make the arrest.105 His conduct rules 
were “power-directing.”106 They served primarily as “means of insulating” the 
arrest from constitutional challenge.107 They described a safe harbor within 
which he could plan and carry out exercises of official coercion.108 Within that 
safe harbor, he needed no genuine or even manufactured good reason.109 
 
to sometimes-bad reasons (like the decision to arrest for morally neutral petty crime), . . . [t]he Court 
has opted to regulate not at all.”). 
99 Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 (2001); see also Kathryn R. Urbonya, Four on the 
Fourth: High Court Gets Several Chances to Elaborate on Standards for Searches and Seizures, 86 ABA J. 
4, 32 (2000) (describing the arrestee as a “soccer mom”). See generally Bowers, supra note 1 (examining 
Atwater in great detail). 
100 Wayne A. Logan, Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: Police Power Takes a More 
Intrusive Turn, 46 AKRON L. REV. 413, 429 (2013) [hereinafter Logan, Florence v. Board]. 
101 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346-47. 
102 See id. (“[The] police officer . . . was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.”). 
103 See Schauer, infra note 139, at 429 (defining a “nonlegal impetus” as, inter alia, an 
“idiosyncratic reaction to . . . the very particular facts of the case”). 
104 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354. 
105 See id. (emphasis added). 
106 See Eric J. Miller, Are There Two Types of Decision Rules?, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS 20, 21 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2009) 
(defining “power-directing” conduct rules). 
107 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
108 See infra Section II.B (describing the manner by which rules, counterintuitively, produce 
discretion and opportunities for sovereign choice); cf. infra note 146 and accompanying text 
(discussing opportunities for legal professionals to game rules). 
109 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353-54 (“[H]is subjective reason for making the arrest need not be 
the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” (quoting Devenpeck v. 
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004))); Weinstein, supra note 88, at 1163-64 (“This state of affairs runs 
counter to the notion that official power is constrained . . . that law enforcement must have a reason 
under the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added)). 
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The formalist might respond that probable cause, as a metric of legal guilt, 
constitutes its own persuasive reason or justification. But technical guilt accuracy is 
ultimately insufficient for discretionary order–maintenance arrests (though it 
might the right measure for serious offenses for which categorical arrest is 
anticipated).110 In petty public-order cases, probable cause merely translates to a 
troubling form of “constitutional carte blanche”111—a plenary authority to harass 
and humiliate, to constrain and coerce, to behave in a manner antithetical to the 
purpose of the legality principle “as an important prophylaxis against the arbitrary 
and abusive exercise of discretion in the enforcement of the penal law.”112 John 
Jeffries has written that order–maintenance enforcement “invite[s] 
manipulation.”113 As he saw it, the problem was the failure of courts to adjudicate 
the actions of legal officials in a class of cases that almost never proceed to trial.114 
But, even as to the public-order cases that do get litigated, judges never resolve the 
normative matters that matter most, instead asking and answering only relatively 
off-topic questions of whether officers violated formal conduct rules, like the 
requirement of probable cause. 
B. Precision & Pretext 
An officer may also pick between offenses. He may substitute one 
demonstrable offense for a roughly suspected other.115 In the process, the 
principle of legality loses grip. At the extreme, an expansive penal code 
 
110  See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1658 (“Most people anticipate 
something approximating categorical enforcement of very serious felonies but anticipate 
nonenforcement of some nontrivial number of petty crime incidents.”). 
111 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Atwater majority insisted that low-
level, order–maintenance arrests are vanishingly rare. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 321, 353 (majority 
opinion) (disclaiming an “epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests,” and noting the “dearth of 
[Atwater-like] horribles demanding redress”). But it is not obvious that they are so uncommon—at 
least in certain communities. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “people of color are disproportionate[ly] victims” of “suspicionless stop[s]”); 
Logan, supra note 87, at 336 nn.128-29 (cataloguing cases and studies of full-custodial arrests for 
traffic and other non-jailable public-order offenses); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban 
Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043, 1064 (2013) (describing the practice of “making a full-
custodial arrest for [non-criminal] marijuana possession”); see also Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra 
note 40, at 993; see, e.g., infra notes 392–93 and accompanying text (discussing cognitive and 
institutional biases in favor of arrest, and describing the arrest of Sandra Bland, following traffic 
stop for failure to signal a lane change). 
112 BONNIE ET AL., supra note 25, at 81; see also Rachel Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative 
State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1333-35 (2008) (“[O]ur legal culture has come 
to view unreviewable discretion . . . as the very definition of lawlessness.”); see supra notes 4-5, 26, 
41–42, infra notes 127, 250, 295, 385, 421–32, and accompanying text. 
113 Jeffries, supra note 11, at 197. 
114 Id. 
115 Supra Section II.A. 
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resembles a “menu of options” more than a set of effective constraints.116 Law 
enforcement becomes a matter of “picking the man and then searching the 
law books . . . to pin some offense on him.”117 This, then, is what Richard 
McAdams meant when he suggested that pretextual arrests and charges may 
“fail on rule of law grounds.”118 Constructively, the state’s evidentiary burden 
diminishes as to the genuine object crime.119 
Consider, for instance, United States v. Whren.120 Vice squad officers 
observed a vehicle occupied by several young African-American men. The 
officers harbored an inarticulable suspicion that the occupants were narcotics 
traffickers (based on what, we may wonder?).121 But, of course, their educated 
guess could not authorize a vehicle stop. So they waited. In short order, the 
officers observed the motorist commit two low level traffic infractions. They 
stopped the vehicle and recovered cocaine. The reason for the stop was 
obviously pretext. Vice squad officers do not care about the enforcement of 
traffic laws. And, even if we disregard the racial subtext,122 we still may see 
the case for what it was—an intrusion motivated by rough hunch. The officers 
 
116 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
911, 932-34 (2006) (arguing that criminal laws create “a menu of options” for police and prosecutors 
to decide whether to arrest and charge); see also STUNTZ, supra note 83, at 509, 521 (“Broad criminal 
codes ensure inconsistency. Broad codes cannot be enforced as written; thus, the definition of the 
law-on-the-street necessarily differs, and may differ a lot, from the law-on-the-books.”); Stuntz, 
supra note 96, at 3-4, 36 (“Law enforcers . . . define the laws they enforce . . . . Too much law amounts 
to no law at all.”); Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Criminal Law and Procedures: The 
Pessimists’ View, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, 517, 521 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, 
& Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2011). 
117 See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 18, 19 (1940); see also 
RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 609, 621 (2d ed. 2005) 
(“[P]olice may employ commonly violated but relatively clear laws to pick and choose among the 
violators they will stop.”). 
118 See Richard H. McAdams, The Entrapment Defense Defended, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS 509, 519-20 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 
2011) (describing use of pretext as a state of affairs that “stands on its head the distinctive criminal 
law idea of the principle of legality”). 
119 See id.; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972) (describing how 
a prosecution “may be merely the cloak for a conviction that could not be obtained on the real but 
undisclosed grounds for the arrest”); id. at 170 (remarking that it “would be in the highest degree 
unfortunate” if law enforcement “should entertain, connive at or coquette with the idea” to punish 
an individual by pretext “in a case where there is not enough evidence” for the object crime) (quoting 
Gordon Hewart); cf. STUNTZ, supra note 83, at 301 (explaining the way in which legal officials may 
rely upon pretext to escape accountability). 
120 53 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff ’d, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
121 Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441-42 n.1 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing 
that when officers act in the absence of individualized suspicion their motivation is “less likely to be 
inarticulable than unspeakable” (emphasis omitted)). 
122 See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
2001, 2005-09 (1998) (examining the overlap between pretext and discriminatory traffic stops). 
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were confident that the young men were bad guys, up to no good.123 And they 
were empowered to act on that estimation of poor character—that perception 
of what I have called “normative guilt.”124 It was irrelevant that the officers 
were unable to satisfy their drug–law conduct rules; the officers satisfied their 
traffic–law conduct rules, and those rules were ready substitutes.125 
Thus, we discover the limits of the dominant conception of the legality 
principle. It is too cramped to account for pretext or its implications. The officers 
were free to behave in a manner that would have been arbitrary (according to 
even the Court’s formal legal definition) but for the happenstance of other 
available legal tools. And, as to vice squad officers, the array of vehicle and traffic 
law is just that—happenstance, a happy expedient that gave the officers “the same 
kind of authority . . . [as] old-style vagrancy and loitering laws.”126 
III. EXCEPTIONS TO CONDUCT RULES. EXCEPTIONS                            
AS CONDUCT RULES? 
But our rule of law is not entirely lawless. The officer still must satisfy his 
conduct rules, right? Not quite. As it happens, even if he is not legally 
authorized, he may be equitably excused. This is nothing new. Criminal 
procedure students learn early on that baseline Fourth Amendment conduct 
rules are replete with exceptions. Warrants and probable cause are hardly “per 
 
123 See Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 
72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1067–68 (1998) (explaining that many traffic and public-order offenses may be 
“designed to give police probable cause for arresting those suspected of being up to no good”). 
124 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1678-79 (describing the concept 
of normative guilt and contrasting it with legal guilt). 
125 Significantly, there was a time when the Court was much more skeptical about the use of 
pretext. See GOLUBOFF, supra note 67, at 189 (discussing early constitutional efforts to regulate 
vagrancy statutes and observing that the “[Supreme] Court as a whole had sporadically hinted that 
[these] uses of vagrancy laws in the service of more serious crime control goals might be 
problematic.” (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964))); see also Roaden v. Kentucky, 
413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973) (“A seizure reasonable . . . in one setting may be unreasonable in a different 
setting.”); supra notes 225–42 and accompanying text.  
126 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 842, 853-54 (2001); see also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life 
in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 618 (1997) 
(“[B]road and overinclusive rules enhance police discretion, and . . . a plethora of narrow rules may 
not meaningfully constrain it.”). As Wayne LaFave explained a half-century ago, one of the principal 
problems with vague statutes is that officers may manipulate them “to justify detention and 
interrogation of persons suspected of more serious crimes.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST; THE 
DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY: THE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
FOUNDATION’S SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 87-88 (1965). And this is how officers now use minor traffic and public-order offenses. 
Mazrui, supra note 88, at 1502 n.32 (“[W]hen courts invalidate ‘vague’ laws, ironically they often 
invite greater degrees of police discretion.”); supra notes 42, 66–68, 89–94, infra notes 233–36, and 
accompanying text. 
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se” requirements, notwithstanding the Court’s assurances.127 To the contrary, 
the Court has adopted a number of bright line exceptions, justified typically 
by pressing circumstance.128 Thus, a police officer needs no warrant to search 
a vehicle, which is considered inherently mobile.129 Following the same logic, 
the officer may conduct a warrantless arrest outside the home and, thereafter, 
may search the person.130 And, because traffic stops are thought to be 
especially dangerous, an officer is given “unquestioned command of the 
situation” to minimize the risk of harm.131 This means that he may remove 
drivers and passengers and may even secure and frisk them on the roadside 
without individualized suspicion, much less a warrant or probable cause.132 
In carving out these bright line exceptions, the Court has tempered the 
conventional conduct rules with a methodology of understanding—
specifically, an understanding of the officer and his predicament. But even 
though the bright line exception is a product of understanding, it naturally 
constitutes a rigid and recognizable pronouncement. In this way, it remains 
entirely consistent with legality’s conventional formal approach with its 
preference for precisely drawn conduct rules. The more obvious challenge to 
the dominant conception of the legality principle is the piecemeal exception—
which is the principal subject of the rest of this Article. 
A. Understanding the Methodology 
The piecemeal exception entails an all-things-considered and ex post form 
of evaluation. The exception is designed to meet persuasive moral and 
prudential demands in domains where, under the particular circumstances, 
“law runs out.”133 The methodology has more in common with Max Weber’s 
preferred mode of sociological inquiry, called verstehen, whereby we 
 
127 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasizing that “searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment”). 
128 Indeed, immediately after the Katz Court declared warrantless searches “per se unreasonable,” 
it acknowledged “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 357. 
129 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-62 (1925). 
130 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976) (holding constitutional warrantless 
arrests outside the home); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1973) (holding constitutional 
warrantless searches incident to lawful arrests); see also infra note 391 (discussing Robinson). 
131 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 324 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
132 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1977) (per curiam) (granting officers the 
categorical authority to remove drivers from vehicles “as a matter of course”); see also Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) (extending the Mimms rule to passengers); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 113 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In the instant case, the officer did not have even the slightest hint, prior 
to ordering respondent out of the car, that respondent might have a gun . . . . The car was stopped 
for the most routine of police procedures, the issuance of a summons for an expired license plate.”). 
133 See Sarat & Clarke, supra note 91, at 413 (“[T]he rule of law is replete with gaps, fissures, 
and failures . . . . In those places, law runs out.”); see also infra notes 139, 182, and accompanying text. 
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understand “the nature of the situation” by “projecting ourselves” into it.134 
To a degree, juries may do this when they evaluate situational excuses, and 
judges may do this when they contemplate Fourth Amendment exceptions.135 
Judges evaluate the Fourth Amendment question of constitutional 
reasonableness from the perspective of the officer and ask whether his failure 
to follow the prevailing conduct rules was reasonably explicable and thereby 
excusable, in light of sometimes delicate, evolving, and even dangerous 
extenuating circumstances.136 It is a matter of understanding an officer’s 
objectively good reasons for falling short in “circumstances of emergency, 
high pressure, and emotion.”137 
The analogue to this mode of legal reasoning is particularism, a moral 
philosophy that rejects generally applicable rules and instead prioritizes the 
exercise of human intuition and practical deliberation as applied to concrete 
cases.138 The premise is that the “bivalence” of a rule may be competent to 
produce only a boxy and fictive representation of fine-grained reality.139 
Comparatively, the ambivalence of a particularistic approach allows the 
adjudicator to get to the bottom of a complicated story.140 On this reading, 
 
134 See William T. Tucker, Max Weber’s “Verstehen”, 6 SOC. Q. 157, 158, 161-63 (1965) 
(explaining that sociologically meaningful understanding “comes about only as the individual orients 
himself with reference to the conduct of others”) 
135 See infra Section V.D (discussing situational excuses and other affirmative defenses). 
136 See infra Part V. 
137 Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 639. 
138 Solum, supra note 52, at 98; see also JOHN KEKES, HOW SHOULD WE LIVE? A PRACTICAL 
APPROACH TO EVERYDAY MORALITY 47 (2014) (expressing the strong particularist account that 
“moral judgment can get along perfectly well without any appeal to principles” (quoting Jonathan 
Dancy)); cf. DAVIS, infra note 140, at 20 (noting it is “through case-to-case consideration, where the 
human mind is often at its best,” not in formulation or application of generally applicable rules). 
139 Frederick Schauer, Analogy in the Supreme Court: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 405, 405-06 (describing the “bivalence” of rules and their inability to demand 
“some of this and some of that”). 
140 Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 93, 96 (1993) (“[T]he 
‘matter of the practical’ can be grasped only crudely by rules given in advance, and adequately only 
by a flexible judgment suited to the complexities of the case . . . . The point of the rule of law is to 
bring us as close as possible . . . . But no such rules can be precise or sensitive enough.”); Roscoe 
Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 802, 816 (1923) (“The times call insistently 
for results in actual cases, not merely for abstractly just general rules.”); Sarat & Clarke, supra note 
91, at 406 (“[I]n certain circumstances, the rule of law is not enough.”); Solum, supra note 52, at 206 
(“[T]here will always be cases in which the problem is not that the rule was not given its optimal 
formulation. Rather, the problem is that the infinite variety and complexity of particular fact 
situations outruns our capacity to formulate general rules.”); R. George Wright, Dreams and Formulas: 
The Roles of Particularism and Principlism in the Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195, 214 (2008) (noting that 
formal law can become “insensitive, mechanical, morally blind, or ‘rule fetishist.’”); cf. KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 21 (1976) (“[A] needed . . . 
escape from rigid rules [is] a far cry from the proposition that where law ends tyranny begins.”). 
This is, of course, the rules–standards debate—that rules may be clearer and easier to 
administer, but that standards respond better to context. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
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the piecemeal exception is defensible. It is animated by the admirable human 
impulse to understand meaningfully just how hard it often is to follow the 
rules. 
B. Understanding the Exception 
Meaningful understanding of this kind does not fit well within legality’s 
typical playbook. Nevertheless, it need not offend the principle, even 
according to legality’s prevailing formulation. According to Dan-Cohen, “no 
one is likely to complain about the frustration of an expectation” when a 
particularistic doctrine of excuse is “more lenient than the relevant conduct 
rules.”141 In other words, the rule of law abides pleasant surprises because such 
surprises do not affect the individual’s opportunities to plan conduct in the 
shadow of law.142 Dan-Cohen further suggested that a criminal justice system 
might even strive to keep the prospective beneficiary unaware of a potentially 
 
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 
42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557 (1992). I have picked sides in the debate. See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra 
note 40, at 1024-25 (describing the virtues of standards); see also Bowers, Baselines, supra note 56, at 
1114-15 (questioning the criminal justice system’s widespread dependence upon bright-line rules); 
Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 355 
(2012) [hereinafter Bowers, Normative Grand Juries] (expressing concern that “the Court has come 
to rely too heavily on bright-line rules”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 
1672 (“Complete justice demands both the simple justice that arises from fair and virtuous treatment 
and the legal justice that arises from the application of legal rules.”). And I have my allies. See, e.g., 
Alschuler, supra note 74, at 231 (describing the manner by which bright line Fourth Amendment 
rules, as applied, may produce a “disregard of values”); cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral 
Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222 (2010) (“[O]ne virtue of 
standards is that their lack of precision induces moral deliberation.”); Jeremy Waldron, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 269, 273-74 (2010) (observing that 
less-structured legal standards may improve the “quality of moral argument” by leading individuals 
“to reflect upon . . . a given practice”). But I am not insensitive to countervailing claims concerning 
rules’ virtue and value. I am just skeptical of the great promise ascribed to formal rules by their 
proponents and, more to the point, by the dominant conception of the legality principle. See infra 
Sections V.B–C (endorsing a procedural conception of the legality principle, and proposing 
evaluative approaches to certain Fourth Amendment questions). 
141 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 634, 671 (explaining that, with respect to leniency, “no one 
is likely to feel ‘entrapped’ by the law” in a manner that might offend the rule of law); Shiffrin, supra 
note 140, at 1240 (discussing the affirmative defense of self-defense, and concluding that “[t]he use 
of a standard in this circumstance operates less as a ‘blind,’ trapping those who might otherwise steer 
clear of danger . . . because the standard here operates as a defense in response to a conduct norm.”). 
142 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 673 (“[B]y definition, conduct rules are all one needs to know 
in order to obey the law.”); see also Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation 
in Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 3, 10-11 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, 
& Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2011) (“[T]he rule of law allegedly promotes liberty or autonomy by 
increasing predictability. But the need for security of individual expectations is not a great obstacle . . . 
when decision rules are more lenient than conduct rules would lead people to expect. In such cases no 
one is likely to complain of frustrated expectations.”). 
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available piecemeal exception. “Acoustic separation,” as Dan-Cohen dubbed 
it, prevents the individual from feigning situational excuses like duress, which 
tend to be genuinely felt only when they are unplanned.143 Comparatively, an 
individual who designs his conduct to fit a particular exception to a conduct 
rule is probably playing games—concocting extenuating circumstances (or, at 
least, not experiencing them genuinely). 
But “acoustic separation” (or a lack thereof) is not my principal concern.144 
My focus is a practical point about timing—specifically, that a judge is not 
permitted to implement a methodology of meaningful understanding until 
after conduct rules are broken. Put differently, the dominant conception of 
the legality principle allows a judge to consider the whole story only as a 
means to excuse, not as a means to condemn. The logic may seem obvious—
no one ought to be penalized just for following the rules. Indeed, this assertion is 
really just a restatement of legality’s keystone—“nulla poena sine lege” or “there 
is no penalty without law.”145 By this reasoning, a layperson may act immorally 
or destructively—without fear of judicial interference—unless and until a 
 
143 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 641 (“The typical situation that gives rise to a defense 
of duress or necessity involves an actor of no special legal sophistication caught in circumstances 
of emergency, high pressure, and emotion. The likelihood that the actor is aware of the defense 
or able to act on such awareness is in these circumstances at its lowest.”); see also Anne M. 
Coughlin, Of Decision Rules and Conduct Rules, or Doing the Police in Different Voices, in CRIMINAL 
LAW CONVERSATIONS 15, 16 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 
2011) (“What does the lawbreaker have to whine about? The fact that she thought she was going 
to be punished, but lo and behold, duress provides an escape hatch? That would be goofy, to say 
the very least.”); cf. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1439 (1995) 
(“[Affirmative] defenses are legislated only in bare outline.”). Acoustic separation could create 
other problems, however. Anne Coughlin observed that victims of crime are entitled to know 
when a criminal justice system might excuse offenders, particularly with respect to crimes that 
traditionally have been under-enforced, like sexual assault. Coughlin, supra, at 16 (“The women 
interpret this conduct rule to mean . . . [no] non-consensual sex . . . . [Thus, when women are] 
told, nope, sorry, that was not rape, . . . [it] may produce uncertainty, insecurity, a loss of 
autonomy, and a loss of faith in the rule of law.”). 
144 Still, a lack of acoustic separation is a concern, as it pertains to the police. Without 
acoustic separation, officers may more readily manipulate exceptions to conduct rules to inflict 
rough punishment. Fan, supra note 72, at 1418 (noting that “[police] are sensitive to shifts in the 
law—even subtle and less publicized decision rule shifts that limit remedies for constitutional 
violations—and can adjust behavior accordingly”); Steiker, supra note 72, at 2471 (“The law 
enforcement community’s easy access to decision rules should create concerns that sophisticated 
law enforcement agents will see some incentives to violate conduct rules when no court-imposed 
sanction will follow.”); cf. Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1242 n.82 (explaining that “rules [may] 
facilitate gaming behavior”); supra note 73 and accompanying text. See generally Bibas, supra note 
116 (distinguishing between professional criminal-justice “insiders” and lay “outsiders”). 
Although manipulation is not my focus, I touch on the problem in places. See, e.g., infra notes 
225–31 and accompanying text. 
145 See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 186-89 (1937) (describing 
development of the principle). 
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statutory rule proscribes her conduct.146 And an officer may likewise behave 
badly without fear of judicial interference—unless and until a Fourth 
Amendment rule proscribes his conduct.147 
There is a snag, however. The legality principle’s bedrock proposition—
that a rule follower is free to go about his business—disregards the way in 
which the business of the rule-following layperson is categorically different 
from the business of the rule-following cop. The layperson plans a law-
abiding life. In contrast, the officer plans law-abiding intrusions into the lives 
of laypeople. Their plans intersect, and when they intersect, the officer’s 
piecemeal exception may become the layperson’s piecemeal burden. But, of 
course, the premise and promise of the legality principle is that a layperson’s 
burdens—her conduct rules—are not meant to be piecemeal. Her burdens are 
supposed to always remain precise.148 
The result is a doctrinal asymmetry that I call the sword/shield distinction. 
An officer may be granted a qualitative excuse—a particularistic shield—once 
he has failed to follow Fourth Amendment conduct rules. But the layperson 
has no particularistic sword with which to challenge the legally authorized, 
yet morally problematic, intrusion. Extralegal arguments are only available to 
forgive police conduct that otherwise would have been legally arbitrary. In 
comparison, a legally authorized intrusion just is constitutional, even if it is 
obviously arbitrary for extralegal reasons. Put differently, the officer may 
invoke a normative conception of reasonableness to ground his excuse, but 
the individual may invoke no normative conception of unreasonableness to 
ground her constitutional claim. The consequent asymmetry puts the 
individual in a pinch. She cannot adequately learn the law in practice where 
the law is a product of police practices (and a court’s understanding of those 
practices).149 Nor may she ask a court for meaningful understanding of her 
own predicament.150 In the process, her conduct rules are defined not only by 
a penal code’s precise rules, but also by the flexible and fuzzy exceptions that 
benefit law enforcement at her expense. 
 
146 See infra notes 269–71 and accompanying text (discussing the conduct requirement). 
147 Cf. infra notes 100–11 (discussing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001)). 
148 See supra notes 5, 26, 47, 50-53, 113 and accompanying text (discussing the legality principle’s 
purpose as a buffer against arbitrary coercion).  
149 Cf. State v. Pomianek, 110 A.3d 841, 843-46 (N.J. 2015) (holding unconstitutionally vague a 
purported mens rea provision that “impose[d] criminal liability based solely on the victim’s perception 
of the underlying crime, regardless of the defendant’s intent”) (emphasis added). In essence, the 
Pomianek Court held that a defendant could not be required to read a victim’s abstract mind. Id. 
150 See infra notes 159–64, 179, 181–220, 240–53 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine and 
hypotheticals). 
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IV. UNDERSTANDING THE POLICE 
In this Part, I examine the doctrines that exemplify the Supreme Court’s 
asymmetric methodology of understanding. Specifically, I analyze and interpret 
the opinions by which the Court has accommodated the officer’s reasonable 
perspective—his mistakes, his needs, his fears—even as it has demanded that the 
individual make her constitutional pitch according to rules or not at all. 
A. Mistake 
Consider, for a moment, the Fourth Amendment doctrine of consent. 
With voluntary consent, the officer may search without a warrant or probable 
cause (or, for that matter, individualized suspicion of any kind).151 Again, his 
search just is reasonable—categorically. In this way, the doctrine of actual 
consent is not piecemeal; it describes a bright-line exception that reshapes 
the officer’s baseline conduct rules in a relatively precise fashion. Thereafter, 
his modified conduct rules may be summarized to read: “an officer needs (i) 
a warrant and probable cause as to a valid offense, or, alternatively, he needs 
(ii) actual voluntary consent.” 
But the consent inquiry does not always end there. Even if an officer has 
failed to secure actual consent, he still may rely upon so-called apparent 
consent—a piecemeal exception to the officer’s (already tempered) baseline 
conduct rules. As the Court observed in Illinois v. Rodriguez: “[W]hat is 
generally demanded of . . . agents of the government . . . is not that they 
always be correct, but that they always be reasonable . . . . [S]ufficient 
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness.”152 In Rodriguez, 
the Court credited the officers’ reasonable (albeit erroneous) perspective that 
a home’s occupant had authority to consent to a search. The Court thereby 
reached two steps beyond the conventional legalistic framework—from the 
purported requirements of warrant and probable cause, to a categorical 
alternative of actual consent, to a piecemeal exception of apparent consent.153 
At that degree of remove, the constitutionality of the police intrusion no 
longer relied principally upon facts about the world, but on an 
epistemological inquiry into whether the officers’ mistake was an 
 
151 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (involving a consent search of 
a car after the vehicle was pulled over for a broken headlight and license plate light). 
152 See 497 U.S. 177, 185-86, 188 (1990) (emphasis added) (indicating that the relevant inquiry 
was whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution 
in the belief” that his actions were lawful (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 
153 See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1139 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (indicating 
that, pursuant to prevailing consent doctrine, “[i]nstead of adhering to the warrant requirement . . . 
police . . . may dodge it”). 
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“understandable and . . . reasonable response to the situation.”154 And this question 
turned on the officer’s reasonable beliefs—his good reasons for his failure to 
follow the law. The complication is that, by making the law a product of police 
perspective, the Court “significantly expand[ed]” police power, as Justice 
Sotomayor observed in a related dissent.155 If the resident had wished to keep 
the state at bay, he had to do more than identify and assert his rights; he also 
had to block unauthorized others from his front door, thereby preventing 
them from undermining his legal position by looking enough like authorized 
occupants to reasonable cops. 
To get to this point, the Rodriguez Court endorsed a mode of 
particularistic evaluation that it had rejected in more legalistic decisions, like 
Whren v. United States.156 The Whren Court held that the constitutionality of 
an arrest was “not in doubt” as long as it was supported by probable cause.157 
In doing so, the Court declined to adopt the defendant’s alternative 
qualitative test: “[whether] a reasonable officer in the same circumstances 
would not have made the stop for the reasons given.”158 The Court determined 
that any constitutional test oriented around a reasonable officer’s perspective 
would be unpredictable and thereby incompatible with the legality principle. 
It would compel judges “to plumb the collective consciousness of law 
enforcement in order to determine whether a ‘reasonable officer’ would have 
been moved to act.”159 
But, of course, this is the very same test of constitutional reasonableness 
that the Rodriguez Court endorsed. Notably, Rodriguez was a decision 
authored by the very same Supreme Court Justice, Antonin Scalia. Then, why 
did Justice Scalia conclude that an evaluation of reasonable perspective 
constituted an exercise in “virtual subjectivity” in one context but not in the 
 
154 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added); see also Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 
803-04 (1971) (asking whether an officer’s mistake “was understandable” given “the situation 
facing him at the time.”). 
155 See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Giving 
officers license to effect seizures so long as they can attach to their reasonable view of the facts some 
reasonable legal interpretation (or misinterpretation) . . . significantly expands [police] authority.”); 
Logan, supra note 72, at 93 (noting that when courts credit such mistakes, “[t]he public is not freed 
from the grip of state control but rather is subjected to it”); infra notes 166–78, 272, 281, 286, 299–
300, and accompanying text. 
156 See 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (“[T]he officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners 
had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”); 
see also Colb, supra note 74, at 1654 (describing Whren as turning on “the formal legal status . . . of [the 
driver’s] specific conduct under the traffic laws”); supra Part II (discussing legalistic decisions). 
157 Whren, 517 U.S. at 817. 
158 Id. at 814; cf. Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1044-48 (endorsing and defending 
this alternative Fourth Amendment test). 
159 Whren, 517 U.S. at 815. 
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other?160 The dominant conception of legality provides the basis for the 
difference. Whereas Whren established a baseline conduct rule (that an arrest 
requires probable cause), Rodriguez provided for a piecemeal exception (that 
a search may be excused by reasonable mistake). By now, the underlying 
rationale ought to be apparent: positive legality allows courts to adopt a 
particularistic methodology only as to exceptions.161 This is the sword/shield 
distinction in a nutshell. In Rodriguez, the officers possessed a viable equitable 
shield of reasonable perspective after their understandable mistakes led them 
to deviate from their bright-line conduct rules. But, in Whren, the defendant 
had no equitable sword with which to challenge a pretextual (but rule-bound) 
traffic stop. The rule-bound stop was constitutionally reasonable categorically 
(even in the face of a persuasive argument that the particular exercise of 
pretext was unreasonable in the folk sense of the word).162 
*      *      * 
There is nothing new to the Court’s willingness to accommodate some 
police errors. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment has long tolerated reasonable 
mistakes of fact—for instance, mistakes about the facts that support a finding 
of probable cause.163 But, recently, the Court excused even an officer’s 
reasonable misinterpretation of code law. In Heien v. North Carolina, a police 
sergeant observed a “very stiff and nervous” driver, whom he proceeded to 
tail and ultimately stop for operating a vehicle with a broken taillight.164 But, 
 
160 Id. 
161 Supra Section III.B and accompanying text; cf. Logan, supra note 72, at 74 (describing 
mistake doctrine as a form of “[j]udicial forgiveness” (emphasis added)). 
162 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 
(2001)); see also Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1010-13 (examining the normative 
implications of Atwater in greater detail). 
163 See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971) (“The upshot was that the officers in good 
faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite wrong as it turned out, . . . [but] the 
arrest [was] a reasonable response.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“Officers can 
have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause . . . .”). 
An obvious response to my critique of a decision like Saucier is that I am making a mountain of a 
molehill. Probable cause is, by its very nature, a probabilistic and sometimes inaccurate measure. As 
Holmes observed: “[I]f the law is to punish at all, it must . . . go on probabilities.” OLIVER WENDEL 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 72 (1881); see also supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text 
(discussing the imprecision of probable cause). Thus, when we say that there is probable cause, we 
actually mean only that an adjudicator—a magistrate or judge—has declared it so. The question 
remains epistemic, and the final arbiter necessarily brings her own perspective to bear. Nevertheless, 
we may recognize the inevitable role of uncertainty in criminal justice without accepting uncritically 
all efforts to stack probabilities upon probabilities. We should acknowledge that we compound 
endemic uncertainties when we allow an officer to make reasonable mistakes about what a final 
arbiter will decide. 
164 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014). 
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in fact, the sergeant had the traffic law wrong. North Carolina motorists 
permissibly may drive a car with just one working taillight. Nevertheless, the 
Court held the stop (and a subsequent consent search) constitutional because 
it deemed the sergeant’s mistake reasonable.165 
Notice the manner by which the Heien decision intersects with Whren v. 
United States.166 After Heien, an officer may engage in pretextual stops premised 
on no law. This was what so troubled Justice Sotomayor in her Heien dissent: 
“[W]e assumed in Whren that when an officer acts on pretext, at least that 
pretext would be the violation of an actual law.”167 But, for the majority, it did 
not matter that the sergeant’s conduct fell “outside the scope of the law.”168 The 
determinative criteria were police perspective and practice.169 Understanding 
trumped legality, notwithstanding the traditional rule that individuals are 
presumed to know the law and are strictly liable for their errors.170 
It is a bit ironic, to say the least, that the Court would excuse the legal 
mistakes of a trained official (a sergeant, no less).171 Still, I am unconvinced 
that the Court was wholly misguided. To the contrary, I subscribe to the 
premise that an excuse of mistake of law should be available to anyone (even 
the sergeant, here), particularly as to mala prohibita public-order offenses.172 
But we cannot ignore the implications for the dominant conception of the 
legality principle, which is grounded on the idea that the criminal law must 
remain immutable and impervious to perspective or any other particularistic 
influence.173 It is on those formalistic terms that the Heien decision fails, not 
on my own comparatively functional terms. The entrenched view, articulated 
 
165 Id. 
166 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
167 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. at 536. 
169 See id. (explaining that allowing reasonable mistakes of both law and fact gives officers “fair 
leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection”). 
170 See, e.g., State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 137, 138 (1926) (refusing to recognize a defense of mistake 
of law notwithstanding the existence of lower-court precedent supporting the erroneous reading). 
171 See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“One is left to wonder . . . why an 
innocent citizen should be made to shoulder the burden of being seized whenever the law may be 
susceptible to an interpretive question.”). 
172 Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 127, 133, 152 (1997) (endorsing a negligence standard for reasonable mistakes of law); see also 
BONNIE ET AL., supra note 25, at 207 (“Not surprisingly, it is precisely in the context of modern 
regulatory offenses that plausible claims of ignorance of the law most commonly arise. In such cases, 
the policy of ignorantia legis must be explained as something other than an attempt to describe 
reality.”). And it appears the sergeant’s mistake was reasonable. As the Heien Court observed, the 
statute in question was “genuinely ambiguous” and posed “a quite difficult question of 
interpretation,” such that one court could read the “statute’s conflicting signals in one way” while 
another court “could easily take the officer’s view.” Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541-42. 
173 As Justice Sotomayor remarked in dissent: “‘[T]he notion that the law is definite and 
knowable’ sits at the foundation of our legal system.” Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543. 
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by Jerome Hall more than half a century ago, was to keep mistake from 
bending or upending law: 
[A] doctrine [of mistake of law] would contradict the essential requisites of a 
legal system, the implications of the principle of legality. To permit an 
individual to plead successfully that he had a different . . . interpretation of 
the law would contradict the . . . postulates of a legal order . . . [T]he 
consequence would be: Whenever a defendant in a criminal case thought the 
law was thus and so, he is to be treated as though the law were thus and so, 
i.e., the law actually is thus and so.174 
The Heien Court endorsed an alternative conception of law as a 
manifestation of belief and practice. Naturally, an officer is bound to have a 
better grasp over this body of “practice law,” since it is his beliefs that matter.175 
To divine the operative law’s shape, the officer may rely upon his own 
perspective and norms as a lens to draw blurry lines into sharper focus. This 
amounts to a procedural form of notice.176 The officer might not know 
precisely which types of mistakes are reasonable enough, but he knows 
enough to realize that he enjoys the benefit of the doubt. Comparatively, the 
individual can no longer bank on even positive legality’s foundational 
guarantee, which Justice Scalia once described as “an admirable belief that the 
law is the law.”177 The individual is left to pay two prices for the officer’s errors: 
the quality of her rights diminishes, as the clarity of her obligations gets 
obscured. And she suffers these twin penalties pursuant to a dictum that reads 
as almost arbitrary—“ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse, unless you have a 
badge (and wear it well enough).” 
 
174 JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 380-83 (2d ed. 1960); see also 
Logan, supra note 72, at 91-92, 95 (“When courts forgive mistaken police constructions of laws, a 
problem akin to that attending judicial approval of vague laws arises; a ‘potent message’ is broadcast 
to law enforcement that ‘the limits of official coercion are not fixed; the suggestion box is always 
open.’” (quoting Jeffries, supra note 11, at 223)). 
175 See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1154-55 (2013) 
(describing “practice law,” as defined by legal officials’ norms, perspectives, and actions). 
176 See infra notes 330–34 and accompanying text (discussing concept of procedural notice). 
177 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 480 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he only ‘fair warning’ discussed in our precedents . . . is fair warning of what the law 
is. That warning . . . safeguards [defendants] against changes in the law after the fact.”); cf. Heien, 135 S. 
Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he meaning of the law is not probabilistic in the same way 
that factual determinations are. Rather, ‘the notion that the law is definite and knowable’ sits at the 
foundation of our legal system.”) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)). 
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B. Fear 
Just as the Supreme Court has forgiven reasonable police mistakes, so too 
it has sought to understand the distinct and very real fears of the cop on the 
beat. Indeed, we may fairly describe much of Fourth Amendment exigency 
doctrine as a judicial effort to prioritize officer safety over a strict application 
of the usual conduct rules. And, here again, the Court has evaluated all-
things-considered claims of exigent circumstances “from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer.”178 
Consider the Court’s recent decision in Ryburn v. Huff.179 Officers went to 
the home of a juvenile who allegedly had threatened to “shoot up” his school. 
The officers repeatedly banged on the front door until the boy’s mother 
emerged. When an officer demanded to know whether there were guns inside, 
the mother retreated into the home. The officer would later claim that this 
“extremely unusual” behavior “scared” him—that he “didn’t know what was 
in that house” and had “seen too many officers killed.”180 But, of course, the 
mother had no legal obligation to cooperate, as even the Court 
acknowledged.181 Thus, the officers’ extralegal fears ran up against the mother’s 
attempt to exercise her legal rights. And her legal rights came up short. Again, 
asymmetric understanding trumped legality, because, as the Court put it, 
even “lawful conduct may portend imminent violence.”182 
It does not follow that the Court got it wrong. A blind fidelity to Fourth 
Amendment conduct rules might have left the officers in an untenably tight 
 
178 See Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 992 (2012) (evaluating constitutionality of warrantless 
entry, premised on exigency of officer safety, based upon “the perspective of a reasonable [police] 
officer”); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (“The Constitution is no more violated 
when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the 
person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when they 
enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a 
violent felon who is about to escape.”); cf. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013) 
(“[E]xigency . . . must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.”). 
179 132 S. Ct. at 987 (2012). 
180 Id. at 988-89. 
181 See id. at 990 (observing that the mother had “merely asserted her right to end her 
conversation with the officers and returned to her home”). 
182 Id. at 991; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014) (“The Fourth Amendment does 
not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger 
their lives or the lives of others.” (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 
(1967))). Admittedly, Ryburn was a qualified immunity case and not a case squarely about 
constitutional reasonableness. “The Court’s analysis strongly suggests, however, that the Justices 
believed the officers’ conduct was lawful.” RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 2014 SUPPLEMENT 91-92 (2014); see also Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 990 (“No 
decision of this Court has found a Fourth Amendment violation on facts even roughly comparable 
to those present in this case.”); id. (“[T]he Fourth Amendment permits an officer to enter a residence 
if the officer has a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an imminent threat of violence.” 
(citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006))). 
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spot. More generally, a rule-bound approach would prove insufficient to 
“cover all exigencies, especially . . . in situations of emergency or extreme 
peril.”183 In the real world, exceptions must be carved out. The difficulty, 
however, is that there is no such thing as a singular real world. To the contrary, 
the officer and the individual interact at the intersection of their “two separate 
worlds,” defined by their separate “lived experiences.”184 The individual 
cannot be expected to know and understand the officer’s world any more than 
the officer can be expected to know and understand the individual’s world. It 
follows that the individual should not be obligated to anticipate what 
reasonably might pique the officer’s fears—particularly when those fears are 
evaluated always from the officer’s perspective. Indeed, the very premise of 
the dominant conception of the legality principle is that, in order to plan a 
law-abiding life, an individual should be required to anticipate only her own 
law as it applies to her own world—her own rights and obligations, designated 
by her own precisely drawn conduct rules. In Ryburn, however, the Court used 
a methodology of asymmetric understanding to unintentionally destabilize 
that premise. The mother could not assert her rights without compromising 
them. Nor could she accurately comprehend her obligations. As her 
information costs rose, she was made to bear the burden of the officers’ fears. 
She too was put in a tight spot. But she had no opportunity to articulate her 
predicament—to ask for her worldview to count also in the balance of reasons. 
On the same score, consider Kentucky v. King, a case in which the Supreme 
Court held that police officers purposefully could create exigent 
circumstances by loudly announcing their presence at the door of a home to 
see how occupants might react.185 Here, as in Ryburn, the Court framed the 
qualitative question asymmetrically only—simply, whether the officer 
reasonably believed exigent circumstances existed to excuse entry at the 
moment of entry, independent of the actions taken by the officer to produce 
the belief or circumstances in the first instance.186 For his part, the defendant 
had two other qualitative questions in mind—two alternative constitutional 
tests—neither of which the Court was willing to entertain. Pursuant to the 
first alternative test, the Court would have asked whether the officers 
“engage[d] in conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry 
was imminent and inevitable.”187 With this test, the Court would have 
transitioned to a methodology of understanding oriented around the 
 
183 See Sarat & Clarke, supra note 91, at 408 (explaining that, under such circumstances, a legal 
official may come to act “both inside and outside the law”). 
184 Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople Perceive Good Policing, 105 
J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 297, 297 (2016). 
185 563 U.S. 452, 468 (2011). 
186 Id. at 465-66. 
187 Id. at 453 (emphasis added). 
170 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 129 
reasonable perspective of the occupants, not the police officers. But, tellingly, 
the Court dismissed this test as too “nebulous and impractical,”188 just as it 
had rejected the defendant’s proposed test in Whren as an exercise in “virtual 
subjectivity.”189 Again, we discover that the dominant conception of the 
legality principle permits evaluation of only the perspectives of the intended 
subjects of a conduct rule (and only in circumstances in which those 
perspectives might operate to excuse rule violations—here, the officers’ failure 
to secure a warrant before entering the home).190 Only some perspectives 
matter some of the time, and the layperson’s perspective is not one. 
Pursuant to the defendant’s second alternative test, the King Court would 
have asked whether the officers had behaved in a manner wholly “contrary to 
standard or good law enforcement practices (or to the policies or practices of 
their jurisdictions).”191 In other words, the defendant wanted the Court to 
consider the officers’ potentially bad reasons—here, the normatively dubious 
practice of manufacturing exigent circumstances. But this test was rejected 
on like logic—namely, that a conduct rule should not be piecemeal, pursuant 
to the dominant conception of the legality principle. By the King Court’s 
reasoning, an evaluation of unreasonable reasons would subject officers to an 
imprecise constitutional obligation and thereby “fails to provide clear 
guidance for law enforcement officers.”192 Ultimately, then, it did not matter 
what motivated the officers to bang loudly. It also did not matter whether 
they wished only to circumvent their conduct rules by engineering exigent 
circumstances.193 It did not even matter that other reasonable officers might 
not have banged so loudly or at all.194 Post-King, the incentives are troubling 
but also eminently clear. It is cheap and easy for officers to shout forcefully 
and take things from there—to shake the tree and see what falls. They are 
free to take advantage of the investigative tactic known as “knock and talk” 
(or, more accurately, “bang and yell”) to circumvent legality’s costlier conduct 
 
188 Id. at 469. 
189 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996). 
190 See King, 563 U.S. at 459 (“It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law . . . that searches 
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable . . . . But we have also 
recognized that this presumption may be overcome in some circumstances because the ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” (internal citations omitted)); see also supra 
Section III.B (describing the relationship between the dominant conception of legality and 
particularistic methodologies). 
191 King, 563 U.S. at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
192 Id. 
193 See supra note 145, infra notes 217–19, and accompanying text (discussing the manner by 
which criminal justice professionals may manipulate conduct rules and exceptions). 
194 Indeed, the officers admitted frankly that they “banged on the door as loud as [they] could,” 
shouting “[p]olice, police, police.” King, 563 U.S. at 471. 
2017] Annoy No Cop 171 
rules and exact a bit of rough justice.195 And, in response, a home’s inhabitants 
cannot be heard to complain. 
By now, the complication ought to be apparent. Individuals cannot 
predictably or credibly decipher or rely upon legality’s purported conduct 
rules and corresponding rights against intrusion. Consider the King Court’s 
admonishment: “Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional 
rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves 
to blame for the warrantless exigent circumstances search that may ensue.”196 
But, in fact, these occupants were not obviously “attempt[ing] to destroy 
evidence.”197 To the contrary, they were quite possibly trying to exercise their 
rights. The officers testified only that “[i]t sounded as [though] things were 
being moved inside the apartment,” and that they “could hear people inside 
moving.”198 These sounds reasonably might have signaled exigent 
circumstances, but the sounds also might have signaled a lawful course of 
action. Significantly, home occupants enjoy constitutional rights “to prepare 
. . . for the entry of the police,” which is why officers are typically required to 
announce their presence.199 And it is hard to imagine how these occupants 
might have composed themselves without moving their bodies and personal 
belongings.200 Simply put, the officers might have been wrong. The occupants 
might have been asserting rights—assertions that served only to trigger and 
excuse a quicker and more forceful intrusion. In any event, we know already 
that the King officers were wrong in at least one meaningful respect. The 
officers were pursuing a particular suspect, but he was not there.201 Likewise, 
in Ryburn, the officers believed that there were guns in the home, but none 
were found.202 Thus, we discover that there is the potential for overlap 
between doctrines of understanding—here, fear and mistake. 
The result of overlapping doctrines of asymmetric understanding is to 
further undermine the clarity of the individual’s obligations and the quality 
of her rights. In the face of ambiguity, civilians may be left to act at their own 
peril—a frightening prospect made readily apparent to the residents of 
majority–minority high-crime communities. Eventually, these residents may 
even come to conclude, somewhat hopelessly, that there is no practical 
alternative but to teach children to tread lightly, as Justice Sotomayor noted: 
 
195 See infra notes 279–96 and accompanying text (describing arrest as a form of rough punishment). 
196 King, 563 U.S. at 470. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 456. 
199 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). 
200 See id. (“[T]he knock-and-announce rule protects those elements of privacy and dignity 
that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance. It gives . . . the opportunity to collect oneself before 
answering the door . . . to pull on clothes or get out of bed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
201 King, 563 U.S. at 455-57. 
202 Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 471-72 (2012). 
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For generations, black and brown parents have given their children “the 
talk”—instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your hands 
where they can be seen; do not even think about talking back to a stranger—
all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them.203 
And Ta-Nehisi Coates echoed the sentiment in a warning to his own son: 
“One must be without error out here. Walk in single file. Work quietly. Pack 
an extra number 2 pencil.”204 
No proponent of the rule of law should prize “the talk.” Its substance is 
not the autonomous life, but a compelled form of cowering survival. More to 
the point, it reveals the universality of fear. In his harrowing and provocative 
memoir, Coates described a childhood in Baltimore “blindfolded by fear”—
fear of the criminals (who were, in turn, “dangerously afraid”) and fear of the 
officers authorized to turn their own fears and misunderstandings into 
“destruction”: 
It does not matter if the destruction is the result of an unfortunate 
overreaction. It does not matter if it originates in a misunderstanding . . . . 
Sell cigarettes without the proper authority and your body can be destroyed. 
Resent the people trying to entrap your body and it can be destroyed.”205 
Ultimately, there is plenty of fear to go around. The police officer has no 
monopoly on the sentiment. And, in dangerous situations, any party may be 
prone to mistake. But only the officer may rely upon his emotions and errors 
to claim an ex post excuse.206 This, then, is what Coates meant when he 
concluded that “our errors always cost us more.”207 
 
203 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see, e.g., TALIB 
KWELI, The Proud, on QUALITY (Rawkus Records 2002) (“[W]hat the fuck do I tell my son?/I want 
him livin’ right, livin’ good, respect the rules . . . . /How do I break the news that when he gets some 
size/He’ll be perceived as a threat or see the fear in they eyes/It’s in they job description to terminate 
the threat/So forty-one shots to the body is what he can expect.”). 
204 COATES, supra note 21, at 95 (emphasis added); see also id. at 82 (describing members of 
high-crime communities “who are made to fear not just the criminals among them but the police 
who lord over them.”). 
205 Id. at 9 (emphasis added); see also id. at 14 (“When I was your age the only people I knew 
were black, and all of them were powerfully, adamantly, dangerously afraid . . . . I think back on 
those boys now and all I see is fear.”); id. at 126 (“[M]y eyes were made in Baltimore . . . . [M]y eyes 
were blindfolded by fear.”); id. at 75-76 (describing the “terror” he felt during a traffic stop); id. at 
16 (“Everyone had lost a child, somehow, to the streets, to jail, to drugs, to guns”). See generally 
ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF 
THE INNER CITY (1999). 
206 See COATES, supra note 21, at 71 (“[T]he policeman who cracks you with a nightstick will 
quickly find his excuse in your furtive movements.”). 
207 See id. at 95–96 (“Make no mistakes . . . . the story of a black body’s destruction must 
always begin with his or her error, real or imagined.”). 
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*      *      * 
Before we leave fear and mistake, consider a hypothetical based partially 
on a pair of recent decisions. Imagine an upstanding and competent officer 
who reasonably believes in the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant. As 
it turns out, the officer has failed on two separate scores to satisfy his conduct 
rules. First, the warrant is stale. Second, the statute supporting the warrant 
is invalid. But, in the midst of a fast-paced street encounter “fraught with 
danger,” he reasonably neglects to do everything he might have done to 
double check and discover his errors.208 Still, he may rely upon his reasonable 
fears and mistakes—factual and legal—to excuse his otherwise unlawful 
seizure.209 Now, imagine a disreputable and incompetent officer—a bully and 
a brute—who knows nothing of a valid, outstanding arrest warrant (for, say, 
a “small [but genuine] traffic” offense).210 This bad actor may want only to 
subject the motorist to “an arrogant and unnecessary display of authority.”211 
Nevertheless, he may rely upon the existence of the valid arrest warrant (of 
which he was unaware) to authorize his seizure post hoc—to figuratively and 
literally paper over his otherwise unlawful conduct.212 
Our hypothetical officers enjoy two very real constitutional hooks based 
on two distinct constitutional methodologies—first, a methodology of 
understanding to excuse good-but-flawed police work; and, second, a 
methodology of legality to authorize bad-and-flawed police work that just so 
happened to be made legal by the coincidence of the valid warrant.213 
Consistent with the dominant conception of the legality principle, both 
officers retain “clear and crisp instructions,” instructing them on how they 
 
208 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (describing when street stops are permitted 
because of “justifiable suspicion . . . that criminal activity is afoot”). 
209 The Court has made clear that, pursuant to the good faith mistake doctrine, the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to reasonable errors about the existence of warrants. See, e.g., 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136-37 (2009). 
210 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
211 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 121 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
212 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 (“While [the] decision to initiate the stop was mistaken, his 
conduct thereafter was lawful.”). The Strieff Court held that the existence of a valid warrant was 
sufficient to attenuate the unconstitutional stop from the arrest and search of the person. 
Accordingly, the exclusionary rule did not apply to the seizure of evidence. See id. at 2060, 2063 
(acknowledging that even “the prosecutor conceded that [the officer] lacked reasonable suspicion,” 
but describing the stop as “an isolated instance of negligence”). 
213 See id. at 2067 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The mere existence of a warrant not only gives 
an officer legal cause to arrest and search a person, it also forgives an officer who, with no knowledge 
of the warrant at all, unlawfully stops that person on a whim or hunch.”). Consider also Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). There, the officers likewise papered over an unconstitutional search. 
Id. at 535-36. They broke into a warehouse without a warrant or any applicable warrant exception. 
Id. Finding drugs, they exited immediately and sought a warrant, alleging only facts known to them 
before the illegal entry. Id. The Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule. Id. at 541-44. 
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lawfully might proceed.214 But, if either officer slips up, he may turn to 
alternative justifications or excuses—here, the justification of the preexisting 
warrant or the excuses of reasonable fear and mistake.215 The officer’s surprises 
are all pleasant surprises. He may not be able to predict the particulars of the 
given surprise, but still he may learn to expect one—like a kid waiting for 
Christmas.216 At a minimum, he will come to recognize that judges will strive 
to understand him. Likewise, he will know that there are millions of open 
warrants nationwide, authorizing the arrests of the majority of residents of 
certain heavily policed communities, such as Ferguson, Missouri.217 The 
consequent opportunities for rough punishment are “staggering.”218 
The officer may indulge his fears, whereas the layperson remains 
paralyzed by hers. She may do all she can to learn (and live by) her conduct 
rules. All the same, she may be made to suffer at the officer’s whim.219 
C. Need 
A police officer is not simply a law enforcer. He is a peacekeeper and a 
community caretaker—a manager of crowds, a mediator of disputes, and a 
first responder to the sick and injured.220 In recognition that these so-called 
 
214 Frederick Schauer, Response & Rejoinder: The Miranda Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 170 
(2013); see also Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2197 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“[L]aw enforcement officers . . . depend on predictable rules to do their 
job.”); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 314 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing officers’ 
interest in “‘fair notice’ that they are acting unconstitutionally”) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U. S. 
730, 739 (2002)); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (describing the system’s “essential 
interest in readily administrable rules”). 
215 Cf. infra notes 398–403 and accompanying text (distinguishing justifications and excuses as 
they relate to officers’ conduct rules). 
216 See supra notes 144, 193, and accompanying text (discussing lack of “acoustic separation” and 
consequent opportunities for police officers to manipulate known conduct rules and exceptions 
therefrom); cf. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 10 ( “Every [petty misdemeanor] arrest [i]s like opening 
a box of Cracker Jack. What kind of toy am I going to get? Got a gun? Got a knife? Got a warrant? 
. . . It [i]s exhilarating for the cops.” (quoting William Bratton, NYPD police commissioner)). 
217 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing studies and statistics and noting 
that “in the town of Ferguson, Missouri—with a population of 21,000—16,000 people had 
outstanding warrants against them.”). 
218 See id. at 2073 (discussing implications of “staggering” numbers of open arrest warrants for 
trivial offenses and unpaid fines). 
219 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (“[T]his ordinance says 
that a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer 
of that city. The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration. It ‘does not 
provide for government by clearly defined laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-
moment opinions of a policeman on his beat.’”); supra notes 41, 111 and accompanying text 
(discussing vagueness doctrine and untrammelled police discretion). 
220 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1005. As Justice Thomas once observed: 
“Police officers are not, and have never been, simply enforcers of the criminal law. They wear other 
hats—importantly, they have long been vested with the responsibility for preserving the public 
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“special needs” cases transcend “the normal need for law enforcement,” the 
Court has developed an alternative “free form” jurisprudence, called “general 
reasonableness.”221 As Egon Bittner explained: “The procedures employed in 
keeping the peace are not determined by legal mandates but are, instead, 
responses to certain demand conditions.”222 In other words, peacekeeping and 
community caretaking constitute forms of exigency where the pressing 
circumstances are, at least plausibly, unrelated to law-enforcement objectives.223 
But the Court has drawn no crisp line between law enforcement and 
purported special need.224 Consider Brigham City v. Stuart.225 With neither 
probable cause nor a warrant, officers entered a home to break up a boisterous 
party. They did more than just keep the peace, however. They made arrests. 
They parlayed one source of Fourth Amendment power into another type of 
Fourth Amendment intrusion. And, just as officers may use one offense as 
pretext for another,226 so too they may use “special needs” as pretexts to 
investigate: “It . . . does not matter here—even if their subjective motivations 
could be so neatly unraveled—whether the officers entered the kitchen to 
arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured 
 
peace.” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 106 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (“Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes, 
some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime.”). 
221 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & County of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 535, 536-37, 539 (1967); see also 
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1982 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is only when a governmental 
purpose aside from crime-solving is at stake that [the Court may] engage in the free-form 
reasonableness inquiry . . . .”); Colb, supra note 74, at 1656 (“[R]easonableness balancing doctrine 
ordinarily operates as a mechanism that permits searches and seizures when the government lacks 
individualized probable cause.”). See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 74. Notably, such an 
unstructured approach may be consistent with historical practice. See Jessica K. Lowe, A Separate 
Peace? The Politics of Localized Law in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 788, 793 
(2011) (discussing, but not endorsing, the historical perspective that “keeping the peace [at common 
law] . . . was not about applying a particular set of rules”). 
222 Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOCIO. REV. 699, 
714 (1967); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (“[I]n dealing with the rapidly unfolding and 
often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible 
responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess.”). 
223 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-37 (“Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation . . . 
there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails.”); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 619 (1989) (applying a Fourth Amendment balancing test); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 
448 (1973) (applying general unreasonableness standard to an administrative search); Seidman, 
Points of Intersection, supra note 48, at 158 (indicating that legal tests “are no longer fixed” when “the 
government’s interests do not relate to law enforcement”). 
224 See Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. 
CHI. LEG. F. 261, 302 (“Law enforcement and community caretaking goals are often entangled.”); 
see also Bittner, supra note 48, at 714 (“[P]atrolmen do not act alternatively as one or the other . . . . 
[P]eace keeping occasionally acquires the external aspects of law enforcement.”). 
225 547 U.S. 398 (2006). 
226 See supra Part II (discussing overcriminalization and pretextual stops and arrests). 
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and prevent further violence.”227 The only relevant inquiry was whether 
reasonable officers could have believed that a special need existed within the 
home, not whether these particular officers subjectively believed it (or ever 
aimed to address it). 
Thus, an officer may come to the aid of an injured person when his genuine 
intention is only to enforce criminal law.228 Or he may make an arrest when his 
genuine intention is only to keep order.229 Either way, the state may subsequently 
argue in the alternative. It may pivot to whichever conception of reasonableness 
is most permissive under the circumstances, because an intrusion considered 
reasonable for one purpose is considered reasonable for all purposes.230 
Moreover, when it comes to maintaining order, we may expect an officer’s 
peacekeeping and law-enforcement purposes to correspond with fair 
frequency. The goals of peacekeeping and misdemeanor law enforcement are 
substantially the same—quality of life and social control.231 Indeed, this 
overlap might explain why historical courts held fast for so long to common 
law offenses concerning “the public health of the nation.”232 Generations after 
most other crimes had come to be defined by statute, public-order common 
law offenses continued to be recognized as flexible means to promote the 
perceived common good.233 Ultimately, the dominant conception of the 
 
227 Stuart, 547 U.S. at 405. 
228 Cf. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22 (1984) (noting that police were entitled to 
“seiz[e] evidence under the plain-view doctrine while they were in petitioner’s house to offer her 
assistance”); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“[T]he police may seize any evidence that 
is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.”). 
229 See Bittner, supra note 48, at 710 (“[P]atrolmen encounter certain matters they attend to by 
means of coercive action, . . . called ‘preventative arrests.’”); id. (“[P]atrolmen . . . use [the law] as a 
resource to solve certain pressing practical problems in keeping the peace.”). 
230 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1008 (“[T]he Court—by refusing to consider 
an officer’s subjective reasons for action—has failed to draw a line between peacekeeping and law 
enforcement objectives when an officer’s motives are mixed. That is, police officers may exploit their 
peacekeeping authority to build criminal cases . . .”). 
231 See Natapoff, supra note 112, at 1087-88 (“At its best, order maintenance policing aims to do 
what zoning, nuisance law, and other urban development policies do: improve the livability, safety, 
and economic value of shared urban spaces. Those are laudable goals, but they are not centrally about 
evidence and culpability.”); see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 614 (2014) (concluding that the modern criminal justice system has taken on 
a role “largely organized around the supervision and regulation of the population . . .”). 
232 2 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR 
BOOKS, book 4 at 439 (George Sharswood ed., 1866); see, e.g., Shaw v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions, [1962] AC 220 (Eng.); Rex v. Manley, [1932] 29 AC 574, 575 (KB) (Eng.) (recognizing 
the validity of the common law crime of “effect[ing] a public mischief”). 
233 See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 277, 281 (Pa. 1812) (“The malicious ingenuity of 
mankind is constantly producing new inventions in the art of disturbing their neighbours. To this 
invention must be opposed general principles [and common law crimes], calculated to meet and 
punish them.”); see also Shaw, [1962] AC at 267 (claiming that it is the duty of courts to “guard . . . 
against attacks which may be the more insidious because they are novel and unprepared for”). 
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legality principle won out, and the criminal justice system transitioned to 
precisely drawn public-order statutes.234 But peacekeeping endures as a 
“residual power to enforce . . . safety and order”—a stopgap that officers may 
manipulate to fight crime.235 
Look no further than the Terry stop-and-frisk. In its initial iteration, the 
practice was intended to serve peacekeeping needs only—particularly, the need 
for officer and public safety.236 But officers are well aware that stop-and-frisks 
also may turn up evidence of crime, which makes the practice quite useful in 
settings where conventional Fourth Amendment conduct rules would prohibit 
searches. Unsurprisingly, then, the stop-and-frisk has evolved (or devolved) 
over time from a peacekeeping measure to a law-enforcement expedient.237 
Nevertheless, peacekeeping still provides the operative test—a fluid evaluation 
of “common sense and ordinary human experience” over the “rigid criteria” of 
warrants and probable cause.238 But whose “common sense” matters? Whose 
“ordinary human experience”? Only the “inferences” of the reasonable 
officer.239 The individual is left with no comparable opportunity to tell her own 
story arising out of her own lived experiences.240 In this way, flexibility goes 
only so far. The “rich . . . diversity” of street encounters does not account for 
the rich diversity of reasonable perspectives regarding these encounters.241 
Consider, for instance, the pedestrian who flees at an officer’s approach. 
He cannot be heard to explain that he ran because he too had seen “too many 
. . . killed,” that he too was scared.242 To the contrary, in Illinois v. Wardlow, the 
Supreme Court used the very fact of a suspect’s “headlong” flight as a reason 
to excuse a subsequent stop and frisk. The Court accepted uncritically the 
 
234 Supra Section I.A and notes 73-76. 
235 BLACKSTONE, supra note 232, at 439. 
236 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968) (observing that general “crime prevention and 
detention” are not appropriate bases for a stop-and-frisk); see also Seidman, supra note 48, at 154 (“[T]he 
commentators have missed a significant aspect of Terry that has not expanded at all: For almost thirty 
years, the Court has steadfastly refused to permit Terry frisks designed to uncover evidence of crime. 
Instead, the frisk is permissible only to protect the officer from the threat of violence.”) 
237 See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, 
and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s 
Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1277-79 (1998); 
cf. supra notes 73, 109, 145 and accompanying text (discussing police manipulation of known conduct 
rules and exceptions therefrom). 
238 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). 
239 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (observing that reasonableness should be 
evaluated according to the reasonable officer’s “inferences about human behavior”). 
240 See supra notes 157–163, infra notes 243–52, and accompanying text. 
241 Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 (describing street encounters as “incredibly rich in diversity”); see also 
infra notes 355–59 and accompanying text (discussing studies of “cultural cognition”). 
242 See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Ryburn). 
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state’s narrative that flight is “the consummate act” of culpable “evasion.”243 
And it wholly disregarded what else pedestrians might try to evade. There are, 
in fact, many “innocent and understandable” reasons why a person might “quit 
the vicinity with all speed,” as the Wardlow dissent made plain.244 Look no 
further than the recent shootings of civilians by police and of police by 
civilians.245 Street encounters are dangerous. Once engaged, a pedestrian 
might understandably perceive that her safest course of action is to run.246 
More to the point, pedestrians have every right to flee—that is, unless 
and until officers have satisfied their conduct rules.247 In Wardlow, the suspect 
ran after officers approached on a blind hunch (but perhaps not a colorblind 
hunch).248 And the dominant conception of the legality principle promises 
that the pedestrian should be allowed to leave in the face of inchoate 
suspicion.249 Here, however, the exercise of that right did not function as a 
directive to the officers to stand down. To the contrary, the pedestrian’s right 
of flight was self-defeating.250 It provoked pursuit and empowered seizure. 
The lesson is not lost on either officers or pedestrians: it is cheap, easy, and 
effective for police to approach a hot spot with sirens blaring—to create fear, 
 
243 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate 
act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”). 
But cf. id. at 129, n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting the Biblical proverb that “the wicked 
flee when no man pursueth”). 
244 Id. at 131 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“[A] reasonable person may conclude that an 
officer’s sudden appearance indicates nearby criminal activity . . . [and] a substantial element 
of danger—either from the criminal or from a confrontation between the criminal and the police.”). 
245 See infra notes 342, 386–87, 423 and accompanying text (describing tragic deaths of civilians 
and police officers). 
246 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Among . . . minorities and those 
residing in high crime areas, there is also the . . . belie[f] that contact with the police can itself 
be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence. For 
such a person, unprovoked flight is neither ‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal.’”); see also supra notes 202–11 
and accompanying text (describing encounters “fraught with danger” (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 
555 U.S. 323 (1999))). 
247 Supra Section I.B, notes 147-149, and accompanying text. 
248 The majority in Wardlow failed to consider the frequency or danger of racially motivated 
stops. Cf. 528 U.S. at 132 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Among some citizens, particularly 
minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person 
is entirely innocent, but . . . believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous.”); supra 
notes 156-162 and accompanying text (describing pretextual traffic stop of a group of young African-
American men in Whren v. United States). 
249 See supra Part I (defining the relationship between legality, personal autonomy, and state 
authority); see also Jeremy Waldron, How the Law Protects Dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200, 206 
(2012) (describing as lawless a system that would leave “people . . . waiting for coercive intervention 
from the state”). 
250 Cf. supra notes 178–90 and accompanying text (discussing Ryburn v. Huff and Kentucky v. King). 
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see who runs, give chase, and capture.251 And pedestrians face an unenviable 
choice: stay or go at peril. 
This is not to say that it is inappropriate to allow police officers to undertake 
reasonable peacekeeping measures. But there are countervailing moral 
questions. Most obviously, there is the question of whether it was 
constitutionally reasonable in the first instance to make a criminal case out of a 
search or seizure that was constitutionally reasonable for peacekeeping reasons 
only. That question is never asked and answered. An individual has no chance 
to argue that the law enforcer and peacekeeper are not similarly situated—that, 
under certain circumstances, deference to the peacekeeper ought not extend to 
the law enforcer (whether or not he is one and the same person wearing two 
different hats).252 Comparatively, officers are empowered by overlapping 
jurisprudential approaches: a law-enforcement approach, designed deliberately 
and deliberatively and crafted with precision; and a peacekeeping approach, 
cobbled together post hoc to meet extralegal needs. Officers may repurpose, 
without explanation, these multiple strands of constitutional power.253 They 
may slide readily between peacekeeping and law-enforcement roles to pursue 
prerogatives antithetical to the purpose of the legality principle. 
V. UNDERSTANDING PROCEDURAL LEGALITY 
On the afternoon of July 10, 2015, Officer Brian Encinia pulled over a 
twenty-eight-year-old woman, Sandra Bland, for failure to signal a lane 
change, which she initiated after Encinia’s squad car approached close behind 
her vehicle. A dashboard video camera captured the infraction and much of 
what happened next.254 It appears that Encinia was going to let Bland off with 
a warning. But then he asked a question. And, from there, the situation 
deteriorated rapidly. The written word cannot capture the parties’ tones nor 
the mood of the exchange. Nevertheless, I pick up from the pivotal moment, 
with emphasis added to key passages: 
 
251 Significantly, in California v. Hodari D., the Court held that a mere show of authority—no 
matter how forceful—is not a seizure. 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). Fourth Amendment scrutiny is not 
triggered until officers apply physical force or compel the suspect to submit to the show of authority. Id. 
252 See infra note 312 and accompanying text (proposing a “special exclusionary rule” that might 
exclude evidence or bar charges that were products of a peacekeeping search or seizure). 
253 See supra Part II (examining the constitutional irrelevance of subjective motivation and the 
corresponding ability of officers to manipulate their conduct rules and exceptions). 
254 A recording of the dashcam footage is publicly available. See TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY, Sandra Bland Traffic Stop, YOUTUBE (July 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=CaW09Ymr2BA [https://perma.cc/4QSQ-LU5F]. The entire written transcript is also 
available. See Ryan Grim, The Transcript of Sandra Bland’s Arrest Is as Revealing as the Video HUFFINGTON 
POST (July 23, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sandra-bland-arrest-transcript_us 
_55b03a88e4b0a9b94853b1f1 [https://perma.cc/496M-Q44H] [hereinafter Bland Transcript]. 
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Encinia:  Okay, ma’am. (Pause.) You okay? 
Bland:  I’m waiting on you. This is your job. I’m waiting on you. 
When’re you going to let me go? 
Encinia:  I don’t know. You seem very really irritated. 
Bland:  I am. I really am. I feel like it’s crap what I’m getting a ticket 
for. I was getting out of your way. You were speeding up, 
tailing me, so I move over and you stop me. So, yeah, I am a 
little irritated, but that doesn’t stop you from giving me a 
ticket, so [inaudible] ticket. 
Encinia:  Are you done? 
Bland:  You asked me what was wrong, now I told you. 
Encinia:  Okay. 
Bland:  So now I’m done, yeah. 
Encinia: You mind putting out your cigarette, please? If you don’t mind? 
Bland:  I’m in my car, why do I have to put out my cigarette? 
Encinia:  Well you can step on out now. 
Bland:  I don’t have to step out of my car. 
Encinia:  Step out of the car. 
Bland:  Why am I . . . 
Encinia:  Step out of the car! 
Bland:  No, you don’t have the right. No, you don’t have the right. 
Encinia:  Step out of the car. 
Bland:  You do not have the right. You do not have the right to do this. 
Encinia:  I do have the right, now step out or I will remove you. 
Bland:  I refuse to talk to you other than to identify myself. [crosstalk] I am 
getting removed for a failure to signal? 
Encinia:  Step out or I will remove you. I’m giving you a lawful order. Get 
out of the car now or I’m going to remove you. 
Bland:  And I’m calling my lawyer. 
Encinia:  I’m going to yank you out of here. (Reaches inside the car.) 
Bland:  OK, you’re going to yank me out of my car? OK, alright. 
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Encinia:  (Calling in backup): 2547. 
Bland:  Let’s do this. 
Encinia:  Yeah, we’re going to. (Grabs for Bland.) 
Bland:  Don’t touch me! 
Encinia:  Get out of the car! 
Bland:  Don’t touch me. Don’t touch me! I’m not under arrest - You don’t 
have the right to take me out of the car. 
Encinia:  You are under arrest! 
Bland:  I’m under arrest? For what? For what? For what? 
Encinia  (To Dispatch.) 2547 county FM 1098 [inaudible] send me another 
unit. (To Bland) Get out of the car! Get out of the car now! 
Bland:  Why am I being apprehended? You’re trying to give me a ticket 
for failure . . . 
Encinia:  I said get out of the car! 
Bland:  Why am I being apprehended? You just opened my - 
Encinia:  I’m giving you a lawful order. I’m going to drag you out of here. 
Bland:  So you’re threatening to drag me out of my own car? 
Encinia:  Get out of the car! 
Bland:  And then you’re going to [crosstalk] me? 
Encinia: I will light you up! Get out! Now! (Draws stun gun and points it 
at Bland.) 
Bland:  Wow. Wow. (Exiting car.) 
Encinia:  Get out. Now. Get out of the car! 
Bland:  For a failure to signal? You’re doing all of this for a failure to 
signal? 
Encinia:  Get over there. 
Bland:  Right. Yeah, let’s take this to court, let’s do this. 
All it took was two minutes for things to fall apart. The confrontation 
continued thereafter with Encinia struggling off-screen to cuff Bland. At one 
point, a brief physical altercation can be heard, after which Bland cried out: 
“You just slammed me, knocked my head into the ground. I got epilepsy, you 
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motherfucker!” Encinia replied: “Good. Good.”255 Subsequently, prosecutors 
charged Bland with assaulting a public servant. A court held her on $5000 bail. 
Three days later, she was dead—an apparent jailhouse suicide by asphyxiation. 
A. Legality, Understanding & Rough Justice 
What do we know? We know that Officer Encinia was not a good cop. He 
may not have been quite a bully, but he displayed a stunning lack of 
professionalism.256 And, ultimately, he was fired for his bad behavior.257 The 
problem was not only that Encinia failed to control his anger and irritation, 
but also that he used his emotions as reasons for action. He had no moral or 
prudential basis to arrest Bland or even to order her out of the vehicle. At 
several turns, he escalated.258 Even his initial question could be read as a 
provocation, asking whether she was “okay” in an obviously less-than-
concerned tone. There was no need to pressure her to extinguish her cigarette. 
There was no need to threaten to “yank her out.” There was no need for verbal 
abuse. And there was no need—at least initially—for physical contact.259 One 
might respond that there was also no need for Bland to lash out—that she 
mocked him, just as he mocked her. But only one of them was a professional. 
More to the point, only one of them had the law at his back. 
And Encinia did have the law at his back. Encinia was right on the 
constitutional law, and Bland was wrong.260 As we know, in the course of a 
valid traffic stop, officers enjoy categorical authority (a blanket exception 
from the conventional conduct rules) to order motorists and passengers out 
of vehicles.261 And we know also that his subjective motivation was irrelevant 
to the analysis.262 Thus, he could indulge his annoyance by removing her for 
 
255 Bland Transcript, supra note 254. 
256 According to Seth Stoughton, a former police officer and current law professor, Encinia 
was more interested in “demanding that [Bland] recognize his dominance” than he was in good 
policing. Seth Stoughton, Cop Expert: Why Sandra Bland’s Arrest Was Legal but not Good Policing, 
TALKING POINTS MEMO (July 24, 2015), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/sandra-bland-video-
legal-but-not-good-policing [https://perma.cc/E5P4-M5E9]. 
257 Tina Burnside & Joshua Berlinger, Trooper Who Arrested Sandra Bland Formally Fired, CNN 
(Mar. 3, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/03/us/sandra-bland-officer/fired/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
LZ6N-UAGD]; see also infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text (discussing promise of political 
and institutional checks on inequitable policing and arbitrary exercises of official coercion). 
258 See Stoughton, supra note 256 (“[Encinia’s] words send a powerful signal: ‘What you said 
does not matter.’”). 
259 See infra notes 337–48 and accompanying text (discussing excessive force doctrine). 
260 See Stoughton, supra note 256 (“Encinia had the authority to order Bland to exit her 
vehicle.”). 
261 Supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
262 Supra note 86 accompanying text. We know also that Encina was entitled to lay hands on 
Bland and use some physical force—at least, once Bland refused Encinia’s lawful order to leave the 
vehicle. See infra notes 337–48 and accompanying text (discussing excessive force doctrine). We cannot 
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her disobedience. Indeed, he taunted her with this very reality: “You were 
getting a warning . . . now you’re going to jail.”263 And, although 
constitutionally, he had no need to explain himself, he could not help but 
reveal his real reasons to dispatch: 
She gave me her driver’s license. I came back to the car . . . to complete [the 
stop] and tell her what’s she receiving and what to do and so forth. At that 
time, she’s still very much irritated and so forth . . . . She wouldn’t even look 
at me. She’s looking straight ahead, just mad.264 
There’s the rub. Bland’s real offense, in Encinia’s estimation, was disrespect. 
And Encinia was entitled constitutionally not only to pull her from her car for 
that manufactured offense, but also to arrest her. Indeed, pursuant to Atwater v. 
Lago Vista, he could have arrested her from the outset based solely upon the traffic 
infraction—that is, even before she refused his lawful (but awful) orders.265 
Bland’s problem was formal guilt—the fact that she actually had 
committed the traffic offense. Her mistake was to think that her rights 
reached beyond legal guilt—to silly stops and inequitable intrusions. She 
knew that she had the legal right to smoke a cigarette in her own car. She 
knew that she had the legal right to express simmering annoyance at a trivial 
traffic stop. And she knew even that she had the legal right to annoy a traffic 
cop. Her error was to suppose that these legal rights were meaningful under 
the immediate circumstances. In this way, she bought into the empty promise 
of the dominant conception of the legality principle. She thought that the 
formal rules would protect her from official acts of intimidation and 
harassment, normatively defined. She believed that the criminal justice 
system would not tolerate illiberal commands. And she paid the price for her 
confusion.266 She was surprised—unfairly surprised—to discover that Encinia 
 
know precisely how a court might have decided the question of excessive force with respect to whatever 
transpired between Encinia and Bland off-screen. But that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
263 Bland Transcript, supra note 254. 
264 Id. 
265 See 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001); supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text (discussing Atwater). 
266 Notably, Encinia may come to pay a legal price, too. But, here, the exception may prove 
the rule. Encinia was arrested and charged with perjury, because a grand jury “did not believe [his] 
statement that he removed Bland from the car . . . so he could conduct a safer traffic investigation.” 
Burnside & Berlinger, supra note 257. Legally, Encinia would have been better served acknowledging 
his subjective reason—that he removed Bland merely for her disobedience. Even if that reason is 
unpopular, it is not unconstitutional, pursuant to prevailing doctrine. See supra Sections II.A-B 
(describing doctrinal proposition that subjective motivation is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment 
analyses). Ironically, then, Encinia now faces the rough justice of a pretextual prosecution. The 
prosecuted crime is perjury, but the extralegal offense is bad policing, as determined by a grand jury. 
Cf. Stoughton, supra note 256 (commenting on Bland’s arrest and concluding that “even though it 
was lawful, it was not good policing”). See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 140, at 330 
(observing that grand juries may reach decisions based on equitable considerations). 
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could impose upon her a whole new set of conduct rules, entirely of his own 
design: Extinguish your cigarette or else. Don’t talk back or else. Get out of the car 
or else.267 
The temptation is to respond that, in due course, individuals like Sandra 
Bland may learn the shape of police authority. With experience comes 
knowledge—knowledge of the breadth of an officer’s real conduct rules in 
application. But, if that form of notice were to be deemed sufficient, then 
legality’s premise would ring hollow indeed.268 Little would remain of even 
the bedrock liberal proscription against status crimes.269 When everyday 
activities—like walking and driving—call down official exercises of coercion, 
then the minimally social existence is proscribed at the officer’s will. In such 
circumstances, the informed individual is no better off than the dumbfounded. 
He lives as either a hermit or at peril. Anytime the officer does “not like the 
cut of his jib,” he may be subjected to intrusion—a state of affairs that Justice 
Douglas once described as “a long step down the totalitarian path.”270 
And asymmetric understanding has made worse the prevailing 
pathologies of pretext and overcriminalization. Imagine that Officer Encinia 
had the law or facts wrong—that he had misconstrued a lawful lane change 
for an illegal one. The arrest would still be constitutional as long as his error 
was reasonable.271 Worse still, if Bland—like millions of Americans—had an 
outstanding “small traffic” warrant for a previously unpaid (or unpayable) 
fine, her arrest would be constitutional whether Encinia’s mistake was 
reasonable or not.272 
 
267 Supra notes 254–60. On this score, consider the observation of hip-hop impresario and 
entrepreneur, Jay-Z (who was once Shawn Carter, a young man of limited means, coming of age in 
the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn): 
And I heard: “Son do you know why I’m stoppin’ you for?”/ Cause I’m young, and I’m black, 
and my hat’s real low?/ Do I look like a mind reader, sir? I don’t know./ Am I under arrest, 
or should I guess some more?/ “Well you was doin’ fifty-five in a fifty-four.” 
JAY Z, 99 Problems, on THE BLACK ALBUM (Roc-A-Fella Records 2004). 
268 Cf. Betancourt v. Bloomberg, 448 F.3d 547, 559 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) 
(noting that there is nothing “comforting” about a court interpreting the meaning of a statute based 
on the way it is used). 
269 PACKER, supra note 6, at 74 (“It is important, especially in a society that likes to describe 
itself as ‘free’ and ‘open,’ that a government should be empowered to coerce people only for what 
they do and not for what they are.”); see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) 
(holding status crimes unconstitutional). 
270 Terry, 392 U.S. at 38-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
271 See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (finding no Fourth Amendment 
violation when an otherwise illegal stop was effectuated because of a reasonable mistake of law); 
supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
272 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Outstanding 
warrants are surprisingly common . . . . The States and Federal Government maintain databases with 
over 7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast majority of which appear to be for minor offenses.”); 
see also supra notes 34, 112, 204, infra notes 424–30, and accompanying text (discussing Strieff). 
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*     *      * 
By way of final example, consider the traffic stop of John Felton, an 
African-American motorist, pulled over outside his mother’s home in Dayton, 
Ohio. Felton used his cellphone to record the stop and demanded to know the 
officer’s reasons for stopping him. At first, the officer provided only the legal 
explanation—that Felton had failed to signal his turn early enough: “I am 
acknowledging that you did signal . . . you just didn’t do it one hundred feet 
prior to your turn.”273 In other words, Felton had almost complied with the 
law—but not quite. The triviality of this legalistic (but obviously pretextual) 
reason was not lost on Felton, who surmised the truth: “You just needed a 
[legalistic] reason to pull me over, sir.”274 While the officer checked the licenses 
of Felton and his passenger, Felton expressed his frustration to his camera: 
He needed a reason to pull me over . . . . He followed me for almost two 
miles. And then when I get to my mom’s house, he want to put on his lights. 
I’m keeping this shit recording. He ain’t about to Sandra Bland me . . . . I didn’t 
do shit . . . . He just needed a reason.275 
The statement is telling. Felton is the informed individual. He knew what 
happened to Sandra Bland. He knew the broad scope of the officer’s authority. 
He knew that the officer might act for extralegal reasons. He knew that the 
law would not adequately protect him from the officer. And he knew that his 
cellphone camera was a better bet than a constitutional claim.276 He knew the 
state of play, but he could do nothing with his information. He could only 
guess at the officer’s real reasons. 
Courageously, he tried one final time: “Sir, you trailed me for how long? . . . 
I’m not doing nothing . . . . [W]hy were you trailing me?” And, somewhat 
astonishingly, the officer came clean: “Because you made direct eye contact with 
me and held onto it when I was passing you.” The officer revealed his ready-made 
conduct rule—Don’t look at me or else. Don’t make me wonder about you or else.277 
*      *      * 
 
273 John Felton Stopped for Eye Contact, YOUTUBE (Aug. 31, 2015) https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=UeJBAo-M5Eg [https://perma.cc/YKS6-2RGN] (emphasis added). 
274 According to Felton: “This is so childish.” Id. 
275 Id. (emphasis added). 
276 See infra notes 396–97 and accompanying text (discussing the promise of political and 
institutional checks). 
277 Cf. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that pretextual stops 
are especially “degrading”). 
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It may be tempting to downplay the traffic stop or even the arrest—to 
claim, for instance, that John Felton suffered only “inconvenience,” not the 
kind of coercion that ought to implicate heightened concerns about precision 
and notice.278 Indeed, the dominant conception of the legality principle is 
built around a formal distinction between law-enforcement intrusions and 
criminal punishments. On this reading, only criminal punishments are 
serious enough to merit the full complement of constitutional protections 
typically associated with the legality principle. Punishment is thought to be 
a product of criminal conviction only—not of searches, seizures, or even more 
serious intrusions, like full-custodial arrests or preventative detention.279 
Indeed, the Supreme Court relied on this formal distinction to distinguish its 
holding in Heien v. North Carolina from the conventional rule that mistakes 
of law are impermissible: “[J]ust because [police] mistakes of law cannot 
justify . . . the imposition or the avoidance of criminal liability, it does not 
follow that they cannot justify an investigatory stop.”280 
But moral philosophers have long endorsed a more functional definition 
of punishment. The prevailing philosophic conception is that punishment is a 
brand of coercion that entails hard treatment and stigma.281 And arrests would 
seem readily to satisfy this description, as even certain Supreme Court Justices 
have acknowledged. Justice Powell, for instance, called arrests “a serious 
personal intrusion.”282 Likewise, Justice Stevens emphasized the potential 
stigmatic consequences when he referenced the “odium of . . . arrest.”283 Even 
a majority of the Court once labeled the arrest “a public act that may seriously 
interfere with the defendant’s liberty . . . disrupt his employment, drain his 
financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and 
create anxiety in him, his family, and his friends.”284 We may extend these 
 
278 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam) (“[A] mere 
inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety.”). 
279 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding that pretrial detention is 
regulation, not punishment); see also Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventative State, 88 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 777 (1998) (“Courts and commentators often tend to conclude, too quickly, 
that if some policy or practice is not ‘really’ punishment, then there is nothing wrong with it.”). 
280 See 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (explaining that the government still “cannot impose criminal 
liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law”). 
281 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: 
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 75, 89, 98 (1970) (“Both the ‘hard treatment’ aspect 
of punishment and its reprobative function must be part of the definition of legal punishment.”). 
282 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
283 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 131 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (quoting 
Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 449, 511 (1896)). 
284 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); see also Logan, Florence v. Board, supra 
note 100, at 413 (“[W]hen it comes to minor offense arrestees, the taxing, delay-ridden and confusing 
adjudicatory process itself is punitive, very often dwarfing the personal consequences of de jure 
punishment levied by the state.”); cf. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 826-44 
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observations likewise to street stops, which Justice Sotomayor dubbed 
“invasive, frightening, and humiliating encounters”285 that “have severe 
consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested by the name.”286 
Sotomayor understood that we must consider also what civilians think and 
feel—that stops “risk treating members of our communities as second-class 
citizens.”287 Social science has shown that pedestrians and motorists typically 
experience police treatment as meaningfully harsh and stigmatizing—
perceptions that are shared by others in heavily policed communities.288 Even 
police officers and prosecutors may come to view stops and low-level arrests 
as forms of rough punishment (and often, punishment enough).289 Moreover, 
 
(2015) (examining the collateral consequences of arrest); supra notes 33–40 (discussing collateral 
consequences of stops and arrests). 
285 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
286 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing 
stops as “degrading” and “humiliations”); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 422 (1997) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“When an officer commands passengers . . . to leave the vehicle and stand 
by the side of the road in full view of the public, the seizure is serious, not trivial.”); id. at 419 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[C]itizens who cherish individual liberty and are offended, embarrassed, 
and sometimes provoked by arbitrary official commands may well consider the burden [of being 
ordered out of a vehicle] to be significant. In all events, the aggregation of thousands upon thousands 
of petty indignities has an impact on freedom that I would characterize as substantial”); id. at 420 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“To order passengers about during the course of a traffic stop . . . can hardly 
be classified as a de minimis intrusion.”); see, e.g., infra notes 100–11, 255–73, 423–31 and accompanying 
text (discussing cases and incidents). 
287 Strieff, 135 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
288 See Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-
Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 175 (2015) (“The fact that racial minorities 
in cities disproportionately encounter police in both constitutional and unconstitutional contexts 
fuels [their] perceptions of illegitimacy of the police.”); see also Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 98-99 (2007) (describing the “fallout of . . . highly localized police 
enforcement”); Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 246 (examining popular perceptions of order-
maintenance policing); Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People”: African-American Young 
Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 71, 85 (2007) (finding that 
minority members of “distressed communities” harbor expectations of disrespectful treatment by 
police officers); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: 
A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 266 (2010) 
(“Respondents felt that their neighborhoods had been besieged by police”); ; infra notes 374–75, 423, 
and accompanying text (discussing “procedural justice”); see also, e.g., BRAND NUBIAN, Probable 
Cause, on FOUNDATION (Arista Records 1998) (“Couldn’t believe it when he took me in/Threw me 
and my man up in the van, a seven-hour stand/ . . . Now Giuliani wanna talk about the ‘quality of 
life’/Think he got the right to follow me at night/ . . . Up in central booking . . . people looking.”). 
289 FEELEY, supra note 32, at 161 (“Traditional police practice encourages officers to administer 
rough justice on the street in lieu of arrest, but modern police professionalism dictates that an arrest 
should be made whenever there is any basis for doing so.”); see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 
351 (“[O]fficers will often . . . [search or seize] to harass or inconvenience suspects, or to ‘send a 
message.’”); Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 7 
(2000) (describing certain arrests as “ends unto themselves”); cf. PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE 
HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT 119–20, 155 (2008) (describing 
how police use arrest, inter alia, “to assert authority” and impose rough justice). Elsewhere I examine 
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because the Supreme Court has refused to constitutionalize either respectful 
policing or subjective intent, bad officers may use even ordinary force as 
means to degrade and terrify, with no moral explanation for inequitable 
conduct.290 Worse still, there are much rougher forms of punishment that are 
not only serious but also permanent. Of course, misdirected police violence 
is typically unintended, but the consequences remain the same. One false 
move (and a bit of bad luck) could describe the boundary between life and 
death—a killing that might be excused, after the fact, as an erroneous but 
understandable reaction to the officer’s reasonable perceptions of danger.291 
And, even once the risk of violence subsides, the burdens of case processing 
continue.292 In the face of these “process costs,” some petty crime defendants 
 
the phenomenon of rough punishment in more detail. See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, 
supra note 1, at 1698-99 (discussing unintended implications of professional and legalistic policing); 
BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32. 
290 See Meares et al., supra note 184, at 123, 141 (“The constitutional criminal procedure as it is 
written has no capacity to tell police how to arrest or stop someone in a way that will tend to support 
procedural fairness . . . . Nothing about constitutional law prohibits a police officer from being rude, 
and very little . . . promotes the kinds of dignity concerns that people tend to care about.”); see also 
Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 989 (“[T]he Constitution provides no protection against 
obdurate jerks and mean-spirited bullies.”); Stoughton, supra note 256 (“[T]here is no law that 
requires officers to meaningfully engage with people.”); see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106, 121 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that civilians “may regard the police command as 
nothing more than an arrogant and unnecessary display of authority”); supra notes 99–109 
(discussing Atwater v. Lago Vista). 
291 See supra Part IV, infra notes 339, 388, 422–30, and accompanying text (discussing doctrines 
of mistake, fear, and excessive force and describing potentially lethal consequences of civilian 
missteps); see also COATES, supra note 21, at 9 (“Turn into a dark stairwell and your body can be 
destroyed.”). In some cases, a civilian might make all the right moves and still be unsafe. See, e.g., 
Francisco Alvarado et al., North Miami Police Shoot Black Man Who Said His Hands Were Raised While 
He Tried to Help Autistic Group-Home Resident, WASH. POST (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/21/fla-police-shoot-black-man-with-his-
hands-up-as-he-tries-to-help-autistic-patient/?utm_term=.95c16dd2e166 [https://perma.cc/FD55-S93K]. 
Coates put it simply: “Each time a police officer engages us, death, injury, maiming is possible.” 
COATES, supra note 21, at 131. The list of dead bodies is long and growing. See, e.g., List of Killings by 
Law Enforcement Officers in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_killings_ 
by_law_enforcement_officers_in_the_United_States [https://perma.cc/5N4U-D8MY] (collecting incidents 
of individuals killed by police officers). 
With respect to John Felton, it is frightening to imagine what might have happened to him had 
he followed through on his misguided plan to resist his traffic stop: “I swear to God, if he need 
anything, I’m getting out of the car, rolling my windows up and I walk into the house, telling him 
he can call his backup and everything. But I’m sitting in my mom’s house, because I didn’t do shit.” 
See Tommy Christopher, Black Man Pulled Over for “Eye Contact” Lucky to be Alive, MEDIATE.COM 
(Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.mediaite.com/online/black-man-pulled-over-for-eye-contact-is-lucky-to-be-alive/ 
[https://perma.cc/9NSL-NZHA] (“[T]he risk of escalation would have increased dramatically had 
he decided to exit his car and walk into his mother’s house.”). 
292 Cf. FEELEY, supra note 32, at 293 (“In the lower courts a great many appearances are ritualistic 
terminations of problems that for all practical purposes were resolved with the arrest itself.”); Josh 
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1132 (2008) (discussing process as punishment). 
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have come to view criminal convictions as welcome exits from punishment—
opportunities to just “get it over with.”293 
In any event, analogies to punishment should not be determinative. The 
genuine purpose of the legality principle, appropriately expressed, is to 
protect against any arbitrary state command, whatever form it might take—
whether, for instance, arbitrary treatment manifests as an unsubstantiated 
final sentence or only as an initial barked order to freeze and put your hands 
up.294 It is the job of judges to protect against the “fundamental unfairness” 
of inequitable policing, just as it is their job to protect against the “inaccuracy” 
of false criminal convictions.295 
B. Understanding & Narrative 
The risk of arbitrary treatment is endemic to any state that uses penal law 
as a principal mechanism to maintain order. The criminal justice system 
cannot excise the threat, but it is obliged to try. Many of the most problematic 
cases I have examined entailed too-quick police decisions and actions, for 
reasons that were unexplained, mistaken, or obviously inequitable. The 
response of the left-liberal formalist might be to layer on ever-more precisely 
defined conduct rules—for instance, rules categorically prohibiting pretext, 
error, or even full-custodial arrest (at least as to some low-level offenses).296 
But even if such bright-line reforms were feasible, they likely would prove 
inadvisable. The temptation is just too great (and too often normatively 
appropriate) to carve piecemeal exceptions. Life outstrips law.297 Inevitably, 
an officer will “confront a situation in the field” as to which the facts and law 
 
293 See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 69-70 (1978) (“Contrary to what the 
newcomer expects, defendants are often eager to plead guilty . . . . [T]hey contrast the relative ease 
with which they can plead guilty with the costs in time and effort required to fight a case.”); Bowers, 
supra note 292, at 1136 (describing “process pleas,” like pretrial detention, and discussing 
circumstances where “conviction may counterintuitively inaugurate freedom”). 
294 See supra note 98, infra notes 302–05, 422–30, and accompanying text (describing different 
types of arbitrary state treatment in different contexts). 
295 Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A Response to 
Professor Bibas, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 52, 53 (2011) (distinguishing between two Due Process 
approaches—one informed by “fundamental fairness,” the other by “accuracy”—and describing the 
criminal justice system’s preference for accuracy); see also infra notes 375–81 and accompanying text 
(describing the legality principle as the judge’s domain). 
296 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 72, at 95 (“[F]ealty to the rule of law compels 
that police mistakes of law resulting in affirmative deprivations of liberty should not be tolerated.”); 
supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (describing Anthony Amsterdam’s left-liberal formalist 
approach to the Fourth Amendment). 
297 See Nussbaum, supra note 140, at 98 (“[G]eneral ethical or legal rules are . . . useful as 
outlines, but [are] no substitute for a resourceful confrontation with all the circumstances of the 
case.”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1691 (endorsing evaluative standards 
over mechanistic rules); supra notes 139–41, infra notes 360–61, and accompanying text. 
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are unclear.298 And it may well be appropriate to consider, when an officer is 
called upon to act “on the fly,” how conditions might have appeared to the 
average officer in the moment.299 In some extraordinary circumstances, even 
pretext might provide a good enough reason for state action.300 
But there are countervailing good reasons to invalidate certain morally 
problematic exercises of official coercion—even exercises that otherwise 
complied with prevailing conduct rules. Thus, Justice O’Connor would have 
held unconstitutional the “pointless” arrest in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 
notwithstanding the indisputable presence of probable cause as to the 
applicable seatbelt offense.301 O’Connor urged the Court, instead, to 
undertake a “realistic assessment of the interests” as a means to promote the 
“principles that lie at the core of the Fourth Amendment.”302 And, in another 
case, Justice Stevens saw a like need to balance an “officer’s interest” against 
“the citizen’s interest in not being required to obey an arbitrary command.”303 
O’Connor and Stevens both understood that bright-line rules are 
incompetent to reach arbitrariness in its varied forms. As Stevens observed, 
there are “millions” of street encounters that “are not fungible,” and attention 
to these differences should compel us to evaluate each and every police 
intrusion from each and every relevant “standpoint.”304 This is the lesson of 
verstehen—that we may comprehend a complex phenomenon only by 
“identify[ing] its meaning as this meaning is understood by the actors.”305 
But how do we operationalize a bilateral approach to understanding? To 
some degree, the effort is self-defeating. The very act of prescribing a legal 
test undercuts a core objective of particularism, which is to abandon the 
kinds of predesigned structures that exclude relevant considerations and 
 
298 See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (“To be reasonable is not to be 
perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, 
giving them fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection . . . . The limit is that 
the mistakes must be those of reasonable men.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) (“[T]he Court has also recognized the need to allow 
some latitude for . . . mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of 
making arrests and executing warrants.”). 
299 Heien, 135 S. Ct at 539. 
300 See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359, 359 (1956) (involving tax prosecution of 
organized crime boss); Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 
GEO. L.J. 1435, 1442-45 (2009) (discussing pretextual arrest and prosecution of Al Capone for tax 
evasion); supra note 266 (referencing pretextual perjury prosecution of Brian Encinia, the officer 
who arrested Sandra Bland). 
301 532 U.S. at 360 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
302 Id. at 362-63. 
303 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 121-23 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
304 Id. at 121. 
305 Guy Oakes, The Verstehen Thesis and the Foundations of Max Weber’s Methodology, 16 HIST. & 
THEORY 11, 22 (1977); supra notes 20, 135, and accompanying text. 
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preclude thoughtful deliberation.306 Perhaps the best we may hope for is the 
common law method, which Jeremy Waldron described as a loose 
framework for moving “from general evaluative ideas to more specific but 
still evaluative ideas.”307 Building off Waldron’s endorsement, I have 
championed a “two-ply” approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness that 
would use the common law method to cultivate, organically, a reason-giving 
requirement of the sort familiar to administrative law.308 As a means to get 
beyond the conduct rules, judges would demand explanations of the real 
reasons for action. For present purposes, I plan to sketch and defend two 
specific iterations of this incremental approach—two rebuttable presumptions. 
Judges could presume unreasonable any obviously pretextual search or seizure, 
as well as any full-custodial arrest for a nonviolent misdemeanor or 
noncriminal violation. These are modest and uncomplicated reforms. To 
trigger bilateral understanding, an individual would first need to make a 
threshold showing of obvious pretext or low-level arrest.309 And the great 
virtue of a presumption is that it is just a presumption. The state could rebut 
it by offering good enough reasons for police intrusions—reasons that might 
be contradicted, in turn, by an individual’s countervailing moral claims. 
 
306 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 274, 363 (1996) (arguing that overly mechanistic legal tests “disguise 
contentious moral issues” and “drive those assessments underground,” producing arbitrary 
decisionmaking); see also supra notes 139–41, 298, and accompanying text (discussing particularism 
and the rules–standards debate). 
307 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1024 (“[T]he crux of my prescription is not 
a call for dyed-in-the-wool particularism but for trust in the common law method—a method that, 
in its ‘elaboration of a standard,’ allows for a healthy degree of ‘movement from general evaluative 
ideas to more specific but still evaluative ideas.’” (quoting Jeremy Waldron)); see also Ronald J. Allen 
& Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical 
Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1197-1200 (1998) (describing the Fourth Amendment as a 
“grown” system of incremental development); cf. Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1222 (celebrating the 
deliberative “virtues” of evaluative standards). On a common law approach to constitutional 
interpretation, see generally David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015) and David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
308 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1030 (drawing analogies to administrative 
law and defending a “two-ply” conception of reasonableness as comparatively “more law-bound”); 
cf. Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 307, at 1197-1200 (describing certain Fourth Amendment doctrines 
as “grown” orders, produced without central coordination, through “cautious, incremental change, 
with a sensitive awareness of the need for close monitoring and adjustment . . . as the common law 
demonstrates so well”). 
309 Cf. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 514 (“The alternative to the [Atwater] Court’s bright-
line rule is . . . a standard: Officers should behave reasonably, considering all the circumstances . . . . 
Arrests are presumptively reasonable when the crime is serious; not so when the crime isn’t. That 
seems to be, roughly, what Justice O’Connor’s dissent argues for. Why, precisely, would that be 
unadministrable? . . . [T]he Court seems to believe [that] police uniquely need clear rules to do their 
jobs. Perhaps they do . . . . But perhaps they don’t . . . .”). 
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Conceptually, we might describe these rebuttable presumptions as just 
another set of conduct rules. Here, the rules would read—no pretext, no low-
level arrest. But, because a rebuttable presumption is a soft rule that might 
bend to persuasive enough reasons, the state would not be allowed to rest 
exclusively on insincere legalistic justifications and asymmetric equitable 
excuses. Instead, the giving of reasons would contribute to the judge’s 
understanding of the complete story. The animating idea is that narrative 
might come to constitute a loose type of legal standard—that stories might 
“complement” legality’s conventional rule-bound baselines.310 
The knottier question is remedy. One possibility is simply to suppress the 
fruits of inexcusable pretext or arrest. As I suggested already, just because a 
search or seizure is reasonable for one purpose, it does not follow that it 
should be held reasonable for all purposes.311 Consider, for instance, the 
officer who would use a peacekeeping search or seizure to build a criminal 
case. A “special exclusionary rule” would allow the peacekeeper to meet his 
reasonable “special needs” without also unreasonably exploiting the effort.312 
Or consider the vice officer who would stop a speeder on a rough hunch that 
she was transporting drugs. A “special exclusionary rule” would prevent him 
from unreasonably using traffic law as pretext for narcotics crime.313 But, 
significantly, suppression would not overdeter by leading good-but-skittish 
officers to act too passively in the face of potential civil or criminal liability.314 
As Bill Stuntz wrote of the conventional exclusionary rule: “[S]uppressing 
evidence looks like a godsend. Suppression is restitutionary . . . deter[ring] 
without overdeterring.”315 But, admittedly, suppression is imperfect. Most 
notably, it would fail to remedy the worst normative abuses—the inequitable 
misdeeds of bad officers who intend to impose only rough justice without 
 
310 See Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1221 (“[R]ules without clear methods of application may 
require standards as complements . . . .”); see also Kelman, supra note 83, at 212 (examining how a 
standard may overlay and supplement a rule). 
311  Notably, the Court once suggested a more nuanced approach with respect to seizures: “A 
seizure reasonable . . . in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting.” Roaden v. 
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973); see also supra notes 125, 225–42, and accompanying text. 
312 See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, 
and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1557 (2009) (“Some 
commentators . . . have argued for the application of a prophylactic exclusionary rule for evidence 
found during community-caretaking searches, but have balked at discouraging the searches 
themselves.”); supra Section V.C (discussing “special needs” doctrine). 
313 Cf. supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text (discussing Whren and pretextual stops). 
314 Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y, 443, 446 (1997) (“Just as a government faced with large damages liability for running a 
municipal pool . . . may simply close the pool, a government faced with large damages liability for 
the police may simply reduce the police presence in areas likeliest to give rise to lawsuits.”). 
315 Id.; see also id. at 445 (“The social costs of this overdeterrence are surely high: they can be 
measured by murders and rapes and drug deals that would not have happened if their perpetrators had 
been put away.”). 
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building criminal cases.316 This, however, is nothing new. These tradeoffs are 
familiar to prevailing Fourth Amendment doctrines of suppression and 
qualified immunity.317 That is to say, the details of test and remedy may be 
worked out incrementally.318 
*      *      * 
My more ambitious normative claim is to defend the proposition that 
a particularized approach to constitutional reasonableness does not offend 
the rule of law. Rather, by surfacing the kinds of contextual questions that 
are often buried by conduct rules, narrative may promote a “richer 
conception” of legality.319 In this vein, Jeremy Waldron has identified a 
distinct rule-of-law “aspect”—a “procedural aspect” as compared to a 
“substantive aspect.”320 The more conventional substantive aspect 
“emphasizes rules” and determinacy, whereas the procedural emphasizes 
“practices and modes of argumentation.”321 Waldron recognized the systemic 
preference for the substantive aspect.322 But he argued that, without 
procedure as supplement, we produce “an impoverished account of the Rule 
of Law, which treats everything besides the determinacy of the rules as 
though it did not matter.”323 On this reading, narrative is no extravagance to 
be tolerated as long as it does not impede with the real work of the rule of 
law; narrative is part and parcel of the real work.324 This, then, explains where 
 
316 Cf. supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text (discussing Atwater v. Lago Vista, and 
observing that police sometimes consider rough justice an end rather than a means to produce 
criminal prosecutions and convictions); see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 351 (“[O]fficers will 
often care little about evidence to be used in formal adjudications; rather they will search in order 
to seize . . . or to harass or inconvenience suspects, or to ‘send a message’ to gang members on the 
street, or for some other reason having nothing to do with criminal prosecution.”). 
317 See Stuntz, supra note 314, at 445-446 (discussing possibility that civil damages and criminal 
punishment may overdeter appropriate policing). At a higher level of abstraction, all remedies are 
imperfect. Tort damages do not heal physical injuries. Criminal convictions do not resuscitate the slain. 
318 Notably, in other criminal procedure contexts, the Court has subscribed to similarly under-
theorized remedies. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012) (“In implementing a remedy . . . the 
trial court must weigh various factors; and the boundaries of proper discretion need not be defined here.”). 
319 Waldron, supra note 25, at 58. 
320 See id. at 5 (“[O]ur understanding of the Rule of Law should emphasize not only the value 
of settled, determinate rules and the predictability that such rules make possible, but also the 
importance of the procedural and argumentative aspects of legal practice.”). 
321 Id. at 57. 
322 Id. at 54, 57. 
323 Id. at 61. 
324 See id. at 59 (“I do not think that a conception of law or a conception of the Rule of Law 
that sidelines the importance of argumentation can really do justice to the value we place on 
governments to treat ordinary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence.”); see also id. at 
55-56 (describing the adjudicatory practice of “offering both sides an opportunity to be heard” to be 
one of the “elementary features of natural justice”). 
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positive legality has spun off the rails. It has marginalized procedural 
opportunities for storytelling. At best, it has treated these opportunities as 
“optional extras,” not “integral parts.”325 
Of course, concerns remain about predictability and notice. But these are 
relative concerns. And the prevailing paradigm hardly qualifies as a recipe for 
consistency and coherence across cases.326 To the contrary, positive legality 
often promotes sovereign prerogative over effective limits.327 For this reason, 
some scholars have suggested that a degree of equitable oversight might even 
produce more predictable law enforcement, particularly when it comes to the 
kinds of petty public-order cases for which moral and prudential considerations 
predominate over determinations of legal guilt accuracy.328 
And, notably, a richer procedural approach to the rule of law might carry 
with it also a meaningful procedural form of notice.329 Admittedly, the 
individual who is subjected to police coercion cannot recapture her foregone 
opportunity to live a life free from state intrusion. Still, she might value the 
knowledge that she has the capacity to explain her predicament and demand 
an explanation in turn. Along these lines, Tom Tyler has stressed the 
importance of systemic “voice” for perceptions of “procedural justice.”330 For 
 
325 See id. at 60 (arguing that “point of view” and “argumentation” are “not optional extras; 
they are integral parts of how law works and they are indispensable to the package of law’s respect 
for human agency”); see also Waldron, supra note 249, at 212 (arguing that exclusive attention to “the 
clarity and determinancy of rules . . . is to slice in half, to truncate, what law and legality rest upon”). 
326 See BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32; see also Sections II.A-B. On the limits of the 
legality principle, see Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1043 (discussing the manner by which 
precisely drawn conduct rules create safe harbors for the unfettered exercise of official coercion); 
Jonathan Simon, The Second Coming of Dignity (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
327 Supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
328 According to Bill Stuntz: “[G]iving other decisionmakers discretion promotes consistency, 
not arbitrariness. Discretion limits discretion; institutional competition curbs excess and abuse.” 
Stuntz, supra note 25, at 2039; see also Kahan & Nussbaum, infra note 360, at 375-76 (“It’s when the law 
falsely denies its evaluative underpinnings that it is most likely to be incoherent and inconsistent.”); 
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1676 (endorsing transparent exercises of 
equitable discretion and adjudication); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical 
and Critical Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at lviii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip 
P. Frickey eds., 1994) (describing realist view that “[l]aw would actually be more predictable and just if 
judges candidly articulated the theretofore submerged policy assumptions of their decisions”); M. 
Glenn Abernathy, Police Discretion and Equal Protection, 14 S.C. L.Q. 472, 486 (1962) (explaining that 
judicial constraints “would work more effectively if the facts of police discretion were recognized openly 
rather than being hidden beneath the myth of a mandate of full enforcement”); infra notes 360–63 and 
accompanying text (discussing the virtue of transparent moralizing). 
329 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (introducing the concept of procedural notice). 
330 See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts 44 CT. REV. 26, 30 (2007) (“People want to 
have the opportunity to tell their side of the story in their own words before decisions are made about 
how to handle the dispute or problem . . . . This desire for voice is found to be one of the reasons that 
informal legal procedures such as mediation are very popular.”); see also David Luban, Lawyers as 
Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 819 
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our purposes, the idea of “voice” entails an individual’s awareness not only 
that her reasonable concerns are going to be considered, but also that her 
reasonable perspective might be brought to bear to resolve any ambiguities of 
law and fact. And, since the individual understands her own perspective 
better than any other, she is likelier to anticipate how conduct rules may bend 
when they must bend. In this way, procedural notice has the capacity to 
promote substantive notice going forward. More to the point, since studies 
show that ordinary people “‘know’ fairness” better than formal law, the 
individual is likelier to discern the shape of constitutional doctrines that 
accommodate folk notions of equitable treatment.331 As Martha Nussbaum 
remarked: “[T]he equitable person is characterized by a sympathetic 
understanding of ‘human things.’”332 From the individual’s standpoint, 
then, bilateral understanding is more dependable and predictable than 
police-friendly asymmetric understanding. It is even potentially more 
dependable and predictable than precisely drawn conduct rules.333 
In any event, even if there is some truth to the claim that “argument can 
be unsettling,”334 there is surely a difference between “deliberately aiming to 
treat like cases unalike, and . . . treating like cases differently . . . because we 
. . . have differing opinions . . . of what constitutes right treatment.”335 In this 
 
(explaining that when a procedural system “gag[s] a litigant and refuse[s] even to consider her version 
of the case,” it is, “in effect, treating her story as if it did not exist, and treating her point of view as if 
it were literally beneath contempt.”); supra note 289 and accompanying text (discussing “rough justice”). 
331 See Meares et al., supra note 184, at 104, 121-23, 139 (“[T]he actual lawfulness of a police officer’s 
. . . conduct . . . had at best a minor influence upon people’s evaluations of police lawfulness”). 
332 Nussbaum, supra note 140, at 94. 
333 See Nussbaum & Kahan, infra note 360, at 287 (observing that an Aristotelian conception 
of equity requires “asking what a person of practical wisdom would do and feel in the situation,” not 
by analyzing only what law commands). Bill Stuntz seemed to intuit this when he wrote: “[S]harp 
legal lines between ‘searches’ and ‘seizures’ and everything else ought to be replaced with hazier 
boundaries between decent police behavior and the indecent kind.” William J. Stuntz, Local Policing 
After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2141 (2002). 
334 See Waldron, supra note 25, at 8 (“[T]here are aspects of the procedural side of the Rule of 
Law that are in some tension with the ideal of formal predictability.”). 
335 Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1242-43; see also Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 347 (2006) (“Treating like cases alike is a value, but not the only one. Equality 
also requires treating unlike cases unlike . . . . Justice demands a balance of many competing values . . . 
that should keep justice from being inexorable and rigid.”). Perhaps the best statement I have read of late 
on the virtues of thoughtful moral deliberation over artificial consistency comes from Jacques Barzun: 
[J]udgment does not mean outward consistency. The best judgment often looks inconsistent 
. . . . [A] traveler was given hospitality by some remote peasants, who noticed with horror that 
the man blew on his hand to keep them warm and again on his soup to make it cool. Being 
great readers of Euclid and lovers of consistency, the peasants killed their guest, because his 
inconsistency frightened them. The poor victim, as we know, had a perfectly sensible idea. Life 
is not geometry. The living have to blow hot and cold, whether they like it or not. 
Jacques Barzun, The Advantages of Inconsistency, GENTLE REREADER (Feb. 6, 2014), 
https://gentlerereader.com/2014/02/ [https://perma.cc/6UTJ-K56E]. 
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vein, Seana Shiffrin has described the “virtues of fog”—that qualitative 
standards may produce sites of “deliberation and conversation on the ground, 
redounding to the moral health of both citizens and a democratic polity.”336 
Comparatively, “rule by rote” is incompetent to resolve normatively contested 
questions, including the question that concerns us most here—whether police 
were “behaving reasonably.”337 
*      *      * 
If nothing else, a bilateral methodology of meaningful understanding 
might temper a particularly pernicious aspect of prevailing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine—namely, that judges currently must collapse or expand 
temporal horizons of evaluation to accommodate only the officer’s 
perspective. With respect to excessive force claims, the implications are 
profound and disturbing. To see what I mean, we need to interpret what the 
doctrine of excessive force actually is—another prospective piecemeal 
exception from an officer’s conventional conduct rules. To wit, the 
conventional rule dictates that an officer is obligated to take a suspect into 
custody peacefully.338 Nevertheless, he may use physical force, as reasonable 
under the circumstances.339 Doctrinally, then, an excessive force claim is 
evaluated in the same manner as any other piecemeal Fourth Amendment 
exception—“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”340 
Again, the dominant conception of the legality principle accommodates the 
perspective of only the conduct rule’s subject and only to excuse his conduct-
rule violation. Positive legality thereby dictates that the officer’s story is the 
 
336 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1214, 1240 (2010). Id. at 1214 (“[T]he traditional picture ignores the salutary 
impact that superficial opacity may have on citizens’ moral deliberation and on robust democratic 
engagement with the law.”). 
337 See id. at 1217 (explaining that evaluative standards provoke discussion over whether parties 
“are treating one another fairly, whether they are acting in good faith, whether they are taking due 
care, whether they are behaving reasonably, and the like”); see also LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR 
UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION 8 (2001) (arguing that an open-textured constitutional standard that 
“unsettles creates no permanent losers . . . [leaving] citizens with a forum and a vocabulary that they 
can use to continue the argument”). On this score, Bill Stuntz once offered a counterintuitive 
criminal justice reform: make penal statutes more vague to provide juries and judges with statutory 
breathing room to moderate police and prosecutorial discretion and power. Stuntz, supra note 25, at 
1974, 2038-39 (noting that “[t]he criminal law . . . is filled with bright lines” and arguing that 
governments should “define criminal prohibitions more vaguely—so jurors can exercise judgment 
instead of rubber-stamping prosecutors’ charging decisions”). 
338 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
339 See id. (“Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make 
an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical 
coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”). 
340 Id. 
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only story that matters. And it follows that his relevant timeframe is the only 
relevant timeframe. 
By way of example, consider the horrific death of Tamir Rice, a twelve-
year-old boy, shot by police while he played with a toy gun in a public park. 
The officer who killed Rice exited a squad car mere feet from the child and 
pulled the trigger within seconds.341 A seemingly significant question was why 
the officer had decided to approach so closely and in such an exposed manner, 
thereby exacerbating an already apparently dangerous situation. But, 
consistent with dominant conception of legality, the prosecutor narrowed the 
timeframe to exclude that question: “The Supreme Court instructs [me] to 
judge an officer by what he or she knew at the moment.”342 The only moment 
relevant to the officer’s excuse was the moment he came face-to-face with the 
child. And the prosecutor concluded that it was reasonable, from the officer’s 
perspective, to fire the gun at that moment.343 But, because the officer’s 
perspective matters, the prosecutor also expanded the time frame to consider 
what a reasonable officer might have known about years-old shootings of 
officers in the area.344 Notice what the prosecutor selectively left out—not 
only the officer’s dubious decision to invite danger, but also police reports 
that had described the officer’s firearms skills as “dismal” and his 
psychological profile as near “emotional meltdown.”345 These reports were no 
part of the narrative, because they were no part of the officer’s excuse. 
It is not necessarily my position that the officer should have been charged. 
As indicated, I am agnostic as to whether a bilateral methodology ought to 
extend to contexts where officers are sued civilly or charged criminally.346 
Here, I draw upon excessive force doctrine only to illustrate the ways in which 
 
341 See Daniel Marans, How a Prosecutor Managed to Blame a 12-Year-Old for Getting Killed by a Cop, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/tamir-rice-timothymcginty_us_ 
5681d451e4b014efe0d91562 [https://perma.cc/FH75-3RSX] (“We are instructed to ask what a reasonable 
police officer, with the knowledge he had, would do in this particular situation.” (quoting prosecutor)). 
342 Id. (emphasis added). 
343 See id.; cf. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Instead 
of dealing with the [officer’s entire course of action] . . . the majority dwells on the imminence of 
the threat . . . . The majority recharacterizes [the officer’s] decision to shoot . . . as a split-second, 
heat-of-the-moment choice, made when the suspect was ‘moments away.’”). According to Brandon 
Garrett and Seth Stoughton, this insensitivity to the right timeframes has allowed the Court to treat 
as irrelevant “imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless” police conduct that precedes the moment 
of physical force. See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. 
REV. 211, 236, 299 (2017) (discussing San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777-78 (2015)). 
344 See Marans, supra note 341 (noting that the prosecutor referenced shootings of officers that 
occurred in 2006 and 1996); cf. Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 555 U.S. 964, 964 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of cert.) (evaluating officer’s perception of probable cause based on his 
experience doing drug interdiction and thus crediting officer’s “inferences ‘that might well elude an 
untrained person,’” and refusing to treat purported drug sale as a “single, isolated transaction”). 
345 Marans, supra note 341. 
346 Supra notes 312–19 and accompanying text. 
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an asymmetric narrative may affect timeframes and transform hard normative 
claims into oversimplified police excuses.347 My position is only that a 
genuine and complete story entails much more.348 
C. Understanding & Craft 
The question remains as to whether judges are up to the evaluative task 
of comprehending complete stories. Lon Fuller once described a related form 
of reflection, termed “productive thinking,” that demands the rejection of 
“ready-made solutions” and “familiar props” in favor of “free, flexible, and 
effective” evaluation.349 This is, of course, not the judge’s standard stock in 
trade. She tends to gravitate to formal rules by training and by disposition. 
Rules describe her conventional culture and craft.350 Except, not always. In 
other Fourth Amendment contexts, judges have demonstrated that they are 
competent to particularize. To date, they have only made serious efforts to 
understand officers’ objectively good reasons.351 But, by the same approach, 
judges may recognize and reject officers’ objectively bad reasons. They need 
only the Supreme Court to extend jurisprudential invitations to do so. 
I am somewhat more skeptical about whether judicial elites can access and 
understand the perspectives of ordinary individuals. The Court’s record is 
uninspiring. Already, there are two narrow Fourth Amendment doctrines 
where judges do consider lay perspectives. Specifically, the Court has defined 
a search based on whether the state has intruded upon an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.352 And it has defined a seizure based on 
 
347 See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 
591, 594 (1981) (explaining that adjudicators make normative choices “between narrow and broad 
time frames,” and the contestable “interpretive ‘choice’” may prove dispositive). 
348 See Meares, supra note 288, at 165 (“Although the constitutional framework is based on a 
one-off investigative incident, many of those who are stopped—the majority of them young men of 
color—do not experience the stops as one-off incidents . . . . Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
must account for this fact.”). 
349 Lon L. Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. REV. 35, 39 (1950); cf. COATES, supra note 21, 
at 50 (criticizing the hollow exercise of “limiting the number of possible questions” and “privileging 
immediate answers” over “courageous thinking”). 
350 See Dennis Jacobs, The Secret Life of Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2855, 2856-59 (2007) (“In 
our courts, judges are lawyers . . . . The result is the incremental preference for the lawyered solution 
. . . and the confidence and faith that these things produce the best results . . . . [J]udges have a bias 
in favor of legalism and the legal profession . . . . It is a matter of like calling unto like.”); see also 
People v. Warren, 81 N.W. 360, 363 (Mich. 1899) (“[P]rofessional persons are under a constant 
temptation to make the law symmetrical by disregarding small things.”); Hamilton v. People, 29 
Mich. 175, 190 (1874) (observing that legal professionals may reject common sense in favor of “rigid 
forms and arbitrary classes”); State v. Williams, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 257, 269 (1855) (observing that 
the legal professional “generalises, and reduces every thing to an artificial system, formed by study”). 
351 See supra Part IV (discussing Supreme Court doctrine that accommodates professional 
police perceptions but not lay individual perceptions). 
352 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). 
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whether a reasonable individual would have felt free to terminate an 
encounter with police.353 But, as Paul Robinson and I have examined 
elsewhere, the Court has adopted somewhat curious conceptions of this 
mythical reasonable person. The Court’s reasonable private person seems 
exceptionally reclusive, and its reasonable autonomous person seems 
exceptionally courageous.354 
Still, there are reasons to believe that lower court judges might do better 
than Supreme Court Justices. First, because these judges are closer to the 
ground, they are likelier to intuit the perspectives of police officers and the 
policed. Indeed, lower court judges might even have family and friends who 
occupy one or both camps. Recall Justice Sotomayor’s observation: “I would 
hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would 
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t 
lived that life.”355 The comment was clumsy, but it powerfully illustrated how 
cultural proximity generates appreciation. And, true to her words, Sotomayor 
has come closest, in a series of recent dissents, to championing my preferred 
methodology of bilateral understanding.356 
Second, lower court judges are uniquely well suited to develop and grasp 
the “protean variety of the street encounter” precisely because they may 
compel other professionals to help them understand.357 They may ask the 
 
353 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). 
354 See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 224-25 (discussing social science studies that 
demonstrate that Court holdings often do not align with actual societal expectations of privacy). 
Thus, the Court has sometimes extended a reasonable expectation of privacy only to information an 
individual keeps secret from the whole world. See White, 401 U.S. at 752 (“[O]ne contemplating 
illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police.”). Compare 
Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 225 n.60 (citing a study showing lay disapproval with police 
officers rummaging through trash), with California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in bagged trash). Likewise, the Court has sometimes imagined 
a heroic ability of the individual to exercise rights to ignore police. Compare Bowers & Robinson, 
supra note 1, at 226 (“[F]indings suggest that—notwithstanding the Court’s view to the contrary—
reasonable people rarely feel free to refuse police requests.”), and Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue 
Encounters” - Some Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 
VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 272 (1991) (“[F]or most black men, the typical police confrontation is not a 
consensual encounter. Black men simply do not trust police officers to respect their rights.”), with 
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205-06 (2002) (holding that reasonable bus passengers 
should feel free to terminate drug interdiction). 
355 Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html [https://perma.cc/FB5L-WPAU]. 
356 See supra notes 155, 167, 203, 343, infra notes 424–30, and accompanying text (discussing 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissents in Mullenix v. Luna, Utah v. Strieff, and Heien v. North Carolina); cf. 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132-36 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (considering the reasonable 
perspectives of both the officer and the civilian to determine the relevance of an individual’s flight 
from police officers); cf. also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 362-63 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that warrantless misdemeanor arrests require a balancing test). 
357 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). 
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attorneys to develop and deliver narratives, honed to each side’s worldview. 
And they may consult social science, like the important empirical work Dan 
Kahan and others have done on “cultural cognition”—the idea that culturally 
contingent values shape normative beliefs and even perceptions of fact and 
risk.358 Lawyers’ stories and social scientists’ studies could thereby provide 
useful reference points against which judges might evaluate particular 
circumstances and perspectives. 
Third, and most importantly, lower court judges are moral actors, who 
inevitably wrestle with normative questions (at least internally), even if 
prevailing doctrines preclude meaningful constitutional consideration. The 
aim is to replace the conventional kind of “stealthy moralizing” with 
transparent moral reasoning.359 And, notably, this goal has long been a 
principal objective of Aristotelian theories of virtue ethics and 
jurisprudence.360 Proponents of these theories stress “the virtue of justice” 
over “strict legal justice”—articulated “legal vision” over rigidly applied “legal 
rules.”361 They call upon judges to contemplate “what morality asks of all of 
us every day and what most of us do, as a general matter.”362 
The methodology is introspective, particularistic, and practical—at once, 
ordinary and complex. It is an approach that does not lend itself to easy 
answers and, therefore, may sit uncomfortably with the dominant conception 
of legality. But the judge—well accustomed to reflective deliberation—is up 
to the task. Indeed, Lon Fuller even concluded that “the kind of situation most 
 
358 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 120-25 (2007) 
(“The theory of cultural cognition posits that the heuristic processing of risk information interacts 
decisively with individuals’ defining group commitments.”); Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, supra note 
74, at (2009) (discussing the theory of cultural cognition of risk); see also, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et 
al., The Salience of Social Contextual Factors in Appraisals of Police Interactions with Citizens, 30 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 599, 619 (2014) (“[S]ocial contextual factors shape citizen 
evaluations of police wrongdoing even when people see the same event.”). 
359 See Kahan, supra note 172, at 153-54 (“Stealthy moralizing is in fact endemic to criminal law 
. . . . The moralizing that occurs with . . . criminal law doctrines . . . [is] on balance a good thing, 
and . . . ought at least to be made openly.”); cf. PACKER, supra note 6, at 89 (noting that “the police 
and the official prosecutors operate in a setting of secrecy and informality”). 
360 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 374 (1996) (“[I]t is when the law refuses to take responsibility for its most 
contentious choices that its decisionmakers are spared the need to be principled, and the public the 
opportunity to see correctable injustice.”); supra notes 139–42, 298, infra notes 410–15, and accompanying 
text (discussing particularism, virtue ethics, virtue jurisprudence, and the virtue of transparency). 
361 Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centric Theory of Judging, 34 
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 197 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Nussbaum, supra note 140, at 93 (“Aristotle[] 
. . . define[s] equity as a kind of justice, but a kind that is superior to . . . strict legal justice.”); supra notes 
139–41, 306, and accompanying text; Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1672. 
362 Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1244; see also Waldron, supra note 140, at 284 (describing a 
jurisprudential approach that accommodates “a shared sense among us of how one person responds 
as a human to another human”). 
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likely to elicit ‘productive thinking’ . . . [is] the process of adjudication.”363 My 
faith, then, is a faith in the judge as a moral, rational, empathetic, and 
sympathetic agent, capable of exercising experiential wisdom and common 
sense—and capable, also, of articulating that wisdom and common sense, once 
it is exercised.364 My faith may be misplaced. There are judges who are narrow-
minded and insistent on applying rules for rules’ own sake.365 There are even 
judges who are bullies and brutes, just as there are officers who are bullies and 
brutes, just as there are defendants who are bullies and brutes, just as there are 
people who are bullies and brutes.366 But a layer of judicial oversight 
minimizes the chances that the bullying officer will get the best of the 
vulnerable individual.367 
And there are two final reasons for hope. First, there may be extreme 
circumstances in which a normatively arbitrary search may be apparent from 
any perspective. Return, again, to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.368 There, even the 
Supreme Court came to know and identify the bully—just as it has come to 
know and identify the decent enough officer with the good enough excuse.369 
The distinction is that the Court lacked the constitutional will to turn its moral 
(but rhetorical) condemnation into meaningful constitutional oversight.370 But 
a normative conception of reasonableness would provide a jurisprudential 
opportunity for a more willing judge to take action. Second, even if a judge 
were to underutilize her equitable oversight, the cop on the beat typically 
cannot know this ex ante. He cannot know which judge a criminal case might 
draw or how that judge might respond to a persuasive normative claim. The 
 
363 Fuller, supra note 349, at 39. 
364 Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1231 (“The sort of deliberation that is encouraged [by an 
evaluative standard] is moral in nature . . . .”). 
365 Jerome Frank once suggested that a rule-bound approach to adjudication may represent a 
kind of infantilism—a childlike fear of confronting the real. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND 166 (1930) (“The constant effort . . . is regressive, infantile, and immature.”). Judge 
Posner, while discussing Frank, wrote that “[t]he child becomes fearful and later in life intolerant of 
challenges to accepted modes of thought or structures of authority.” See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW 
JUDGES THINK 99-100 (2008) (“Frank . . . believ[ed] that rigid, dichotomous, ‘inside the box’ 
thinking . . . was rooted in infantile troubles . . . an unwillingness to interpret law flexibly so that it 
would keep pace with changing social conditions and understandings.”). 
366 For one perspective on a judge as bully, see Albert W. Alschuler, How Frank Easterbrook Kept 
George Ryan in Prison, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 7, 7-8 (2015) (describing Judge Easterbrook’s involvement in 
the conviction of former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan). 
367 See Stuntz, supra note 25, at 2039 (“[G]iving other decisionmakers discretion promotes 
consistency, not arbitrariness. Discretion limits discretion; institutional competition curbs excess and 
abuse.” (emphasis added)). 
368 532 U.S. 318 (2001); supra notes 99–110 and accompanying text. 
369 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346-47 (condemning the officer for behaving badly and subjecting 
the arrestee to “gratuitous humiliations”). 
370 Id. at 347 (expressing preference for “readily administrable rules” as opposed to contextual 
evaluation). 
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mere possibility of oversight, therefore, might lead the officer to self-screen at 
the scene—to think twice before intruding in a manner that would be irrational 
or overly aggressive.371 This, according to Seana Shiffrin, is yet another hidden 
virtue of a comparatively evaluative and opaque standard: In the moment, 
“those subject to the standard must consider what is or is not fair or reasonable 
or unconscionable—not merely what is or is not in their interest.”372 
In any event, it may not matter whether the judge is destined to fail. First, 
even when she falls short, her very efforts to understand carry expressive 
value.373 As the literature on “procedural justice” teaches, perceptions of 
fairness are shaped by opportunities for argument as opposed to favorable 
substantive outcomes.374 Second, and more importantly, a judge must strive 
to understand (independent of the promise of results) for the fundamental 
reason that, by her position, she is obliged to try. The nature of my claim here is 
institutional as much as it is normative. The judge may be considered a 
warden of the legality principle. Legality is one of her basic responsibilities. 
It puts her on the rule-of-law’s front line, just as politics puts the legislator 
on representative democracy’s front line. 
Indeed, it is precisely because the stakes of law enforcement are so high that 
the legality principle is seen as playing such an indispensable role in criminal 
justice.375 The rule of lenity, the presumption of innocence, the Double 
Jeopardy clause—these and many other procedural protections—are all liberal 
devices designed to correct (and even overcorrect) for potentially arbitrary 
errors that could harm the individual.376 And the costs of error extend likewise 
to moral arbitrariness.377 Particularly in the context of order–maintenance 
 
371 See Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1227 (explaining that “[e]valuative standards . . . empower 
citizens” by demanding “that others alter their conduct or take seriously considerations that might 
have been neglected or otherwise received relatively short shrift.”); see also COATES, supra note 21, 
at 29 (describing the virtue of “ruthlessly interrogat[ing]” one’s own motives and actions). 
372 Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1231. 
373 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1024 (discussing the expressive value of a 
jurisprudence of qualitative reasonableness). See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 339 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
374 See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 219-20 (citing studies about perceptions of 
“procedural justice” and fairness); see also supra notes 288, 320, and accompanying text (discussing 
“procedural justice” and the “procedural aspect” of the rule of law). 
375 See Waldron, supra note 249, at 217 (observing that the rule of law is especially important to 
criminal justice because “its currency is ultimately life and death, prosperity and ruin, freedom and 
imprisonment”) (contrasting LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 108 (rev. ed. 1969)); supra notes 
48–50 and accompanying text (discussing the special role legality plays with respect to criminal justice). 
376 See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of 
Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1018 (1980) (discussing the liberal principle that “it is 
ultimately better to err in favor of nullification than against it”). 
377 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1672; supra notes 140–42, 308, 
332–70, and accompanying text. 
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enforcement, the normatively inequitable exercise of coercion may hurt every 
bit as much as the legally inaccurate.378 With that in mind, the criminal justice 
system’s prevailing asymmetries of understanding seem almost anachronistic—
a product of sovereign eras before legality’s purported triumph.379 The modern 
message is that when two sets of rules or exceptions stand in tension, the 
autonomy interests of the individual ought to outweigh the instrumental needs 
of the state. Look no further than Blackstone’s maxim.380 
But, notably, I do not go even that far. I do not definitively prize the 
individual’s interests above those of the state. I seek only case-specific balance; 
that is, bilateral understanding. The liberal state owes genuine reasons to the 
autonomous individual, and the judge is duty-bound to provide them: 
[I]ndividualized inquiry into the reason for each intrusion . . . [is a] guarantee 
against arbitrary harassment . . . . [T]o eliminate any requirement that an officer 
be able to explain the reasons for his actions signals an abandonment of effective 
judicial supervision . . . and leaves police discretion utterly without limits.381 
Ordinary political checks are just too contingent.382 Even if a particular 
community–policing measure might carry great practical promise in a 
particular political climate, the “flourishing” judge must be willing to provide 
appropriate oversight within her own particular domain—the domain of 
legality.383 In the face of all forms of arbitrary state treatment, legality is the 
judge’s liberal call to action. She cannot abdicate her duties—whatever her 
 
378 See supra Section V.A, notes 321, 410, 124, 218, infra notes 402–06, and accompanying text 
(discussing the concept of normative innocence, the phenomenon and instances of rough justice, 
and the notion of process as punishment). 
379 See supra notes 42, 66–68, 127, 233–36, and accompanying text (discussing common law crimes). 
380 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (“[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape 
than that one innocent suffer.”); Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1041 & n.273 (“[A]s Blackstone’s 
maxim prescribes, the state ought to take extra precautions to avoid unwarranted punishment.”); see also 
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES 
WE LIVE BY 445-46 (2012) (“Cruel and unusual punishments are expressly prohibited by the Constitution; 
merciful and unusual punishments are not.”); Matt Matravers, Unreliability, Innocence, and Preventative 
Detention, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 81, 82 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly 
K. Ferzan eds., 2009) (“[A] situation in which someone is overburdened is worse from the point of view 
of justice than one in which someone carries a burden that is too light. It is worse, still, for someone for 
whom no burden is appropriate and yet a burden is applied.”). 
381 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
382 Cf. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, 
Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089 
(1993) (arguing that, in crafting the rules of criminal procedure, the legislature’s “members will be 
motivated by what consumers of this legislation are willing to pay for it, in such political currency 
as votes, volunteer time, and campaign contributions”). 
383 See Solum, supra note 361, at 83 (describing “flourishing” as one of the aims of “virtue 
jurisprudence”). 
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prospects for success. “The art of life is to do this with a mind, guided by a 
lively conscience. With those guides one should not ask for guarantees.”384 
*      *      * 
Much has been made of the deference owed to officers on the beat. I do not 
mean to discount it entirely, but the argument is overplayed.385 First, there is 
the claim of danger. Admittedly, police officers do dangerous jobs. The killing 
of officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge provide vivid and tragic examples.386 But 
it is also dangerous to live as a presumed suspect, as recent killings of civilians 
have likewise shown.387 In any event, policing is not an exceptionally dangerous 
job, at least as compared to other industries that are regulated without similar 
calls for deference. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, policing is only 
the fifteenth most dangerous profession.388 Workers in the logging and fishing 
industries fare far worse, dying at rates many times higher than officers.389 
Even as to homicide, taxi drivers are twice as likely to be victims than police 
officers.390 Danger matters, but there is more to the story. 
Second, there is the claim of police expertise. And, admittedly, police 
officers are experts at their craft. They are trained professionals, and they 
develop experiential wisdom. But there are good reasons to believe that 
partial state actors, like police officers and prosecutors, are particularly bad at 
 
384 Barzun, supra note 335. 
385 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1028-29 (describing deference claims as 
“undefended, underanalyzed, undertheorized, and probably the product of unplanned evolution”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A 
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-89, 191 (1976) (discussing related questions of deference to prosecutors 
and concluding that “no one has done any systematic thinking to produce the assumptions”). 
386 See Julie Bloom et al., Baton Rouge Shooting Jolts a Nation on Edge, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/us/baton-rouge-shooting.html [https://5A3J-KBQG] 
(reporting on Baton Rouge shooting); Patrick McGee et al., Snipers Kill 5 Dallas Officers at Protest 
Against Police Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/dallas-
police-officers-killed.html [https://perma.cc/9226-JMJV] (describing the shooting in Dallas). 
387 See, e.g., Matt Furber & Richard Pérez-Peña, After Philando Castile’s Killing, Obama Calls Police 
Shootings ‘an American Issue’, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/ 
us/philando-castile-falcon-heights-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/45UE-QNEQ] (discussing 
outrage in the aftermath of the shooting of Philando Castile); Wesley Lowery et al., Outrage After Video 
Captures White Baton Rouge Police Officer Fatally Shooting a Black Man, WASH. POST (July 6, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/06/video-captures-white-baton- 
rouge-police-officer-fatally-shooting-black-man-sparking-outrage/ [https://perma.cc/BWY8-LBBD] 
(reporting on shooting of a black man by police). 
388 See Max Ehrenfreund, Charted: The 20 Deadliest Jobs in America, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/28/charted-the-20-deadliest-jobs-in-america/ 
?utm_term=.e3c02cf7bdbe [https://perma.cc/65MU-DEFU] (displaying data for deaths per 100,000 full 
time works in specific industries for the year 2013). 
389 Id. 
390 Id. 
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seeing past their own professional perspectives—their own cognitive and 
institutional biases.391 Simply put, an officer’s vested interests may outweigh 
even his well-developed “situation sense.”392 
This is not to say that constitutional law is the best means to cultivate 
positive relationships between police and civilians. The most effective reforms 
might be political. Police chiefs, policymakers, and civic leaders might better 
alter institutional culture to broaden respect for the individual and for her 
moral claim to a maximally autonomous life.393 But, as numerous scholars have 
 
391 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1029 (noting that, because of underlying institutional 
incentives, “police and prosecutors may be considerably worse than laypeople at moral reasoning and 
decisionmaking.”); cf. Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1688-90 (examining a prosecutor’s 
cognitive and institutional biases). The institutional biases are somewhat obvious. An officer has prudential 
reasons to play on people’s fears, as we have already discovered—to shake the tree and see what falls. See supra 
note 196, 252 and accompanying text. After a civilian is stopped (lawfully or not), an officer may check for 
warrants. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (“The outstanding arrest warrant for Strieff’s arrest is 
a critical intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of the illegal stop.”). He may search incident to 
arrest, and catalogue pedigree information incident to booking. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 
(1973) (“It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment . . . . [A] search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of 
the lawful arrest . . . . [A] search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee.”).  
In some circumstances, the police officer may even conduct body cavity searches and harvest DNA 
samples. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1521-23 (2012) (holding body-cavity searches 
of even misdemeanor detainees constitutional); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (holding 
constitutional a statute that provides for taking DNA samples as part of routine booking); see also id. at 1989 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Make no mistake about it: As an entirely predictable consequence of today’s decision, 
your DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, 
and for whatever reason.”). Remarkably, the officer may even benefit financially. In some jurisdictions, officer 
compensation is pegged to arrest numbers. See, e.g., Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1452-53 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(noting that a Mississippi fee statute was not unconstitutional “simply on account of the officer’s motives in 
making the arrest”); see also HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH P. SMALL, MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: 
RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY: 1997–2017 20 (New York Civil Liberties Union ed., 
2008) (describing so-called “collars-for-dollars” phenomenon whereby officers make order–maintenance arrests 
to generate overtime pay); cf. Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12 & 19, 2013, at 18 (discussing police 
incentives to enforce criminal laws to trigger civil forfeitures, generating profits for departments). As an early 
proponent of order–maintenance policing, James Q. Wilson observed: “A legalistic department will . . . make a 
large number of misdemeanor arrests.” JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 172 (1968); see 
also Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1698 (“[T]he resultant pool of petty crime arrestees 
is somewhat larger than the pool of normatively guilty offenders”). 
392 Solum, supra note 360, at 192 (quoting Karl Llewellyn). This seemed to be the case with 
Officer Encinia, who could not appreciate what he had done to so upset Sandra Bland: “Over a 
simple traffic stop. Yeah, I don’t get it. I really don’t. Why act like that? I don’t know.” Bland 
Transcript, supra note 254. Of course, Officer Encinia might be the atypically bad cop. But his words 
reveal that if the judge does not strive to understand the individual’s story, it may never be 
understood meaningfully. 
393 See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 216-19 (discussing community justice). In the same 
vein, social justice movements may push departments to back progressive talk with effective action. 
And cameras have kept evidence of some of the worst encounters from falling through the cracks. 
Thereafter, the bad apple may face discipline. As indicated, Brian Encinia was terminated and is 
facing perjury charges. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
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recognized, judges also may play parts to achieve the laudable objectives of 
community justice.394 More to the point, they are compelled to try.395 
D. Understanding Understood? 
One final (and potentially fundamental) objection. Perhaps there is no 
asymmetry in the first instance. Courts already recognize a set of 
particularistic trial defenses that potentially could build meaningful 
understanding into backend questions of criminal conviction. Indeed, there 
is a fairly obvious overlap between the criminal defendant’s affirmative 
defenses and the officer’s justifications and excuses. To see what I mean, 
consider the character of an officer’s intrusions. It is no accident that, 
traditionally, the definition of a Fourth Amendment search correlated with 
trespass law, because the conduct of the law enforcer often parallels the 
conduct of the criminal.396 The officer forces entry into homes. He detains 
people. He carries away property. He perpetrates violence. And he even 
sometimes kills. These are the actions of the trespasser, the robber, the 
kidnapper, and the murderer. But, just as affirmative defenses provide 
individuals with justifications and excuses against criminal charges,397 the 
Fourth Amendment provides police officers with justifications and excuses 
against constitutional claims. Justifications and excuses separate the police 
officer from the offender in the same fashion that they separate the 
individual from the offender.398 
 
394 Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, for instance, have advocated greater constitutional 
deference to legislation and law enforcement that are products of collaboration between civilians 
and legal officials. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Forward: The Coming Crisis of Criminal 
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1173 (1998); see also Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 25, at 2031-39 
(offering constitutional reforms designed to localize law enforcement). 
395 Supra notes 376, 385 and accompanying text. Elsewhere, I have suggested an alternative or 
complementary reform—a “Fourth Amendment jury”—that might evaluate questions of qualitative 
reasonableness. Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 112 NW. U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017). Of 
course, laypeople might have more difficulty understanding the police perspective. I could envision, 
therefore, some amount of collaboration between judge and jury. In any event, such an ambitious 
proposal, which sounds in “popular constitutionalism,” is beyond the scope of this project. See 
generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); Bibas, supra note 116, at 914 (examining the respective competencies of 
lay “outsiders” and professional criminal-justice “insiders”). 
396 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (“By the laws of England, every invasion 
of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.” (quoting Lord Camden)). 
397 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 954 (1985) 
(distinguishing between justifications and excuses). 
398 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627 (“No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license 
. . . . If he admits the fact, he is bound to show, by way of justification, that some positive law has 
justified or excused him . . . . [I]t is now incumbent upon the [state actors] to show the law by which 
this seizure is warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass.” (quoting Lord Camden)). 
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It is for this reason that I have used the term “excuse” quite purposefully 
throughout this Article to describe an officer’s piecemeal exceptions from his 
baseline conduct rules.399 Moreover, I am not the first academic to compare 
the manner by which “reasonableness” has been used in the contexts of 
affirmative defenses and criminal procedure.400 And we might extend the 
analogy still further. As applied to Fourth Amendment conduct rules, we 
could say that a police officer is justified for his otherwise illegal 
intrusion when he has satisfied his baseline conduct rules. Indeed, Mitch 
Berman has described justifications in just this way: “[O]ne might suppose 
that justifications simply are those defenses that fall within the system’s 
conduct rules, while excuses are the defenses residing in the [exceptions]. I 
think this is precisely right.”401 
For the most part, this overlap with affirmative defenses provides only 
taxonomical clarity. But it also invites the question of whether the criminal 
justice system really has been so unwilling to understand the layperson’s 
perspective. Perhaps affirmative defenses take up the slack?402 The problem, 
however, is that these trial defenses are largely nonresponsive to the rough 
punishment of an inequitable order–maintenance intrusion.403 Simply put, 
the question of whether an officer inequitably overreached or overbore is 
often irrelevant to the individual’s criminal culpability (or lack thereof).404 
Indeed, this is a principal descriptive point of my project: the problems of 
order–maintenance policing tend to be unrelated to technical legal guilt.405 
 
399 See, e.g., supra notes 140, 144 and accompanying text. 
400 Most notably, scholars have drawn analogies between “reasonableness” in the contexts of 
civilian self-defense and police use of force. See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1147-48 (2008) (proposing excessive force test modeled on self-defense 
doctrine); see also Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 341, at 231 (explaining that both doctrines turn 
on questions of imminence, necessity, and justification); cf. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: 
Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1338 (1997) (explaining that the 
partial defense of provocation is available to the killer when he successfully “appeals to the very 
emotions to which the state appeals to rationalize its own use of violence.”). 
401 Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (2003). 
402 See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 35-36 (2003) (observing that “flexible doctrines 
of liability, permitting defendants to plead excuse or justification . . . [or] extenuating 
circumstances” provide space for “a form of authority to exercise mercy”); Paul H. Robinson, Why 
Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1842 (2000) (“Social science research makes clear that . . . excuse defenses are 
part of laypersons’ intuitions of justice.”); Huigens, supra note 143, at 1439 (describing the manner 
by which excuses invite “the actual, individualized adjudication of a person by a jury . . . . [of] twelve 
people judging another person”). 
403 This is a topic I take up elsewhere in more detail. BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32. 
404 The entrapment defense may be the exception. But, critically, courts almost never 
recognize entrapment claims based upon “outrageous” government conduct. Dripps, supra note 37; 
McAdams, supra note 119. 
405 Supra notes 30, 35, 111–15, 124, and accompanying text. 
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In any event, prevailing affirmative defenses are not nearly as flexible and 
forgiving as an officer’s prospective excuses. There is no equivalency of 
understanding as between the two domains. Whereas a piecemeal Fourth 
Amendment exception may accommodate all manner of extraordinary 
policing conditions, affirmative defenses are reserved for a narrow set of fairly 
well defined and highly unusual circumstances. Thus, courts have recognized 
no general affirmative trial defense of situational excuse.406 And even as to 
the conditions that might trigger an established affirmative defense, trial 
courts typically consider the question by reference to the fictive every person 
only—a point of comparison that, according to Judge Bazelon, stands in the 
way of “a deeper understanding” of the defendant’s distinct community, 
culture, and experiences.407 Comparatively, the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
methodology of understanding slices the evaluation of reasonableness more 
finely. The inquiry is attuned to the particular reasonable officer—his 
professional training, his experiences, his perceptions of his own 
environment.408 If anything, the more apt comparison to the officer’s 
piecemeal Fourth Amendment exception is the practice of jury nullification, 
which is prohibited by the dominant conception of the rule of law.409 
Of course, it is not encouraging that trial courts have failed to slice 
affirmative defenses thinly enough. Perhaps, then, my faith in judges is 
misplaced after all. Or perhaps there is another reading. The adage that “practice 
makes perfect” is surely an overstatement, but it may be fair to say that practice 
 
406 See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he criminal law treats the vast majority of 
accused persons as fit candidates for punishment, notwithstanding their internal failings or 
situational difficulties.”); Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law 
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 9 (1985) (“No jurisdiction 
in the United States or elsewhere recognizes a criminal defense based on socioeconomic deprivation 
simpliciter.”); Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1261 (1976) (“There are various factors which have a strong positive correlation 
with violent crime, such as youth and poverty. But social science is not yet ready to make firm causal 
statements.”); see also United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 960-65 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing 
the defendant’s defense that his crimes were the result of his “rotten social background”); cf. Andrew 
D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 314 (1996) (proposing an affirmative 
defense of general situational excuse). 
407 See David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 396 (1976) 
(explaining that cultural defenses are necessary to cultivate “a deeper understanding of the causes of 
human behavior in general and criminal behavior in particular”  (emphasis added)); see also Bedder v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1119 (H.L.) (“The reasonable person, the ordinary 
person, is the person you must consider.”); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some 
Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 996 (2002) (“[T]he dominant culture is not 
required to accept the values of another community”). But see, e.g., State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 83 (Me. 
1996) (holding that the lower court erred by not considering the defendant’s cultural background). 
408 Supra Part IV. 
409 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 87-88 (1895) (“[W]hile to facts answer juries, to the 
law answers the court” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Leipold, supra note 406, at 253-55 
(exploring the practice of jury nullification). 
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makes better. And, to date, the judge is not well enough practiced in the craft of 
meaningful understanding—a craft that is closer to sociology or literature than 
conventional legal training.410 There is no obvious impediment, however, to the 
judge developing her capacities, as Sherman Clarke once suggested: 
Athletes lift weights, run long distances, and the like. They task themselves 
in ways they hope will build the capacities they need. Life too calls for 
capacities . . . . What strengths and capacities might we develop through 
bearing this weight? . . . [The] ability to see things from the perspective of 
others—to not only understand what it is like to be in their shoes, but also to 
see what the world looks like though their eyes.411 
Max Weber suggested that meaningful understanding is integral to 
productive social interaction. But real-world experience has taught that the 
gulf may be just too great between the perspectives of police and the 
populace. On this reading, urban policing is plagued by misunderstanding. 
But, with time and effort, a judge may learn to become an arbiter of 
understanding,412 who negotiates sensitively “the two separate worlds” 
occupied by the officer and the individual.413 And the common law method is 
available to provide (light) guidance.414 
Indeed, there is even the possibility that a Fourth Amendment 
methodology of bilateral understanding might push judges to likewise 
appreciate capaciously and comprehensively criminal trial defenses of general 
situational excuse. But that is a topic for another time.415 
 
410 See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE, 95-96 (comparing the novelist to the 
particularist, who demands “understanding the whole story”); Tucker, supra note 134, at 163 (describing 
the sociological methodology of verstehen as an effort to “know enough about the situations from which 
individuals come, and couple this with knowledge of a particular situation in which they are involved 
at the time of observation”); supra notes 20, 134, 139–41, 306–08, and accompanying text. 
411 Sherman J. Clarke, The Juror, the Citizen, and the Human Being: The Presumption of Innocence and 
the Burden of Judgment, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 421, 422 (2013); see also Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1224 
(“Maintenance of moral agency, like muscle tissue, requires exercise through practices of attention and 
thoughtful consideration . . . . not merely the will and practice of staying within pre-drawn lines.”). 
412 Thanks to Jim Whitman for helping me think through this point. 
413 Meares et al., supra note 184, at 105. As studies of diversity in the corporate context show, 
the more viewpoints that are heard, the more reliable and sensible the decision making. See generally 
SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER 
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007). Of course, when it comes to a Fourth 
Amendment question there is only one ultimate decisionmaker, but the judge may benefit from 
hearing many voices and perspectives. This is the virtue of some of our most cherished constitutional 
principles, from federalism, to jury trials, to democratic experimentalism more generally. See 
generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 
(2005); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005). 
414 See supra notes 307–09 and accompanying text. 
415  BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32. 
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CONCLUSION 
Woody Guthrie was on to something when he inscribed these words on 
his guitar: “This Machine Kills Fascists.” He used his instrument to craft fully 
formed narratives of oppression.416 Fortunately, very few police officers 
behave consistently like oppressors. No doubt, there are some bullies in 
uniform—but, hopefully, not too many.417 The threat more often is just the 
propensity of the law enforcer to exercise dominion reflexively over the usual 
suspect—to fail to perceive the genuine individual with a genuine life 
interrupted.418 In a related vein, Ta-Nehisi Coates wrote: 
Slavery is not an indefinable mass of flesh. It is a particular, specific enslaved 
woman, whose mind is active as your own, whose range of feeling is as vast as 
your own; who prefers the way the light falls in one particular spot in the woods, 
who enjoys fishing where the water eddies in a nearby stream, who loves her 
mother in her own complicated way.419 
I do not mean to draw too tight comparisons between the evils of slavery or 
fascism and the more complicated normative questions that surround urban 
policing. Still, there are dangers common to all institutions of power that come 
to treat people as numbers or commodities—as bodies without internal lives and 
stories to tell. At a minimum, there is disengagement and disempowerment—
in our terms, the perceived and real inability to “predict and plan” a life.420 This 
sense of futility is obvious not only in Coates’s prose, but also in the words of 
Eric Garner, who was stopped for unlicensed vending and then died in a 
chokehold after he refused to comply with police orders: “Every time you see 
me, you want to mess with me. I’m tired of it. This ends today! . . . Please leave 
me alone . . . . Every time I turn around, you grab me . . . . I can’t breathe.”421 
 
416 See, e.g., WOODY GUTHRIE, All You Fascists Bound to Lose, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VwcKwGS7OSQ [https://perma.cc/HN28-P4NM]; cf. supra note 
310 and accompanying text (describing “complete” stories as expressed by rules tempered by standards). 
417 But cf. supra notes 101–02, 211, 257, 268, 367–79, and accompanying text (providing examples 
of disrespectful or otherwise controversial police behavior). 
418 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. 
REV. 885, 907 (1981) (observing that liberalism “has at its core the notion that individuals are the basic 
unit of moral and political value.”); Kelman, supra note 347, at 210 (“Each defendant is a unique 
individual, with a unique set of perceptions and capabilities. Every crime is committed in a unique 
setting.”); cf. Tucker, supra note 134, at 159 (“The individual is . . . the upper limit and the sole carrier 
of meaningful conduct.” (quoting Max Weber)); cf. also Josh Bowers, Response: The Unusual Man in the 
Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 260, 262 (2009) (discussing “usual suspects” policing). 
419 COATES, supra note 21, at 69. 
420 HART, supra note 46, at 180; see also supra notes 2, 47, 213, 325, and accompanying text. 
421 Eric Garner Video —Unedited version, YOUTUBE (July 12, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=JpGxagKOkv8 [https://perma.cc/84AA-6PKB] (emphasis added); see also COATES, supra note 
21, at 82 (describing “a people who control nothing, who can protect nothing”); supra notes 289, 329 
373–75, and accompanying text (discussing “procedural justice” studies). 
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One could tell a story of race. Coates did just that.422 But the story is more 
complicated.423 There are problems of policing that transcend race. 424 Still, 
the discriminatory effects cannot be ignored or lightly dismissed, particularly 
within heavily policed majority–minority neighborhoods. On this score, 
Justice Sotomayor wrote recently of “the canaries in the coal mine whose 
deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere,” 
inclusive of all, “white and black, guilty and innocent.”425 Sotomayor 
understands that these “voices matter too.”426 They carry messages that 
resonate from “the bottom of the well.”427 We cannot ignore them, 
jurisprudentially, without conveying our own destructive message—a 
message antithetical to liberal criminal justice.428 In Sotomayor’s words, the 
message is just this: “[T]hat your body is subject to invasion while courts 
excuse the violation of your rights . . . . that you are not a citizen of a 
democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be catalogued.”429 
 
422 See generally COATES, supra note 21; see also KRS-ONE, Sound of Da Police, on RETURN 
OF THE BOOM BAP (Showbiz Records 1993) (“[T]he overseer had the right to kill/The officer 
has the right to arrest/And if you fight back they put a hole in your chest . . . . /After 400 years, 
I’ve got no choices.”). 
423 See generally Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
424 See id. at 2070 (“The white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated 
in this manner. But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this kind of 
scrutiny.”). Likewise, race and racism were not factors in Ryburn v. Huff or Atwater v. Lago Vista. See 
supra notes 99–112, 142–44, and accompanying text. James Forman has recently discovered decades-
long patterns of problematic policing even within minority-led departments. See generally JAMES 
FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017). 
425 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070-71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
426 Id. 
427 See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE 
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992). 
428 Cf. Ekow N. Yankah, The Truth About Trayvon, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, at A23, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/opinion/the-truth-about-trayvon.html [https://perma.cc/8TQC-HURS] 
(advocating “an honest [constitutional] jurisprudence that is brave enough to tackle the way race 
infuses our criminal law . . . a jurisprudence that at least begins to [consider] racial disparities”). 
429 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2071 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Until their voices matter too, our 
justice system will continue to be anything but.”). Or consider the perspective of an outsider, lay 
theologian G.K. Chesterton: 
And the horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all judges, 
magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of 
them are good), not that they are stupid (several of them are quite intelligent), it is 
simply that they have got used to it. Strictly they do not see the prisoner in the dock; 
all they see is the usual man in the usual place. They do not see the awful court of 
judgment; they only see their own workshop. 
G.K. Chesterton, The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 80, 85–86 (1910); see also Michael 
O’Hear, Restorative Justice: Dangers of the Big Tent, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 602, 602 (Paul 
H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2009) (discussing the virtues of a restorative 
justice system that “insist[s] that victims and offenders are real human beings, not just wooden 
marionettes to be brought upon the criminal justice stage as it serves the convenience of the lawyers”). 
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The promise of the legality principle is to keep the overreaching state at 
bay—to challenge as arbitrary an official’s legally and normatively illiberal 
motivations and actions. To that end, conduct rules lay the foundation. But 
rules are competent to do only so much. After the rules, there is 
understanding.430 And meaningful understanding is not asymmetric. Nor 
may we leave it to sovereign prerogative.431 We are owed understanding. It is 
our rightful claim. It is the job of all branches of government to deliver it.432 
And legality is the mechanism by which the judiciary does its fair share of the 
work. That principle—appropriately appreciated and expressed—is our 
jurisprudential call on the state’s debt. 
 
 
430 See Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1226 (“[W]here precedent runs out, the parties will have to 
try to articulate for themselves what sorts of conduct are beyond the pale and whether the conduct 
they contemplate falls within or outside that line”). 
431 Cf. PACKER, supra note 6, at 93 (“A good definition of a police state would be a system in 
which the law enforcers were allowed to be the judges in their own cases.”); supra notes 4–5, 25, 40–
41, 45–52, 127, 250, 295, 385 and accompanying text (describing sovereign prerogative as lawless, and 
discussing inadequacy of ordinary political checks). 
432 Cf. Stoughton, supra note 256 (“We all deserve more than legal policing. We deserve 
good policing.”). 
